

USAID/JAMAICA R4
FY 1999-2000
RESULTS REVIEW AND
RESOURCE REQUEST

May 13, 1998

Table of Contents

List of Acronyms

Introduction and Overview.....	1
A. Performance Assessment.....	1
B. Country Need.....	2
C. Quality of Partnership.....	2
D. Contribution to US National Interests	3
E. Common Objectives Table	5
I. Factors Affecting USAID/Jamaica’s Program Performance	6
A. Macroeconomic factors.....	6
1. Overview.....	6
2. Financial System Crisis.....	6
3. Implications for Economic Growth	7
B. Other Cross-cutting factors.....	8
C. Critical Assumptions for SO Performance.....	9
1. SO1	9
2. SO2	10
3. SO3	10
II. Progress Toward Strategic Objectives in 1997	13
A. SO1: Increased participation for Economic Growth	13
1. Performance Analysis.....	13
a. Toward achieving SO1	13
b. Intermediate results.....	13
2. Expected Progress through FY 2000 and Management Actions.....	16
SO1 Results Framework.....	18
SO1 Performance Data Tables.....	19

B.	SO2: Increased Protection of Key Natural Resources.....	26
1.	Performance Analysis.....	26
a.	Toward achieving SO2	26
b.	Intermediate results	26
2.	Expected Progress through FY 2000 and Management Actions.....	31
	SO2 Results Framework.....	32
	SO2 Performance Data Tables	33
C.	SO3: Young Jamaicans Better Equipped for the 21st Century	43
1.	Performance Analysis	43
a.	Toward achieving SO3.....	43
b.	Intermediate results	45
2.	Expected Progress through FY 2000 and Management Actions	47
	SO3 Results Framework	48
	SO3 Performance Data Tables	49
D.	Caribbean Regional Program	59
1.	Performance Analysis.....	60
a.	Towards achieving the objective.....	60
b.	Intermediate results.....	60
2.	Expected Progress through FY 2000 and Management Actions.....	64
	CRP Results Framework.....	65
	CRP Performance Data tables.....	66
III.	Status of the Management Contract.....	73

IV. Resource Request.....	76
A. Financial Plan.....	76
Tables - USAID FY 1998 Budget Request by Program	78
B. Prioritization of Bilateral Strategic Objectives	81
C. Field Support Linkage.....	81
Table - Global Field Support	83
D. Workforce and Operating Expense Request	84
Tables - Workforce	86
Table - Trust Fund and FSN Separation Fund	91
Table - Operating Expenses	92
Tables - Cost of Controller Operations	97

LIST OF ACRONYMS

CBO	-	Community-Based Organization
CEN	-	Caribbean Environmental Network
CDC	-	Center for Disease Control
DEMO	-	Development of Environmental Management Organizations
EAI	-	Enterprise for the Americas Initiative
EFJ	-	Environmental Foundation of Jamaica
EIA	-	Environmental Initiative for the Americas
EMIS	-	Educational Management Information System
EU	-	European Union
FPMU	-	Fiscal Policy Management Unit
FSN	-	Foreign Service National
FTAA	-	Free Trade Areas of the Americas
FTC	-	Free Trade Commission
FY	-	Fiscal Year
GOJ	-	Government of Jamaica
HIV	-	Human Immuno-deficiency Virus
IBRD	-	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IDB	-	InterAmerican Development Bank
IMEGO	-	Improved Markets, Exports and Economic Growth Opportunities
IMF	-	International Monetary Fund
IR	-	Intermediate Result
JEA	-	Jamaica Exporters' Association
LAN	-	Local Area Network
MBMPT	-	Montego Bay Marine Park Trust
MDP	-	Microenterprise Development Project
MEYC	-	Ministry of Education, Youth and Culture
MIS	-	Management Information System
MRT	-	Math Resource Teachers
MOE	-	Ministry of Education
NAFTA	-	North American Free Trade Agreement
NEPT	-	Negril Environmental Protection Trust
NFPB	-	National Family Planning Board
NGO	-	Non-Governmental Organization
NIBJ	-	National Investment Bank of Jamaica
NIP	-	National Industrial Plan
NRCA	-	Natural Resources Conservation Authority
NWC	-	National Water Commission
SBED	-	Small Business Export Development
SO	-	Strategic Objective
SSU	-	Sanitation Support Unit
STD	-	Sexually Transmitted Diseases
UAP	-	Uplifting Adolescents Project

I. Introduction and Overview

For the USAID/Jamaica program, 1997 was a year of significant achievement and a year of continuing assessment which led to the development of a new economic growth strategy and adjustments to the results frameworks of each of the Mission's strategic objectives (SOs). While the Mission portfolio continued to make progress toward targeted results, SO teams worked with key development partners in extended teams to re-examine and modify SO frameworks. As a result of these working sessions, the SOs and intermediate results were re-tooled where necessary to ensure that the Mission's results framework is complete, consistent and responsive to host-country conditions and concerns.

Common Factors for Program Assessment--Mission Self-Assessment

A. Performance Assessment

Overall Mission program performance, as reflected by Strategic Objective (SO)-level indicator achievement, was solid. Results achieved by SO 1 "Increased Participation for Economic Growth" activities, however, fell short of projected targets in several instances. A Mission-led review of SO1 pointed to an aging portfolio of activities that are not targeted toward accomplishing a focused set of achievable results and SO-level indicators that are simply beyond the Mission's manageable interest given SO1's budget allocation and the wavering state of the Jamaican economy. In response to those findings a new economic growth strategy has been formulated. (See Annex B.) Despite these noted shortcomings, SO1 did make important contributions toward improving access to microfinance credit, exceeding the target for loans made by almost 100 percent, and improving customs revenue collection.

Under SO2 "Increased Protection of Key Natural Resources in Environmentally and Economically Significant Areas" there was significant progress made toward increasing the acreage of threatened areas placed under protection and management. However, consistent with the inherent weaknesses of our partner NGOs (as noted in Section II, Factors Affecting Performance), progress toward enhancing the management capacity and financial sustainability of Jamaican environmental organizations was modest at best. Efforts by local environmental NGOs toward developing and implementing revenue generating programs have moved slowly, as has the Government of Jamaica (GOJ) process of amending legislation to allow the NGOs to collect user fees and retain that revenue for maintenance and operation of the areas which they manage. Efforts to address these challenges have been the focus of USAID's environmental program over the past year.

Overall, notable progress was made toward achieving the expected results of SO3. While trends in overall fertility have decreased from 3 children per woman in 1993 to 2.8 in 1997, youth fertility increased slightly over planned targets. This increase reflects the national

family planning strategy focus on the general population and its scant attention towards youth. The 6.4 % HIV seroprevalance rate among STD clinic attenders is significantly lower than the planned target of 10%. This success can be attributed to improved STD control as reflected in the falling rate for infectious syphilis and the decline in prevalence of genital ulcers. Literacy rates at the grade 4 level achieved planned targets of 48% for boys and 58% for girls as the Ministry of Education and Culture, with direct support from the InterAmerican Development Bank (IDB), continued to implement interventions introduced under USAID's Primary Education Assistance Project (PEAP) II which ended in 1996.

B. Country Need

If one uses per capita GNP, infant mortality and total fertility as indicators, at first glance Jamaica appears to have made good progress on the development spectrum. However, several factors belie what ostensibly appears to be a relatively passable standard of living. Firstly, the per capita GNP does not reflect Jamaica's severely skewed income distribution. Approximately one-third of the population lives below the poverty line and in 1995 the consumption expenditure of the top 10 percent of the population accounted for 29 percent of the country's total consumption expenditure--nearly 10 times more than the consumption expenditure of the poorest 10 percent. Although total fertility rates have decreased overall since the 1960s, there has been a significant increase in the fertility rate for 15 - 19 year-olds and the proportion of births to mothers under 20 years of age has stubbornly remained at 30 percent since the 1970s. These critical constraints to equitable development in Jamaica represent significant needs for development assistance.

C. Quality of Partnership with Host Country Government

Although political rivalry is strong and at times has led to violence, Jamaica has a long standing, robust tradition of democracy. Leading up to last year's election, concerned citizens formed a local electoral monitoring group with the intent of ensuring a free and fair election process. Also, for the first time national elections were monitored by a delegation of international observers led by the Carter Center. (This effort was supported by USAID.) While there were glitches at some polling stations, the election process was overwhelmingly peaceful and the Carter Center concluded that the will of the Jamaican people was expressed.

Jamaica's record in the economic policy arena has been mixed. While the GOJ implemented substantial macroeconomic reform vis a vis the regulation of trade and investment during its 13 year structural adjustment program, it has lacked fundamental discipline in implementing its fiscal and monetary policies since the conclusion of its arrangement with the IMF in 1995. The result has been an economic environment of uncertainty and instability coupled with economic stagnation and, for the past two years, recession.

Over the last two decades Jamaica has been a consistent and staunch supporter of U.S. policy and positions in international fora such as the U.N. Looking ahead, Jamaica's historically close ties to Cuba may eventually place its leaders in the position of facilitating a peaceful transition to democracy.

D. Contribution to US National Interests

U.S. foreign policy interests in Jamaica include, as defined in the U.S. Embassy's most recent Mission Performance Plan (MPP), in rank order--(1) American Citizens and Borders, with a goal of supporting the orderly regulation and facilitation of legitimate travel both from Jamaica to the U.S. and of U.S. citizens coming to Jamaica and by implication the stemming of illegal immigration; (2) Law Enforcement, with the goal of stemming the levels of illegal drug entry from Jamaica; (3) Economic Prosperity, with goals of expanding U.S. markets and promoting broad-based economic growth in Jamaica. USAID's strategic objectives directly support the U.S. national interests which the U.S. Mission in Jamaica seeks to serve.

SO1: Increased Participation for Economic Growth--This SO addresses each of the these USG priority foreign policy interests--(1) stemming the incentives for illegal immigration through increased employment; (2) providing viable, sustainable economic opportunities for targeted, vulnerable populations involved in the drug trade; (3) facilitating the GOJ's economic and regulatory reform measures needed for economic growth; and (4) promoting good governance and respect for political norms which contribute to an improved investment climate, while reducing crime and incentive for immigration.

SO2: Increased Protection of Key Natural Resources in Environmentally and Economically Significant Areas--With U.S. investments in Jamaica valued at \$5.6 billion and a strong and growing Jamaican market for U.S. goods and services, there is a direct linkage between the U.S. foreign policy interest of Economic Prosperity and the economic growth and stability of the Jamaican economy--an economy which is dependent almost entirely on its fragile natural resource base. With tourism, mining and agriculture as Jamaica's key foreign exchange earners, achievement of SO2 is critical to Jamaica's economic growth and stability.

SO3: Young Jamaicans Better Equipped for the 21st Century--This SO targets reduction of fertility rates, prevention of AIDS/STDs and improvement of literacy rates in Jamaica's youth. SO3 supports both the American Citizens and Borders and the Economic Prosperity interests of the U.S. The United States interest of safeguarding the health of Americans is directly served by reducing the risk of infectious diseases abroad. HIV/AIDS and STDs are significant infectious diseases in Jamaica with the number of new AIDS cases increasing at a rate of 60% annually. With an estimated 800,000 U.S. citizens visiting Jamaica on an annual basis and tens of thousands of Jamaicans entering the U.S. as immigrants or tourists the need to address the local HIV/AIDS/STD situation is of paramount interest to both Jamaica and the U.S.

The premise linking the economic growth and expansion of Jamaica's economy to the Economic Prosperity of the United States has been established above. Jamaica's economic growth, however, is seriously undermined when high fertility rates, population growth, and corresponding labor force size begin to grow more rapidly than the economy. This reflects the current situation in Jamaica where the current fertility rate is 2.8 live births per woman and steady, unemployment is 15.3 % and rising, and the GDP was -2.4% in 1997. The effects of a high fertility rate are also felt by the economy in terms of increased demands on the GOJ's ability to provide basic delivery of social sector needs (e.g. education, health care, etc.). High fertility among youth leads to a lower level of educational attainment, more limited job opportunities and lower household income in the long-run.

E. Common Objectives

There has been a conscious effort to develop the Mission development strategy around common objectives with the Government of Jamaica. It has also been serendipitous in the way the USAID/Jamaica development objectives overlay those of the USG SPIA Strategy, the Summit of Americas, and the DAC (see Common Objective Table). A large portion (50%) of USAID development resources directly or indirectly support the GOJ, Summit, and SPIA objectives of economic growth and poverty reduction. This is being accomplished through job creation initiatives, microenterprise programs, and protection of economically important environmental resources. The balance of our program is devoted to GOJ and Summit priorities of basic education, functional literacy and numeracy, as well as major DAC objectives addressing social development in the areas of reproductive health.

COMMON OBJECTIVES

Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
United States Agency for International Development in Jamaica (USAID/Jamaica), and the Government of Jamaica

USAID/Jamaica	USG (SPIA Strategy)	DAC	Summit of the Americas (Action Plan)	Government of Jamaica
Increased participation for economic growth	III. American Citizens & II. Economic Prosperity 6. Promote broad-based economic growth	1. Economic well being: Reduction by one-half in the proportion of people living in extreme poverty 2015	IV. Eradication of poverty and discrimination - promotion of micro, small, and medium size enterprises	National Industrial Policy - small business development - increase access to credit
Increased protection of key natural resources	II. Economic Prosperity & VII. Global Issues 14. Secure sustainable environment	3. Environmental sustainability and regeneration		National Environmental Action Plan - implement coral reef management plans - National parks management plan and strengthen NRCA
Improved Reproductive Health for youth	VII. Global Issues 15. Stabilize world population 16. Protect human health...	2. Social development: (b) Access reproductive health services including family planning methods	IV. Eradication of Poverty - strengthen and improve national and regional networks of health information and surveillance systems	Nat. Health Services Act: - decentralization of services - youth/community focus Nat. HIV/AIDS Program - emphasis on youth
Enhanced socio-economic preparedness for "at-risk" youth	III. American Citizens & II. Economic Prosperity 6. Promote broad-based economic growth	2. Social Development: - universal access primary education - attainment of basic literacy and numeracy	I. Education - functional literacy targeting vulnerable populations - occupational training	Min. of Local Govt./Nat. Youth Service: - integration of jobs & services
Increased literacy and numeracy at primary school level	III. American Citizens & II. Economic Prosperity 6. Promote broad-based economic growth	2. Social Development: - universal access to primary school education - attainment of basic literacy and numeracy	I. Education - in-service teacher training - community and family involvement	Nat. Educ. 5 yr Plan: - Nat. Assessment program - focus on primary - new math curriculum - teacher training for reading

I. Factors Affecting USAID/Jamaica's Program Performance

A. Macroeconomic Factors

1. Overview of Macroeconomic Factors

Two and a half years after the Government of Jamaica (GOJ) ended its formal, 13-year structural adjustment arrangement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Jamaican economy is struggling against a debilitating recession. Despite a favorable external environment, total GDP contracted by 2.4 percent (and per capita GDP by 3 percent) during 1997, with substantial declines in such significant sectors as agriculture and manufacturing. Jamaica's poor economic performance can be attributed to a complicated and diverse set of factors including a widening fiscal deficit, an overvalued exchange rate, high interest rates, deteriorating infrastructure, an unproductive real sector, crime and violence and a financial sector crisis. Characteristic of an economy in recession, in 1997 Jamaica saw a reduction in the demand for labor across several sectors, a reduction in exports and a low demand for credit to the productive sector.

In response to Jamaica's economic crisis, the GOJ has applied a regime of tight monetary policy and high interest rates which has been successful in stabilizing the exchange rate and curbing inflation. However, sustained high interest rates, an uncompetitive exchange rate (42 percent appreciation between November 1995 and May 1997) and a significant crowding out of the private sector by the public sector have forced a contraction in the economy.

Against the backdrop of the GOJ's tight monetary policy, the country's large fiscal deficit was financed through borrowing on domestic credit markets. This had the effect of pushing already high domestic interest rates still higher. Exacerbating the situation, the GOJ drew on the country's Net International Reserves, as revenue targets fell short and an overall balance of payments deficit reemerged. The resulting reserve loss has undermined confidence in the ability of the Bank of Jamaica (BOJ) to maintain the exchange rate, regardless of its willingness. This perceived exchange risk has pushed up domestic real interest rates, despite the BOJ's tight monetary policy and falling rates of inflation. Consequently, Jamaican producers have had to face both prices that reflect an appreciated currency and interest rates which reflect a fundamental lack of credibility in the GOJ's policy mix. (For a more background and in-depth analysis on Jamaica's macroeconomic situation see Appendix 1.)

2. Financial System Crisis

Beginning in mid-1996, serious weaknesses in the financial sector began to appear, as sustained high real interest rates undermined the financial status of many borrowers. At the same time, interlocking ownership among banks, insurance companies and non-financial companies, combined with division of responsibility for regulation of banks and most non-

bank financial institutions (by the BOJ) and insurance companies (by the Ministry of Finance), obscured the weaknesses of the system until the deterioration was very far advanced. Moreover, inadequacies in banking legislation initially made it difficult for the GOJ to take corrective action other than on very favorable terms for the existing owners (and very unfavorable terms for the government).

To date, the GOJ has intervened and taken partial or complete ownership of four commercial banks, four insurance companies, and a merchant bank, profoundly shaking the public's confidence in the banking system. The total fiscal cost of these operations are conservatively estimated at 14 percent of GDP.

The GOJ must substantially improve its financial regulatory structure and, more importantly, supervision of the system, and dispose of its newly acquired banks to private bankers with the background and skill to prevent a repetition. The International Development Bank is providing substantial assistance in this effort.

3. Implications for economic growth

As is to be expected, there is a wide range of problems in the private sector which vary with the size of the firm and the sector. In late 1997 USAID interviewed private sector and other representatives to assess the economic situation. The interviews revealed that Jamaican firms face a different set of constraints than those faced by foreign firms. Firms selling to the Jamaican market face a different set of constraints from those faced by exporters. Nonetheless, there was a strong degree of unanimity expressed by private sector representatives asked to identify the principal constraints to economic growth.

First among the constraints specified was the high cost of credit. The sources of this problem have been discussed in the macroeconomic section but the consequences are severe. Firms point out the need to update plant and equipment in order to meet the challenge of foreign competition but the cost of medium-term credit is beyond their means.

The appreciation in the real exchange rate in the past eighteen months has had very different effects on different sectors. The apparel industry has been most affected where the result has been the contraction of the Jamaican apparel industry, in contrast to the slowed growth elsewhere in the Caribbean, in response to Mexico's NAFTA-enhanced competitive advantage.

The one universally raised constraint by the private sector is government regulation or "red tape". As might be expected, the nature and importance of red tape also differs from industry to industry and from firm to firm. In some ways, this complaint is surprising, since there has been a very substantial deregulation of the business in Jamaica over the last 15 years. But Jamaica's regional competitors have gone even further in relaxing controls on business, leaving Jamaica at a relative disadvantage, particularly in the competition for foreign investment. As one foreign investor put it succinctly "in the Dominican Republic they role

out the red carpet, in Jamaica they roll out the red tape." The perception of many and overlapping bureaucratic requirements, administered arbitrarily and even capriciously, and subject to delays of months and even years, was probably the most common constraint mentioned by the private sector.

Although there has already been dialogue between government and private sector, it clearly has not gone far enough. The problem appears to be most serious for smaller firms and self-employed individuals. Larger firms, particularly those in a position to employ prominent legal firms and customs brokers report having little problem with bureaucratic requirements. Smaller firms, and particularly smaller Jamaican firms selling into the export market, seem to have the most difficulty. In particular, small exporters seeking the legally-provided-for customs exoneration from customs duties on imported inputs, reported arbitrary and inconsistent application of current law. Finally, the most important problem faced by private sector firms is simply inaction and delay.

A final set of constraints identified by the private sector relate to a lack of high-quality management training. A variety of problems identified, such as inability to access credit and poor quality of work force, seem to be, on closer examination, lack of basic management skills on the part of the proprietor and lack of a proper business plan. Credit is available to small and micro-enterprises from a variety of sources, but business and management skills are often a severe constraint. The desire to own one's own business has a strong tradition in Jamaican society where employment is often seen as a stepping stone to starting one's own business. In an open competitive market, business skills are a critical requirement for survival and expansion.

B. Other Cross-cutting Factors

Several cross-cutting factors have the potential to affect program performance under each of the Mission's strategic objectives. With 53 percent of the GOJ's US\$2.5 billion budget going to debt servicing, *extremely limited economic resources* are available to address the country's development problems, and bi-lateral donor activity is dwindling.

Another serious obstacle to Jamaica's development is the *dearth of educated, skilled human resources*. In fact, the lack of trainable work force entrants has been cited as one of Jamaica's most critical impediments to economic growth, and although, of all the GOJ ministries, the education ministry will receive the highest proportion (13 percent) of Jamaica's FY 1998 budget, 95 percent of that allocation will go to teachers' salaries. That leaves little for systemic or targeted improvements in such areas as teacher skills, physical infrastructure, books and instructional materials, or curriculum development. Further exacerbating the situation, average daily attendance in schools is only 72 percent according to official reports.

A third cross-cutting factor is the *weak institutional capacity of our NGO partners*. Consistent with the GOJ's policy of working through community-based, non-governmental organizations, the Mission is pursuing and developing partnerships with key NGOs under all

SOs. While these organizations are dynamic leaders in their sectors and show great potential, many of them are nascent groups with little institutional capacity. As the Mission implements increasingly through NGOs, their ability to become organizationally and administratively efficient will have a great impact on the viability of USAID's program.

The GOJ's success in creating the environment and meeting the targets it has set out in its National Industrial Policy also will have a significant effect on the Mission's program performance across SOs.

C. Critical Assumptions for SO Performance

1. SO1

Under SO1, activities supporting equitable economic growth are directly dependent on the GOJ's ability to maintain and advance the gains made toward economic reform under its Structural Adjustment Program. Although liberalization has benefitted the private sector, especially in exports, business confidence and investment are still inhibited by high interest rates; high taxes; excessive government regulation; low productivity; and scarcity of foreign exchange. In other countries which have pursued structural adjustment, four factors have consistently determined the presence or absence of equitable economic growth and increased participation by citizens in society: (1) the degree of certainty about government policies; (2) a legal and regulatory framework which fosters competition; (3) the state of physical infrastructure; and (4) the efficiency of financial and labor markets. Even when these factors are present, private investment (key to sustainable growth) recovery generally takes three to five years. Certainty, predictability and private sector confidence are critical prerequisites to a favorable and enabling environment for long-term economic growth and poverty reduction in Jamaica.

Critical assumptions over the R4 planning period to achieve growth are:

- GOJ commitment to policy reform towards a free market economy;
- Stable macroeconomic climate regarding fiscal (tax & spend), monetary (interest & inflation rates) and exchange rate policies;
- Reduction of bureaucracy and red-tape obstacles to investment;
- Efficient and stable banking sector;
- Adequate physical infrastructure;
- Legal and regulatory framework which fosters competition
- A trained, skilled labor force; and
- Stable labor markets.

2. SO2

Key prerequisites to progress under SO2 are the:

- Continuation of public policy to decentralize management of natural resources and urban services;
- Continuation of GOJ commitment to establish national systems of protected areas, including Cabinet approval of the policy document, establishing the protected areas institutional framework;
- GOJ enabling of local revenue generating programs to directly finance urban services and natural resource management;
- GOJ adoption of appropriate legal framework for implementation of environmental impact assessment regulations;
- GOJ adoption of key environmental management policy reforms; and
- National Water Commission (NWC) commitment to community-based, self-financed water and sanitation services and commitment to public/private partnerships for the operation and management of sewage treatment plants.

3. SO3

Enrollment, attendance and literacy/numeracy standards have declined dramatically over the past 10-15 years, and an entire generation of young Jamaicans is at risk to a gamut of problems including in-school failure, unwanted pregnancy, AIDS/STDs, crime, violence and drugs. For SO3 to achieve planned results and address these problems, the following assumptions must remain valid:

- The Ministry of Health (MOH) will continue to improve diagnosis and treatment of STDs.
- GOJ will continue to adequately fund its Youth Services program.
- Schools will initiate improvements.
- GOJ will operate an effective National Assessment Program to measure students' and schools' achievement.
- Other donors will continue to work to improve preparation of primary school entrants.
- Several Jamaican NGOs can be strengthened to provide effective adolescent reproductive health and HIV/STD services.

Summary of USAID-Supported Accomplishments in 1997

SO 1: Increased Participation for Economic Growth

- 2,461 micro loans were disbursed in the first full year of lending by Workers Bank.
- A national microenterprise survey, jointly funded by USAID and the Government of the Netherlands, was completed, analyzed and used for policy and program decisions in the sector.
- The new contractor for the Small Business Export Development activity mobilized resources and began providing quality services in a remarkably short period. Client surveys reveal high marks for the program, increased exports and employment.
- A redesigned web site at the Jamaica Exporters' Association now records over 1,500 hits per month. The site has received three awards for computer excellence in Jamaica.
- USAID leveraged \$97.5 million in other donor financing for the North Coast Project, bringing the total for the last two years to over \$200 million.

SO2: Increased Protection of Key Natural Resources in Environmentally and Economically Significant Areas

- Negril was declared Jamaica's first Environmental Protection Area, an important step towards managing the development of the fragile natural resource base on which this popular resort's economy depends.
- USAID, the Natural Resources Conservation Authority (NRCA), and the Montego Bay Marine Park (MBMP) collaborated to lay the ground work for establishing a pilot user fee collection system.
- NRCA protected area guidelines were developed for more than a dozen topics including protected area management plans, eco-tourism, human resources, and compliance with environmental laws.
- With USAID support, the Negril Coral Reef Preservation Society established both natural resources and water quality monitoring systems.

SO3: Young Jamaicans Better-Equipped for the 21st Century

- Students' mastery of mathematics in Grade 3 increased by up to 4% as a result of USAID-funded interventions.
- Over 3000 at-risk youth were either re-instated in school or are in transition from NGO remedial programs to the formal school system.
- GOJ assumed full responsibility for contraceptive financing and procurement, capping several years of coordination and support from USAID.
- Preliminary findings of the quadrennial (1997) Reproductive Health Survey revealed an increase from 63% in 1993 to 65.1% in 1997 in contraceptive prevalence and a slight decrease since 1993 in the total Fertility Rate (TFR) from 3 to 2.8.
- After several years of USAID support, Parliament passed the National Health Services Act which mandates and promotes decentralization of health administration and services.
- Under Jamaica's Contraceptive Social Marketing Program, injectable sales in 1997 increased by 25% over 1996, achieving the 1997 sales target set for the program. Vasectomy procedures increased by 45% over the previous year.

Summary of USAID-Supported Accomplishments in 1997 (cont'd)

Caribbean Regional Program

- In response to a CDMP intervention, the United Insurance Company in Barbados launched a program aimed at reducing hurricane damage to properties. The program provides incentives to policy-holders in the form of substantial premium reductions.
- CDMP brought together 32 development planners and disaster managers from the region, who collaboratively developed mitigation planning guidelines, including a mitigation policy and planning tool kit for the Caribbean.
- Over 13,000 persons participated in training activities on disaster mitigation and coastal/marine resource management while over 10,000 households benefitted directly from disaster vulnerability reduction interventions.
- Under the ENCORE Project, the Caribbean Tourism Organization adopted the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States' sustainable tourism strategy which will provide guidance for sound environmental management within the tourism sector across the wider Caribbean.
- With support from USAID, Caribbean Action for Sustainable Tourism (CAST), an affiliated agency of the Caribbean Hoteliers Association, produced a compendium of environmental best practices, a set of guidelines for implementation of environmental management systems in tourism facilities and a regional action plan for the tourism industry to address the priorities of Agenda 21.

II. Progress Toward Strategic Objectives in 1997

A. Strategic Objective 1 (SO1): Increased Participation for Economic Growth

1. Performance Analysis

a. Toward achieving SO1

A recent Mission review of the SO1 results framework and strategy revealed a serious incongruity between accomplishments at the intermediate results level and expected achievements as reflected by SO level indicators. Foreign exchange earnings in tourism, apparel, agricultural processing and fresh produce, informatics (*Indicators 1.0.1 and 1.0.2*), as well as total employment in non-traditional activities (*Indicator 1.0.3*), are simply not within the Mission's manageable interest, given an annual program level of approximately \$1.5 million. Results within USAID's management control are discussed below at the Intermediate Results (IR) level.

With the Jamaican economy mired in recession, foreign exchange earnings, overall, have failed to meet targets set in the GOJ's National Industrial Policy (1996) and the trade deficit, which reached over \$1.5 billion in 1997, continues to widen. GDP showed a decrease of at least 2.4 percent for the 1997 calendar year. This level of economic output was incapable of lowering the poverty level which has stood at approximately 30 percent for the past few years. Poor economic performance is the result of a diverse mix of factors, including a widening fiscal deficit, overvalued exchange rate, deteriorating infrastructure, an unproductive real sector, crime and violence, and a financial system crisis. These factors are covered in detail in the proposed SO1 strategy in Annex B.

b. Intermediate results

i. Expanded Access and Opportunity for the Poor (IR 1.1)

With USAID assistance, the Workers Bank microfinance unit achieved excellent performance during 1997. A total of 2,461 loans were disbursed, exceeding the target of 1,250 by nearly 100 percent (*Indicator 1.1.1*). Since last year's R4, there has been a gender shift towards women clients, which now stand at about 70 percent. This is a reflection of the number of marginalized women, many single mothers, who open microenterprises to provide for their families.

The microcredit program expanded into rural areas and operated in 13 post offices by the end of 1997. The Mission's technical assistance program led directly to a number of significant achievements, including the development of a new management information system whereby all loan officers manage their portfolios on laptop computers. A strengthened internal control system resulted in the early detection of a case of loan officer fraud, which minimized losses.

Bank management demonstrated the necessary resolve by dealing with the issue quickly and the loan officer decisively. Most importantly, the microcredit program has maintained a low delinquency rate of approximately five percent during this expansion phase. This low rate is even more impressive considering the state of the economy and the poor performance of the rest of the financial sector.

The postal savings program increased its number of clients to 13,915 by the end of 1997, exceeding the target by 40 percent (*Indicator 1.1.2*). This excellent performance was due, at least in part, to the appropriateness of the savings product. The product incorporates elements of Jamaica's traditional informal Rotating Savings and Credit Association (ROSCA) system and has proven very attractive to lower class savers.

ii. Increased Non-traditional Exports Through Improved Productivity and Marketing (IR 1.2)

Non-traditional exports fell from 1996 to 1997 due to general economic malaise as well as a serious drought. The number of small scale exporters trained through USAID support, although short of the target, was significant (*Indicator 1.2.1*). However, the number of firms assisted was almost double the target due to a decision taken to support non-JEA members. Membership and funds generated by the Jamaica Exporters' Association (JEA) were both well below targets. This too was due in some degree to the poor economy, which has squeezed the profits of small firms and led to the elimination of non-essential costs, such as membership fees.

Another contributing factor to below-target training and membership results (*Indicators 1.2.1 and 1.2.2*) was the change in the USAID-supported contractor which provides assistance to the JEA. There was a three month gap between contractors and a period of several months for the new contractor to initiate and establish regular services. Furthermore, the hiring of the new contractor coincided with a shift in strategy away from generalized training and assistance, and towards customized company-specific technical support. The indicators for training and membership will no longer be collected and reported after this year's R4 because of their limited usefulness.

The Mission is encouraged by the early performance of the new contractor which began in June of 1997. Feedback from the JEA and companies supported indicates that their performance has been outstanding. Technical assistance has focussed on improving information systems and computerization at the Association and company level, improving production techniques and efficiencies, and marketing information. This has already led to increased sales and employment in assisted firms.

The volume of agricultural exports handled by the pre-clearance program for agricultural exports declined in 1997, falling short of the targeted volume due largely to Jamaica's worst drought in 70 years (*Indicator 1.2.3*). It is also a result of the fact that for several months much of the pre-cleared produce was cleared a second time on arrival in the U.S. The latter

problem has been solved, as the U.S. Department of Agriculture has agreed not to do routine inspections of pre-cleared products. The Mission is now working with the GOJ and producers to establish mandatory pre-clearance of all products. Successful resolution of this issue should help establish and strengthen the pre-clearance facilities permanently.

iii. Increased Private Domestic and Foreign Investment (IR 1.3)

This IR casts a wide net over a relatively diverse package of activities. Three of these activities ended in 1997 after achieving intended results. The Customs Department, an institution characterized by public scandals and abuses before USAID assistance began, has made numerous important, concrete improvements and has significantly enhanced its public image. Customs revenue collection, so important to Jamaica's ailing fiscal health, exceeded the 1997 target by 17 percent (*Indicator 1.3.1*). This was due to improved customs procedures and the adoption of higher valuation of commodities. Increased importation of motor vehicles also contributed to the increase. USAID support to the Customs Department ended in 1997, but the institution is expected to play a critical role in the public modernization program supported by the World Bank and in preparing Jamaica for hemispheric trade integration.

Beleaguered Customs Department Moves Towards Efficiency

Three years ago, when USAID initiated its assistance to the Customs Department, this institution was fraught with poor administration and public scandals. Three years of technical assistance provided by USAID has revitalized the Department. Enhanced professionalism and integrity has improved customer services and transparency. Changes in policies and procedures have cut costs and improved efficiencies. The introduction of newly automated systems has improved accuracy and accountability. Finally, new invoice and valuation systems have resulted in increased revenues and have initiated the process of Jamaica's integration into the Free Trade of the Americas Act. As a result of this progress, the GOJ has identified the Customs Department as one of the first entities to become an Executive Agency under the World Bank financed Public Modernization Program. Participation in this program should ensure continued improvements in efficiencies and service over the long term.

With the value of privatized assets far exceeding expectations last year, only one entity was privatized in 1997 generating proceeds of approximately \$125,000 (*Indicator 1.3.2*). The low level of attractiveness of the few remaining state owned entities, the state of the economy, the poor investment climate, and lack of political will during an election year together slowed the privatization process. Nonetheless, the USAID-assisted Privatization Program has resulted in sixty-eight (68) state owned assets being privatized with total proceeds of approximately \$219 million, exceeding planned targets. USAID has assisted directly in the privatization of firms resulting in approximately 50% of these proceeds (US\$m). Most of Jamaica's major assets, including the national airline, the petroleum company, the largest bank (National Commercial Bank) and several major hotels, have been divested. Given the accelerated time frame in

which targets were met, USAID recently took the decision to terminate the program, thereby making over \$250,000 available to the Mission's new SO1 strategy.

USAID support has resulted in the institutionalization of the Fair Trading Commission (FTC). Through seminars and public education programs, the FTC made the Jamaican public more aware of the legal ramifications and economic rationale for fair trade. It has successfully broken monopolistic activities and has helped forge fairer and more transparent business practices throughout the private sector. The reduced number of disputes resolved in 1997 (*Indicator 1.3.4*) is due to the fact that hundreds of disputes, which in earlier years would have been the domain of the FTC, are being directed to the newly revived Consumer Affairs Commission.

In 1997 USAID was again successful, with modest resources, in leveraging substantial resources from other donors and the GOJ for infrastructure development in tourist areas. USAID provided technical and operational support to the GOJ in monitoring the construction of major water, sanitation and road projects. The greater than expected leveraged amount of \$97.5 million (*Indicator 1.3.3*) was due to an unplanned contribution of \$60 million by the European Union. This IR will not be reported on next year and infrastructure development will not be part of the new economic growth strategy. Nevertheless, the Mission will continue to play a coordinating role in infrastructure development, and will ensure that coastal water quality issues are addressed in all water and sanitation programs.

2. Expected Progress Through FY 2000 and Management Actions

With a new strategy and sets of intermediate results being developed this year for SO1, most of the activities described above will be coming to a conclusion within this fiscal year. Therefore, most of the indicators of progress presented in this R4 are being reported on for the last time. The proposed SO1 strategy contained in Annex B includes an entirely new results framework with new indicators and targets. The new strategy has been developed within the context of USAID manageable interest. The new indicators will reflect achievements directly attributable to USAID assistance. In general, the new activities will target employment generation and increased income for small and microbusinesses in targeted niche markets such as eco-tourism, agro-processing and fashion apparel.

Two of the programs being implemented under the current strategy--microenterprise development and support to small export-oriented firms--have been integrated into the new strategy. More meaningful indicators have already been developed for these activities to reflect USAID's contribution to employment creation, sales and institutional viability of microenterprise support institutions. Without introducing all of these indicators in this document, the following provides a qualitative analysis of expected progress through FY 2000.

Normally, we would expect the microfinance unit at Workers Bank to build on progress made last year. The strategic plan developed by the Bank and USAID contemplates growth to over 7,000 credit clients by FY 1999 and a tripling of the number of post office lending/savings branches. However, with Workers Bank being placed in receivership as the result of a March 1998 intervention by the Ministry of Finance, reflective of the national level financial crisis, the program's future suddenly faces uncertainty. The decision to curtail lending until due diligence is performed has threatened the viability of the program, since the entire portfolio of 1,800 clients at the time of the intervention comes due within four months. Furthermore, decisions about future ownership and management will determine the long-term viability of the program. The Government has outlined what the Mission believes is a sound strategy of transferring the risk and assets of intervened and ailing financial institutions into the hands of competent and properly motivated bankers. The Government has also stated the importance it places on the USAID-supported Workers Bank postal units program in particular and on microfinance in general. We believe this crisis offers an opportunity to strengthen the institutional capacity and future viability of the program, and are working closely with the Government to achieve this outcome.

USAID is extending assistance to small businesses through the Jamaican Exporters Association until June 1999. The program will be guided by a new performance plan which will assign targets and track progress in employment generation and increased sales. Meanwhile, the Mission is working with other potential partners in developing other options to support small and micro businesses.

RESULTS FRAMEWORK

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 1: INCREASED PARTICIPATION FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE-LEVEL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

- 1.0.1 Foreign Exchange Earnings In Priority Non-Agricultural Areas
- 1.0.2 Foreign Exchange Earnings Of Selected Agricultural Exports
- 1.0.3 Employment In Assisted Area

INTERMEDIATE RESULTS (IR)

1.1 Expanded Access and Opportunity for the poor

1.2 Increased Non-Traditional Exports Through Improved Productivity and Marketing

1.3 Increased Private Domestic and Foreign Investment

I. R. Level Performance Indicators

1.1.1 Improved access to microfinance credit

1.2.1 Training for small-scale exports

1.3.1 Improved customs revenue collection

1.1.2 Microfinance savings accounts mobilized

1.2.2 Membership and funds generated within the Jamaica Exporters' Association (JEA)

1.3.2 Value of public sector assets privatized

1.1.3 Improved export crop technology adopted by farmers

1.2.3 Volume of produce handled by export marketing facilities for the U.S. market

1.3.3 Funds leveraged by USAID assistance

Partners: UTech, GON, EU, CIDA, GTZ, IDB, Workers Bank, Min. of Ag., UNDP

Partners: Min of Industry, UWI, Min. of Education

1.3.4 Disputes resolved by the Jamaica Fair Trading Commission (FTC)

Partners: JEA, JMA, JAMPRO, IESC, Min. of Foreign Trade, PIOJ, OECF, EV, IDB, IBRD

Critical Assumptions:

GOJ commitment to policy reform towards a free market economy
Stable macroeconomic climate regarding fiscal (tax & spend), monetary (interest & inflation), and exchange rate policies
Reduction of bureaucracy and red-tape obstacles to investment
Efficient and stable banking sector
Decrease of crime and violence in society
Adequate physical infrastructure
Legal and regulatory framework which fosters competition
Improvement in living standards and stable labor markets

CROSS-CUTTING THEME

COMMUNITY
BASED
DEVELOPMENT

DONOR
COOPERATION

INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY

PERFORMANCE DATA TABLE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 1

Strategic Objective 1: Increased Participation for Economic Growth APPROVED: COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Jamaica				
RESULT NAME: Increased Participation for Economic Growth				
INDICATOR: 1.0.1. Foreign exchange earnings in priority non-agricultural areas				
UNIT OF MEASURE: (a) tourism (millions US\$); (b) apparel (millions US\$) and (c) processed agriculture/informatics (millions US\$). SOURCE: JAMPRO, PIOJ, EDIP project records INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Areas of assistance are informatics, processed agriculture, apparel, and tourism. Growth rates for tourism are assumed at 5%. Growth rates for all processed agriculture /informatics are assumed at 5% for 1997 increasing by one percent point each successive year. * There will be no further support to the apparel industry. COMMENTS:		YEAR 1991 (B)	PLANNED	ACTUAL (a) 764 (b) 302 (c) 75
		1995	(a) 1,060 (b) 513 (c) 73	(a) 965 (b) 611 (c) 66
		1996	(a) 1,023 (b) 560 (c) 68	(a) 1,069 (b) 513 (c) 68
		1997	(a) 1,070 (b) * (c) 73	(a) 1,128 (b) * (c) -
		1998	(a) 1,130 (b) * (c) 78	(a) (b) (c)
		1999	(a) 1,176 (b) * (c) 83	(a) (b) (c)
		2000	(a) 1,240 (b) * (c) 90	(a) (b) (c)
		2001	(a) 1,300 (b) * (c) 98	(a) (b) (c)

Strategic Objective 1: Increased Participation for Economic Growth APPROVED: COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Jamaica				
RESULT NAME: Increased Participation for Economic Growth				
INDICATOR: 1.0.2. Foreign exchange earnings of selected agricultural exports				
UNIT OF MEASURE: Millions (US\$) SOURCE: PIOJ Social/Economic Survey, Commodity/Industry Boards, JEA and STATIN INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Selected exports including cucumbers, pumpkin, dasheen, sweet potatoes, yam, papaya, peppers, mangoes, cut flowers, foliage and other live plants. Growth is assumed at 5%. COMMENTS:		YEAR 1994 (B)	PLANNED	ACTUAL 72.9
		1995	76.5	84.9
		1996	80.3	82.7
		1997	84.3	81.8
		1998	88.5	
		1999	92.9	
		2000	97.5	
		2001	102.3	

Strategic Objective 1: Increased Participation for Economic Growth APPROVED: COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Jamaica				
RESULT NAME: Increased Participation for Economic Growth				
INDICATOR: 1.0.3. Employment in assisted area				
UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of jobs - (a) males and (b) females SOURCE: STATIN report for small business, JAMPRO, PIOJ Economic and Social Survey INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Areas of assistance include tourism, apparel industry, small scale exports, selected small holder agriculture export crops. Growth assumptions are that male employment will grow at a rate of 3% and female employment will grow at a rate of 1%. COMMENTS:		YEAR 1991 (B)	PLANNED	ACTUAL (a) 104,000 (b) 129,000
		1995	(a) 125,000 (b) 164,000	(a) 109,200 (b) 148,800
		1996	(a) 112,500 (b) 153,300	(a) 113,500 (b) 145,500
		1997	(a) 116,900 (b) 146,900	(a) 105,742 (b) 135,235
		1998	(a) 120,400 (b) 148,300	(a) (b)
		1999	(a) 124,000 (b) 149,700	(a) (b)
		2000	(a) 127,700 (b) 151,100	(a) (b)
		2001	(a) 131,500 (b) 152,600	(a) (b)

Strategic Objective 1: Increased Participation for Economic Growth APPROVED: COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Jamaica				
RESULT NAME: Expanded access and opportunity for the poor				
INDICATOR: 1.1.1. Improved access to microfinance credit				
UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of loans per year - (a) males and (b) females SOURCE: Supported institutions: ASSIST, EDT, Workers Bank and COK INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Access of formal credit to microentrepreneurs and disadvantaged persons, especially women. Growth rates are projected at 25% based on early performance of Workers Bank's Post Office program. COMMENTS:		YEAR 1993 (B)	PLANNED	ACTUAL (a) 400 (b) 600
		1995	(a) 400 (b) 600	(a) 248 (b) 187
		1996	(a) 500 (b) 500	(a) 150 (b) 96
		1997	(a) 625 (b) 625	(a) 738 (b) 1,723
		1998	(a) 780 (b) 780	(a) (b)
		1999	(a) 1,000 (b) 1,000	(a) (b)
		2000	(a) 1,250 (b) 1,250	(a) (b)
		2001	(a) 1,560 (b) 1,560	(a) (b)

Strategic Objective 1: Increased Participation for Economic Growth APPROVED: COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Jamaica				
RESULT NAME: Expanded access and opportunity for the poor				
INDICATOR: 1.1.2. Microfinance savings accounts mobilized				
UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of savings accounts/year SOURCE: Workers Bank Postal Division INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: The increase in the number of savings accounts through Workers Bank postal windows automatically increases the pool of credit available to entrepreneurs. Growth rates are projected at 35% based on existing number of savings accounts in post offices due to participate in the program over the period indicated. COMMENTS:		YEAR 1995(B)	PLANNED	ACTUAL 0
		1996	6,500	7,904
		1997	10,670	13,915
		1998	14,400	
		1999	19,440	
		2000	26,240	
		2001	35,420	

Strategic Objective 1: Increased Participation for Economic Growth APPROVED: COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Jamaica				
RESULT NAME: Increased non-traditional exports through improved productivity and marketing				
INDICATOR: 1.2.1. Training for small scale exports				
UNIT OF MEASURE: (a) number of firms assisted; (b) number of males trained and (c) number of females trained SOURCE: JEA/SBED Performance Reports INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Includes training in use of information technology, as well as seminars and workshops on production/marketing of non-traditional small scale exports. * Project ends in 1998. COMMENTS:		YEAR 1993 (B)	PLANNED (a) 30 (b) - (c) -	ACTUAL (a) 27 (b) - (c) -
		1995	(a) 45 (b) 300 (c) 300	(a) 52 (b) 169 (c) 100
		1996	(a) 36 (b) 300 (c) 300	(a) 36 (b) 256 (c) 315
		1997	(a) 40 (b) 300 (c) 300	(a) 70 (b) 198 (c) 213
		1998	(a) 40 (b) 300 (c) 300	(a) (b) (c)

Strategic Objective 1: Increased Participation for Economic Growth APPROVED: COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Jamaica				
RESULT NAME: Increased non-traditional exports through improved productivity and marketing				
INDICATOR: 1.2.2. Membership and funds generated within the Jamaica Exporters’ Association (JEA)				
UNIT OF MEASURE: (a) number of firms and (b) thousand US\$ SOURCE: JEA and JEA/SBED Performance Reports INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Increased JEA’s membership and corresponding increase in revenues from membership dues and services is only possible if JEA is providing services that member firms require. Since all of such services are in the export sector, then increased membership and revenues are indicators of export growth. COMMENTS:		YEAR 1995 (B)	PLANNED (a) 210 (b) 2	ACTUAL (a) 240 (b) 10
		1996	(a) 240 (b) 6	(a) 245 (b) 60
		1997	(a) 270 (b) 6	(a) 217 (b) 4
		1998	(a) 300 (b) 9	
		1999		
		2000		
		2001		

Strategic Objective 1: Increased Participation for Economic Growth APPROVED: COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Jamaica				
RESULT NAME: Increased non-traditional exports through improved productivity and marketing				
INDICATOR: 1.2.3. Volume of produce handled by export marketing facilities for the U.S. Market				
UNIT OF MEASURE: Metric ton SOURCE: JEA or PIOJ INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Export marketing facilities pre-cleared agricultural product destined for U.S. markets, primarily papaya, mangoes, fresh fruits and flowers, ornamental plants, etc. COMMENTS:		YEAR 1992 (B)	PLANNED	ACTUAL 11,959
		1995	20,130	26,000
		1996	23,725	11,638
		1997	15,500	7,461
		1998	20,600	
		1999	26,000	
		2000	30,200	

Strategic Objective 1: Increased Participation for Economic Growth APPROVED: COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Jamaica				
RESULT NAME: Increased private domestic and foreign investment				
INDICATOR: 1.3.1. Improved customs revenue collection				
UNIT OF MEASURE: Millions US\$ SOURCE: Department of Custom’s records INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Increased custom revenue indicates efficient customs administration. This, in turn, assures both domestic and foreign investors that their imported equipment will be processed quickly, thus increasing investor confidence and encouraging investment. COMMENTS:		YEAR 1994 (B)	PLANNED 100	ACTUAL 124
		1995	130	136
		1996	169	368
		1997	440	513
		1998	530	
		1999	640	
		2000	760	
		2001	908	

Strategic Objective 1: Increased Participation for Economic Growth APPROVED: COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Jamaica RESULT NAME: Increased private domestic and foreign investment INDICATOR: 1.3.2 Value of public sector assets privatized UNIT OF MEASURE: Million US\$ SOURCE: National Investment Bank of Jamaica INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Privatization income used for debt reduction and investment. * The program was curtailed in 1997. COMMENTS:			
	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
	1990 (B)		6.4
	1995	21	40
	1996	24	69.36
	1997	24	0.125
	1998		
	1999		
	2000		
	2001		

Strategic Objective 1: Increased Participation for Economic Growth APPROVED: COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Jamaica RESULT NAME: Increased private domestic and foreign investment INDICATOR: 1.3.3. Funds leveraged by USAID assistance UNIT OF MEASURE: Millions US\$ - (a) tourism infrastructure and (b) micro-enterprise development SOURCE: Project records INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: USAID's participation in some projects has led to participation by other donors and increased funding by the GOJ. This "leveraging" of funds has increased public investment which was a constraint to private investment. The indicator measures GOJ and other donor funding. Projections are based on projects already identified in a preliminary manner. COMMENTS:			
	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
	1995 (B)	(a) 3 (b) 5	(a) 3.5 (b) 6.6
	1996	(a) 87 (b) 6	(a) 117.5 (b) -
	1997	(a) 50 (b) 6.5	(a) 97.5 (b) 2.7
	1998	(a) 50 (b) 7	
	1999	(a) 50 (b) 7.5	
	2000	(a) 50 (b) 8	
	2001	(a) 50 (b) 8.5	

Strategic Objective 1: Increased Participation for Economic Growth APPROVED: COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Jamaica				
RESULT NAME: Increased private domestic and foreign investment				
INDICATOR: 1.3.4. Disputes resolved by the Jamaica Fair Trading Commission (FTC)				
UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of disputes resolved SOURCE: Fair Trading Commission INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: The FTC acts as a body to regulate competition and ensure that it operates fairly. This competition will encourage potential investors to enter in a market where market forces rather than other considerations govern performance. COMMENTS:		YEAR 1994 (B)	PLANNED 200	ACTUAL 416
		1995	300	1,000
		1996	400	837
		1997	500	348
		1998	600	
		1999	700	
		2000	800	
		2001	900	

B. Strategic Objective 2 (SO2): Increased Protection of Key Natural Resources in Environmentally and Economically Significant Areas

1. Performance Analysis

a. Toward achieving SO2

Program performance under SO2 in 1997 was mixed. While there was significant progress toward increasing the acreage of threatened areas placed under protection and management, progress toward enhancing the management capacity and sustainability of Jamaican organizations to manage the country's natural resources was modest at best. Efforts by local environmental NGOs toward developing and implementing revenue generating programs have moved slowly, as has the GOJ process of amending legislation to allow the NGOs to collect user fees and retain that revenue for maintenance and operation of the areas which they manage.

A notable achievement was the declaration of the Negril Protection Area, which became Jamaica's third official conservation area (*Indicator 2.0.1*). The Negril Protection Area encompasses the fragile marine, wetland and watershed areas which surround the popular and rapidly developed tourism destination of Negril. Because the area has been declared an Environmental Protection Area, any future development in Negril must be approved by the Natural Resources Conservation Authority (NRCA) and must be planned in accordance with NRCA's sustainable use principles. Declaration of the protection area lays the foundation for designation a number of individual protected areas within the Negril Protection Area (e.g., Royal Palm Reserve, Negril Marine Park).

b. Intermediate results (IRs)

i. Expanded areas of priority urban and natural resources under sustainable management (IR 2.1)

Overall, progress towards reaching this result met expectations, with Negril becoming the first protected area to meet the criteria for effectively managed protected areas. One key criterion is for immediate conservation threats to have been deterred. This was achieved as a result of the declaration of the Negril Protection Area and strengthening the protected area management plan which the Negril Environmental Protection Trust (NEPT) developed with USAID assistance (*Indicator 2.1.1*). The new Negril management plan contains improved resource management maps and a more detailed plan for implementing future protected area management activities. Another benefit of placing Negril under protection area status is that the town's 10 mile coastline is now protected from random, environmentally destructive development (*Indicator 2.1.2*).

With USAID assistance, the Montego Bay Marine Park Trust developed management and financial plans for MBMP that were submitted to the NRCA. The management plan provides the basis for a Park vision and clearly identified, tangible results. With USAID assistance, the Montego Bay Marine Park Trust developed management and financial plans for MBMP that were submitted to the NRCA. The management plan provides the basis for a Park vision and clearly identified, tangible results.

NEPT Slated to Manage Jamaica's First Environmental Protection Area

When the local Negril community decided they needed to take action to stem unplanned development and the degradation of this popular tourism destination's natural resources, the Negril Environmental Protection Trust (NEPT) took the lead in laying the groundwork for the establishment of Jamaica's first Environmental Protection Area (EPA). The beneficiary of continued USAID assistance since its inception, NEPT collaborated with the Negril/Green Island Local Planning Authority and the NRCA to prepare the required management plan for the EPA.

After two years of preparatory work, in 1997, under the Natural Resources Conservation Act, the GOJ declared Negril the country's first EPA. The EPA creates a conservation area and provides a framework for guiding land use, establishing public parks and protected areas and preserving Negril's fragile natural resources. It covers approximately 100 square miles including fragile watershed areas and wetlands. In recognition of NEPT's pivotal role as advocate for Negril's environment and coordinator of the community's environmental activities, the Minister of Environment and Housing has announced that the management of the EPA will be designated to NEPT. Delegation is expected by the end of FY 1998.

ii. Increased financial resources for environmental management (IR 2.2)

Progress towards meeting financial sustainability targets fell below expectations (*Indicator 2.2.1*). While a number of environmental trust funds have been established in Jamaica, effective fund raising programs and income generating activities based on resource users are not yet being implemented. There has been little urgency on the part of local environmental NGOs to become financially independent while a host of international donors ensure adequate funding in the short-term. Furthermore, the organizational capacity to mount and maintain income generating programs is lacking among most ENGOs. Currently, no protected area generates even the minimum target of 25 percent of the income needed for operation (2.2.3). However, in FY 1997, USAID worked intensively with the NRCA to establish policy reforms and associated economic instruments which will permit the collection of user fees in protected areas. While the MBMP did not have a revenue generating program in place as expected in 1997 (*Indicator 2.2.2*), USAID-NRCA sponsored a two day workshop, attended by private sector tourism operators, NRCA officials and NGOs, in preparation for the establishment a

pilot user fee program for the Park. Subsequent to the workshop, the MBMP staff is working with the private sector to operationalize a pilot user fee system by July 1998. More than a vehicle for financial independence, the user fee system will establish an economic partnership between the MBMP operators and the private sector tourism operators. Tourism operators will be required to pay a user fee, and they, in return, will expect the Marine Park operators to be accountable for showing an improvement in environmental quality and providing an improved experience for their paying tourist clients.

iii. Strengthened capacity of Jamaican organizations to manage natural resources effectively (IR 2.3)

Progress towards reaching this result was mixed, as delegation of management authority to NEPT was held up due to the GOJ's delay in declaring Negril's EPA. On the positive side, the newly launched Environmental Audits for Sustainable Tourism (EAST) activity, being implemented with the support of the Jamaica Hotel and Tourism Association (JHTA), motivated several hotels in Negril to change operations and maintenance practices with the promise of accruing both financial and environmental benefits (Indicator 2.3.1). This activity supports a program of environmental audits for hotels and tourism attractions as a means for demonstrating the economic as well as environmental benefits that can be derived from adopting more efficient, environmentally sound management practices. This program has been a resounding success, with hotels beginning to implement audit recommendations even before final audit reports have been issued.

Environmental Audits Show Hotels They Can Adopt Environmentally Sound Practices and Save Money, Too

Launched in June 1996, the Environmental Audits for Sustainable Tourism (EAST) activity is demonstrating to hotels and other tourism-related enterprises that the adoption of corporate environmental management systems benefits not only the environment, but the businesses' finances as well. To date, EAST has completed environmental audits on 11 hotels--ten in Negril and one in Port Antonio--to date. (A smaller component involves audits of selected manufacturing industries.)

The first round of audits found inefficient water and energy at the top of the list of wasteful abuses by hotels. The USAID-supported audit team found that in several hotels leaking pipes contributed to 40 percent or more of daily water use adding in excess of \$600 to a hotel's monthly water bill. The audit team also detected excessive use of chemicals, noting that instead of manually cleaning areas like grease traps, some properties use massive amounts of sulfuric acid to the detriment of their plumbing system and the land into which the chemical waste is emitted. Plastic bags are another major source of unnecessary waste and expense. One 25-room property spent over \$1,700 per month on trash bags in which they collect waste, a large portion of which is yard trimmings which could easily be composted, resulting in improved grounds and significant savings. Other simple changes recommended by the audit team, such as the use of aerators and low flow shower heads and recycling of grey water to irrigate hotel grounds, could save properties up to \$30,000 per year on water consumption.

The EAST message, that appropriate environmental management can increase the efficiency of hotel operations and save money, is spreading rapidly. Some hotels have started implementing recommendations even before receiving their audit report and the demand for environmental audits from other hotels is strong and growing.

It should be noted that most of Jamaica's environmental NGOs are nascent organizations in the early stages of building their capacity to assist community resource users and many are making good progress in building awareness of environmental issues and developing a vision for the long-term management of the areas for which they advocate. Many are now beginning to experiment with different institutional models for the management of protected areas. For example, the Jamaican Conservation and Development Trust (JCDDT), was delegated responsibility for the management of the John Crow/Blue Mountains National Park. In 1996, the JCDDT established a co-management agreement with The Nature Conservancy. As a result, this co-management of the park will increase overall capability of management. The two organizations developed a joint work plan in FY 1997. Given the unique advantages that the two organizations bring to the table, it is anticipated that the co-management arrangement will result in increased effectiveness in the management of the National Park.

Protected areas in Negril are also beginning to experiment with different models for management. Within the Negril Protection Area there is a Royal Palm Reserve. The GOJ has provided a lease to two private sector companies to manage the reserve. In FY 1997, NEPT began discussions with the two private companies to establish an ecotourism partnership between NEPT, the private sector and the resource users living under the poverty line. These discussions represent a significant step towards the establishment of an FY 1998 eco-tourism activity which will link eco-tourism to protected area management and poverty alleviation.

In an effort to better coordinate donor assistance in Negril, USAID has made a focused effort this year to better collaborate with the European Union (EU). Where in the past, the EU has provided support directly to the Negril Coral Reef Preservation Society (NCRPS) (a member organization of NEPT) and USAID has funded NEPT, NEPT and NCRPS plan to develop a joint proposal for joint USAID/EU co-financing. This will lead to a more integrated and strengthened management approach in the Negril area.

USAID training activities also contributed to this IR. While only a few people were sent to the U.S. for training (*Indicator 2.3.5*), eighty-five males and one hundred and fifteen females received environmental training in Jamaica in 1997. Development of Environmental Management Organizations (DEMO) project staff decided that the provision of training within the Jamaican context would be more effective than any training identified in the U.S.

iv. Established environmental policies and regulations to conserve key natural resources (IR 2.4)

Progress towards reaching this result generally met expectations. While no new policy reforms were enacted, important policy guidelines for the management of protected areas were developed (*Indicator 2.4.1*). Guidelines were prepared for more than a dozen other topics as well, including eco-tourism, human resources and compliance with environmental laws. USAID is now working with the NRCA to establish economic incentives which will encourage both compliance with regulations and the adoption of sustainable environmental practices.

There were 123 natural resources management enforcement actions in 1997 (*Indicator 2.4.3*), far surpassing the targeted 40. In the Montego Bay Marine Park, a total of 85 spear guns were confiscated and one vessel which was involved in illegal fishing was seized. Cessation order was also served on an individual for the removal of mangroves from the Marine Park. A number of warning letters were also issued for illegal activities in the Blue and John Crow Mountains National Park and one arrest was made. Reinforcing the Government's commitment to enforcement of environmental laws and regulations, the recently presented GOJ annual budget showed financing for 90 new rangers/enforcement officers.

With USAID assistance, in 1997 the Negril Coral Reef Preservation Society (an NGO under the NEPT umbrella organization) established both natural resources and water quality monitoring systems (*Indicators 2.4.2 and 2.4.4*).

2. Expected Progress Through FY 2000 and Management Actions

- Water quality in targeted areas will be improved through maintenance of waste water plants.
- Coral reef ecosystems will be healthier in targeted areas. The specific activities to be implemented to achieve this may include establishment of tertiary sewage treatment systems, rural community sanitary solutions, policy reforms and watershed management.
- Resource users in selected watershed areas, protected areas and community "buffer zones" will have adopted environmentally sustainable practices. Successful private sector/NGO partnerships will result in sustainable eco-tourism development. As a result, the quality of the environment will be improved and employment opportunities will be provided in targeted communities.
- Protected areas will be generating income through user fee systems, eco-enterprises and partnerships with the private sector and international NGOs. Protected area management organizations will be more financially independent as a percentage of their operating budget will be earned through the production of goods and services.
- North Coast hotels will be using environmental management systems that comply with international standards. As a result, they will receive internationally recognized "green certification."

RESULTS FRAMEWORK

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 2: INCREASED PROTECTION OF KEY NATURAL RESOURCES IN ENVIRONMENTALLY AND ECONOMICALLY SIGNIFICANT AREAS

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE-LEVEL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

2.0.1 Environmentally threatened areas under NRCA protection
2.0.2 Key tourism-based areas with improved coastal water quality

INTERMEDIATE RESULTS (IR)

2.1 Expanded areas of priority urban and natural resources under sustainable management

2.2 Increased financial resources for environmental management

2.3 Strengthened capacity of Jamaican organizations to manage natural resources effectively

2.4 Established environmental policies and regulations to conserve key natural resources

[World Bank, IDB, GOJ, CIDA, EU]

I.R. Level Performance Indicators

2.1.1 Protected areas under effective management

2.2.1 Local environmental enhancement activities operating on a cost recovery basis

2.3.1 Households and organizations successfully implementing environmental improvement activities

2.4.1 Policy reforms to create incentives for sound environmental management

[MEH, MPUTE, NRCA, WRA]

2.1.2. Miles of coastline under improved management

2.2.2. Revenue generating programs and activities implemented by NGOs

2.3.2. NGOs receiving NRCA delegation of authority to manage protected areas

2.4.2. Increased GOJ actions to identify and remediate coastal water pollution

2.1.3. Gallons of untreated waste water from sewerage system entering Montego Bay

2.2.3. Protected areas with revenue generation programs in place

2.3.3. Municipal sewerage systems operated/maintained by the private sector

2.4.3. Natural resource management enforcement action

2.1.4. Acres under improved soil conservation practices

2.2.4. Additional investment leveraged by USAID support

2.3.4. Tourism-related enterprises receiving certification of improved environmental operation

2.4.4. Monitoring of natural resources

2.3.5. Trained personnel for environmental management

Critical Assumptions:

1. Continued public policy supporting decentralized management of natural resources and urban services.
2. Continued GOJ commitment to establishing protected areas.
3. GOJ commitment to enable revenue generating programs to directly finance urban services and natural resources management.
4. GOJ commitment to adopt environmental management policy reforms.
5. NWC commitment to concept of community-based water and sanitation services.
6. GOJ commitment to revise development and environmental standards.

CROSS-CUTTING THEMES

COMMUNITY
BASED
DEVELOPMENT

DONOR
COOPERATION

INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY

PERFORMANCE DATA TABLE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE #2

Strategic Objective 2: Increased protection of key natural resources in environmentally and economically significant areas APPROVED: COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Jamaica				
RESULT NAME: Increased protection of key natural resources in environmentally and economically significant areas				
INDICATOR: Environmentally threatened areas under NRCA protection				
UNIT OF MEASURE: (a) number of protected area units and (b) acreage of protected areas (000s) SOURCE: NRCA records INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Number and acreage of "environmentally threatened" areas placed under a protected area status by NRCA. COMMENTS:		YEAR 1992 (B)	PLANNED (a) 0 (b) 0	ACTUAL (a) 0 (b) 0
		1995	(a) 2 (b) 200	(a) 2 (b) 200
		1996	(a) 2 (b) 200	(a) 2 (b) 200
		1997	(a) 4 (b) 240	(a) 3 (b) 280
		1998	(a) 6 (b) 400	(a) (b)
		1999		
		2000		
		2001		

Strategic Objective 2: Increased protection of key natural resources in environmentally and economically significant areas APPROVED: COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Jamaica				
RESULT NAME: Increased protection of key natural resources in environmentally and economically significant areas				
INDICATOR: 2.0.2. Key tourism-based areas with improved coastal water quality				
UNIT OF MEASURE: (a) number of tourism destinations and (b) number of tourists (000s) SOURCE: NRCA, MOH, NWC Water Quality Monitoring Records and JHTA Records INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: (a) Number of tourism destination areas with acceptable coastal water quality (consistent with NRCA standards as derived from the Jamaica Bureau of Standards and ISO standards). (b) Number of tourists visiting improved coastal water locations impacted by results package activities. First site is Negril. COMMENTS:		YEAR 1996 (B)	PLANNED (a) 0 (b) 86	ACTUAL (a) 0 (b) 86
		1997	(a) 0 (b) 140	(a) 0 (b) 215
		1998	(a) 1 (b) 200	(a) (b)
		1999	(a) 2 (b) 350	(a) (b)
		2000	(a) 3 (b) 400	(a) (b)
		2001	(a) 4 (b) 500	(a) (b)

Strategic Objective 2: Increased protection of key natural resources in environmentally and economically significant areas APPROVED: COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Jamaica				
RESULT NAME: Expanded areas of priority urban and natural resources under sustainable management				
INDICATOR: 2.1.1. Protected areas under effective management				
UNIT OF MEASURE: (a) number of protected areas units and (b) number of acres (000s) SOURCE: NRCA and DEMO Project records INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Number and area of targeted protected areas with adequate management includes: immediate conservation threats deterred; implementation of long-term management plan initiated; long-term financial sustainability plan in place; and a local constituency actively participating in supporting protected area management. The area planned for FY 1997 was Negril. The additional two locations in FY 1998 are the John Crow/Blue Mountain National Park and the Montego Bay Marine Park. COMMENTS:		YEAR 1992 (B)	PLANNED (a) 0 (b) 0	ACTUAL (a) 0 (b) 0
		1995	(a) 0 (b) 0	(a) 0 (b) 0
		1996	(a) 0 (b) 0	(a) 0 (b) 0
		1997	(a) 1 (b) 30	(a) 1 (b) 40
		1998	(a) 3 (b) 230	
		1999		
		2000		
		2001		

Strategic Objective 2: Increased protection of key natural resources in environmentally and economically significant areas APPROVED: COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Jamaica RESULT NAME: Expanded areas of priority urban and natural resources under sustainable management INDICATOR: 2.1.2. Miles of coastline under improved management			
UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of miles SOURCE: NRCA, NWC and CWIP project records INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Approximately 75% of Jamaica's formal tourism establishments and attractions are located in discrete areas of the coast totalling approximately 45 miles of frontage. Improved management includes: water quality monitoring systems in place; sewage treatment plants (whether package or municipal) operating satisfactorily; pollution enforcement measures in place; and a local constituency actively participating in coastal zone management. COMMENTS:	YEAR 1996 (B) 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001	PLANNED 0 0 7 12 18 21	ACTUAL 0 10

Strategic Objective 2: Increased protection of key natural resources in environmentally and economically significant areas APPROVED: COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Jamaica RESULT NAME: Expanded areas of priority urban and natural resources under sustainable management INDICATOR: 2.1.3. Gallons of untreated waste water from sewerage system entering Montego Bay			
UNIT OF MEASURE: Million gallons/day SOURCE: NWC records INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: The volume of untreated water, in millions of gallons per day, entering Montego Bay from municipal sewage treatment system. The lower the number, the greater the protection of the Bay. COMMENTS:	YEAR 1994 (B) 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001	PLANNED 2 1.6 1 1 0 	ACTUAL 2 2 2 2

Strategic Objective 2: Increased protection of key natural resources in environmentally and economically significant areas APPROVED: COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Jamaica				
RESULT NAME: Increased financial resources for environmental management				
INDICATOR: 2.2.1. Local environmental enhancement activities operating sustainably				
UNIT OF MEASURE: (a) number of sustainable CBO activities and (b) number of sustainable NGO activities SOURCE: CBO and NGO records INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: This indicator measures the number of activities generating at least 50% of the revenue required to maintain the activity on a self-sustaining basis. COMMENTS:		YEAR 1996 (B)	PLANNED (a) 0 (b) 0	ACTUAL (a) 0 (b) 0
		1997	(a) 1 (b) 0	(a) 0 (b) 0
		1998	(a) 2 (b) 1	
		1999	(a) 3 (b) 2	
		2000	(a) 3 (b) 3	
		2001	(a) 4 (b) 4	

Strategic Objective 2: Increased protection of key natural resources in environmentally and economically significant areas APPROVED: COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Jamaica				
RESULT NAME: Increased financial resources for environmental management				
INDICATOR: 2.2.2 Revenue generating programs and activities implemented by environmental NGOs				
UNIT OF MEASURE: (a) number of national programs and (b) number of local programs SOURCE: National and Local Trust Fund Annual Reports INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Number of fundraising programs under implementation by key participating organizations in order to achieve sustainability of environmental management activities. In FY 1995, the success was the National Park Trust Fund; in FY 1996 it was the Negril Environmental Protection Trust. COMMENTS:		YEAR 1992 (B)	PLANNED (a) 0 (b) 0	ACTUAL (a) 0 (b) 0
		1995	(a) 1 (b) 0	(a) 1 (b) 0
		1996	(a) 1 (b) 1	(a) 1 (b) 1
		1997	(a) 2 (b) 2	(a) 0 (b) 2
		1998	(a) 2 (b) 3	
		1999		
		2000		
		2001		

Strategic Objective 2: Increased protection of key natural resources in environmentally and economically significant areas				
APPROVED: COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Jamaica				
RESULT NAME: Increased financial resources for environmental management				
INDICATOR: 2.2.3. Protected areas with revenue generation programs in place				
UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of protected areas		YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
SOURCE: National and Local Trust Funds and NGO Annual reports		1992 (B)	0	0
INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Number of protected areas with 25% of required annual income coming from user fees, trust fund earnings and other sustainable funding sources. In 1996, the Montego Bay Marine Park instituted charges for Park visitors.		1995	0	0
COMMENTS:		1996	1	1
		1997	2	1
		1998	3	
		1999		
		2000		
		2001		

Strategic Objective 2: Increased protection of key natural resources in environmentally and economically significant areas				
APPROVED: COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Jamaica				
RESULT NAME: Increased financial resources for environmental management				
INDICATOR: 2.2.4. Additional annual investment leveraged by USAID support				
UNIT OF MEASURE: Millions of US\$		YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
SOURCE: USAID, Other Donor, EFJ and Private Sector records		1994 (B)	0	0
INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: An indirect benefit of the USAID’s environmental program is the strengthening of local and national institutions capacities to seek further funding from GOJ, other donors and EFJ and to collect revenues from local resources. Additional US dollar investment leveraged by USAID support is measured.		1995	0.2	0.2
		1996	1	1
		1997	1.2	0.6
		1998	1.6	
		1999	2	
		2000	2.4	
		2001	2.7	
COMMENTS:				

Strategic Objective 2: Increased protection of key natural resources in environmentally and economically significant areas				
APPROVED: COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Jamaica				
RESULT NAME: Strengthened capacity of Jamaican organizations to manage natural resources effectively				
INDICATOR: 2.3.1. Households and organizations successfully implementing environmental improvement activities				
UNIT OF MEASURE: (a) number of CBOs/NGOs; (b) number of households and (c) number of business establishments		YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
SOURCE: CBO and NGO records INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: (a) Number of CBOs addressing environmental issues and NGOs implementing activities that mitigate or prevent environmental degradation; (b) number of households that change environmental practices as a result of environmental training; (c) number of tourism-related enterprises that change operation and maintenance practices in response to environmental training. COMMENTS:		1994 (B)	(a) 0 (b) 0 (c) 0	(a) 0 (b) 0 (c) 0
		1995	(a) 4 (b) 800 (c) 0	(a) 4 (b) 200 (c) 0
		1996	(a) 5 (b) 1,700 (c) 0	(a) 5 (b) 1,400 (c) 0
		1997	(a) 7 (b) 2,000 (c) 4	(a) 7 (b) 1497 (c) 4
		1998	(a) 14 (b) 2,400 (c) 8	
		1999	(a) 18 (b) 2,800 (c) 12	
		2000	(a) 19 (b) 3,100 (c) 15	
		2001	(a) 22 (b) 3,400 (c) 18	

Strategic Objective 2: Increased protection of key natural resources in environmentally and economically significant areas APPROVED: COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Jamaica				
RESULT NAME: Strengthened capacity of Jamaican organizations to manage natural resources effectively				
INDICATOR: 2.3.2. NGOs receiving NRCA delegation of authority to manage protected areas				
UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of NGOs receiving authority SOURCE: NRCA records INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Delegation by NRCA of the management of protected areas to local communities is a key indicator of sustainability. COMMENTS:		YEAR 1992 (B)	PLANNED 0	ACTUAL 0
		1995	0	0
		1996	2	2
		1997	3	2
		1998	4	
		1999		
		2000		
		2001		

Strategic Objective 2: Increased protection of key natural resources in environmentally and economically significant areas APPROVED: COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Jamaica				
RESULT NAME: Strengthened capacity of Jamaican organizations to manage natural resources effectively				
INDICATOR: 2.3.3. Municipal sewerage treatment systems operated/maintained by the private sector				
UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of systems SOURCE: NWC records INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: The effective operation and maintenance (O&M) of sewage systems by the National Water Commission is a major problem and a primary concern for users, both potential and actual, of these systems. Alternative forms of O&M, involving private sector participation, will be introduced to NWC. The number of sewage treatment systems operated and managed by private sector firms is an indicator of both GOJ and NWC acceptance of this concept. COMMENTS:		YEAR 1997 (B)	PLANNED -	ACTUAL 0
		1998	1	
		1999	2	
		2000	3	
		2001	3	

Strategic Objective 2: Increased protection of key natural resources in environmentally and economically significant areas			
APPROVED: COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Jamaica			
RESULT NAME: Strengthened capacity of Jamaican organizations to manage natural resources effectively			
INDICATOR: 2.3.4. Tourism-related enterprises receiving certification of improved environmental operations			
UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of tourism enterprises	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
SOURCE: JHTA and CWIP records	1997(B)	-	0
INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: While the certification standard has yet to be finalized, it is likely to be based upon the newly established ISO 14000 standard.	1998	3	
COMMENTS:	1999	8	
	2000	14	
	2001	20	

Strategic Objective 2: Increased protection of key natural resources in environmentally and economically significant areas			
APPROVED: COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Jamaica			
RESULT NAME: Strengthened capacity of Jamaican organizations to manage natural resources effectively			
INDICATOR: 2.3.5. Trained personnel for environmental management			
UNIT OF MEASURE: (a) number of males trained and (b) number of females trained	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
SOURCE: DEMO, EAST and CWIP Results Packages records INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Number of publicly and privately employed individuals receiving short-term training in environmental management. Only training in the United States is measured. COMMENTS:	1992 (B)	(a) 0 (b) 0	(a) 0 (b) 0
	1995	(a) 46 (b) 20	(a) 27 (b) 14
	1996	(a) 59 (b) 29	(a) 36 (b) 22
	1997	(a) 76 (b) 36	(a) 85 (b) 115
	1998	(a) 80 (b) 60	(a) (b)
	1999	(a) 85 (b) 72	
	2000	(a) 90 (b) 85	
	2001	(a) 100 (b) 95	

Strategic Objective 2: Increased protection of key natural resources in environmentally and economically significant areas APPROVED: COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Jamaica RESULT NAME: Established environmental policies and regulations to conserve key natural resources INDICATOR: 2.4.1. Policy reforms enacted to create incentives for sound environmental management			
UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of major policy reforms enacted SOURCE: GOJ records INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Policies to be addressed include (but not restricted to) investment of park and other government revenues into protected areas; tariff regimes on the importation of environmental technologies; the participation of authority to local constituencies. COMMENTS:	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
	1992 (B)	0	0
	1995	4	6
	1996	6	7
	1997	8	7
	1998	9	
	1999	10	
	2000	11	
	2001	12	

Strategic Objective 2: Increased protection of key natural resources in environmentally and economically significant areas APPROVED: COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Jamaica RESULT NAME: Established environmental policies and regulation to conserve key natural resources INDICATOR: 2.4.2. Increased GOJ actions to identify coastal water pollution			
UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of water quality monitoring systems SOURCE: NRCA, MOH and NWC records INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Number of near-shore water quality monitoring system in place in tourism destinations. COMMENTS:	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
	1996 (B)	-	1
	1997	1	1
	1998	2	
	1999	3	
	2000	4	
	2001	4	

Strategic Objective 2: Increased protection of key natural resources in environmentally and economically significant areas APPROVED: COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Jamaica				
RESULT NAME: Established environmental policies and regulation to conserve key natural resources				
INDICATOR: 2.4.3. Natural resources management enforcement actions				
UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of enforcement actions completed SOURCE: NRCA and National Parks Systems records INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: A completed enforcement action is one in which fines have been collected, cases have been prosecuted to conclusion or the illegal use of resources has been terminated as a result of negotiation or mediation. Authority for enforcement rests with NRCA. COMMENTS:		YEAR 1992 (B)	PLANNED -	ACTUAL 0
		1995	15	28
		1996	35	38
		1997	40	123
		1998	50	
		1999		
		2000		
		2001		

Strategic Objective 2: Increased protection of key natural resources in environmentally and economically significant areas APPROVED: COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Jamaica				
RESULT NAME: Established environmental policies and regulation to conserve key natural resources				
INDICATOR: 2.4.4. Monitoring of natural resources				
UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of monitoring programs SOURCE: GOJ and NGO Natural Resource Monitoring records INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Number of supported interventions in place to monitor key natural resource conditions in USAID project areas such as: status of endangered species; changes in forest cover; health of coral reefs; and size of fishery stocks. COMMENTS:		YEAR 1996 (B)	PLANNED -	ACTUAL 0
		1997	1	2
		1998	3	
		1999	5	
		2000	8	
		2001	12	

C. Strategic Objective 3 (SO3): Young Jamaicans Better Equipped for the 21st Century

1. Performance Analysis

a. Toward achieving SO3

Overall, notable progress was made in 1997 toward achieving the expected results of SO3. USAID interventions to achieve this IR included health-related and attitudinal/behavioral change programs targeted at 10 to 24 year olds. While trends in overall fertility have decreased slightly from 3 children per woman in 1993 to 2.8 in 1997, youth fertility (*Indicator 3.0.1*) increased slightly over planned targets. This increase reflects the national family planning strategy's focus on the general population and its scant attention towards youth. The 1997 Reproductive Health Survey results indicate that the Mission's strategy should be to focus on youth (age 10-19 and young adults age 20-24) in our new reproductive health activity. The 1997 HIV seroprevalance rate among STD clinic attenders (*Indicator 3.0.2*) is 6.4%, far better progress than expected given the planned target of 10% for 1997. This accelerated achievement can be attributed to the improvement of STD control as represented by the falling rate for infectious syphilis, the decline in prevalence of genital ulcers and improvement due to some behavioral change communication activities. It should be noted that while the 1997 rate is higher than that reported in 1996 (from 4.6% to 6.4%), this is an anomaly due to sampling problems, such as low overall numbers caused by spoilage of samples, in 1996 .

Community-Level AIDS Prevention Program Reaches High-Risk Population

To assist in promoting condom use as a means of preventing sexually transmitted disease, USAID's AIDS/STD Prevention Project targeted the training of 60 Community Peer Educators (CPEs) over a four-year period. However, 58 were trained in the first year alone. The CPEs target high-risk areas and assist with the implementation of community interventions. As a result of one such intervention in the parish of St. Catherine, the parish with the third highest AIDS case rate, a famous and popular night club with go-go dancers and prostitutes was targeted.

The proprietor initiated a condom outlet and was supplied with three boxes of condoms per month (50 in each box) at concession rates. This number steadily increased over a six-month period and their supply is now approximately six boxes per month. The condoms are placed in each hotel room and the charge for this is included in the room charge. This innovative method of encouraging safe sex indicates that the message has been positively transmitted and is being practiced in a high risk area.

In 1997, the literacy rates at the grade 4 level (*Indicator 3.0.3*) maintained last year's levels of 48% for boys and 58% for girls. The result reflects a commendable effort toward sustainability by the Ministry of Education and Culture in implementing pre-1997 project reforms. USAID played a monitoring role during 1997 as the Primary Education Assistance Project (PEAP) II, which worked in the areas of literacy and numeracy, ended in late 1996. However, the Ministry of Education and Culture, with direct support from the IDB, applied interventions introduced under USAID's PEAP II project which contributed to the sustained levels in literacy rates. The literacy rates are expected to be stable throughout 1998 and increase in early 1999 onwards, as reforms under the new USAID funded education activity, "New Horizons for Primary Schools," are implemented.

USAID INITIATIVES IN PRIMARY EDUCATION BEING SUSTAINED

A quiet wind of positive change has been blowing across Jamaican primary schools over the past four years in the form of improved performance standards. Student performance in mathematics at Grades 3 and 6 either remained stable or showed increases of up to 4% based on the 1997 test results. This was a direct result of two important factors--one being the successful implementation of innovations under the USAID funded Primary Education Assistance Project (PEAP) II which ended in November, 1996, and the other being the admirable efforts of the Jamaican Ministry of Education and Culture (MOEC) in sustaining the project innovations with its own resources.

The Educational Strengthening Component of PEAP II helped students achieve higher performance in mathematics. The activities included pre-service and in-service teacher training, review and revision of the primary mathematics curriculum and development of prototype materials to support the curriculum. Perhaps the key factor that led to the positive result was the strategy for post project sustainability of project initiatives that included: training of Mathematics Resource Teachers (MRTs), and Assessment Coordinators in clusters of primary schools, close collaboration with the Mathematics Department of the MOEC as well as the Teacher Training Colleges and the donor/lender community. The Primary Education Improvement Project (PEIP) funded by the Inter-American Development Bank, for instance, found the strategy of training Resource Teachers very effective and adapted this strategy in its project.

The MOEC, using its own resources in the post-project phase, pilot tested the revised mathematics curriculum, disseminated it to all schools and increased the number of trained Mathematics Resources Teachers by 60, in addition to the 140 trained under the project.

Five "master" mathematics educators recently concluded an intensive, specially designed training program--elaborated entirely by USAID/Jamaica--in the U.S. to become acquainted with exemplary math curricula, teacher training and materials development and usage at the elementary school level. This ties into USAID's new primary education activity, New Horizons, a principal aim of which is to improve mathematics learning and achievement.

b. Intermediate Results (IRs)

i. Healthier lifestyles for youth (IR 3.1)

Age at first sexual intercourse for at-risk youth served by the USAID-funded Uplifting Adolescents Project (UAP) (*Indicator 3.1.1*) showed remarkable progress over the past year. Although baseline figures for this indicator were based on national statistics for the general population, UAP is targeting a special "at-risk" population. The "actual" figures for this indicator represent data for the 3,000 at-risk youth in the UAP. The "ages" for this group are expected to be below the national level as a large segment within the age cohort (10-14) served by the UAP was sexually active on entry to the program. The increase of age at first sexual intercourse from 13 in 1996 to 13.3 in 1997 among females is a notable accomplishment. The real effects of the program are not expected to be seen until late 1998, slightly more than two years after implementation of the UAP. At that time, it is expected that the behavior of the boys will be more in line with the national level. National level data from the 1997 Reproductive Health Survey indicates that age at first sexual intercourse among 15-24 year-olds averages 13.7 years for males and 15.9 for females.

Preliminary results of the national 1997 Reproductive Health Survey show an increase in the contraceptive prevalence rate from 62% in 1993 to 65.5% in 1997. While the 1993 CPS survey indicated that the preferred method of contraception was the condom, the 1997 survey attributes the increase to the injectable contraceptive. This increase is, in large part, due to the effectiveness of the USAID-funded Personal Choice program, which has increased sales and advertising for the injectable contraceptive in the private sector. However, the dramatic decrease in the contraceptive prevalence rate (*Indicator 3.1.2*) for youth ages 15-19 and the lesser decrease for males 20-24 can be directly attributed to lack of focus on male programs. For the same period, female contraceptive prevalence has increased for the same age groups.

Depo-Provera Injectable Leads to Increased Contraceptive Prevalence

With USAID financial support and technical assistance, Jamaica's Personal Choice contraceptive social marketing program has stimulated a 110 % increase in private sector sales of Depo Provera injectables since 1995. An extensive marketing campaign by Personal Choice has provided information and technical support to assist women in selecting this method. Another important element of the Personal Choice campaign has been an effort to make injectables available in a convenient setting and at an affordable price. Increased use of the injectable has resulted in a national increase in overall contraceptive prevalence to 64.5%. Contributing factors to the success of the injectable program include competitive pricing based on a higher sales volume; the value-added packaging feature of a disposable syringe to ensure quality-of-care; extensive training of physicians and pharmacists in contraceptive technology and counseling; a comprehensive mass media campaign to stimulate demand for the method; and extensive public relations and marketing support, including wide distribution of consumer and provider information and materials.

The number of infectious (primary and secondary) syphilis cases (*Indicator 3.1.3*) in both males and females has decreased significantly over the past year. Infectious syphilis is a important cofactor in the transmission of HIV and this decrease reflects an encouraging trend toward reducing the transmission of HIV. The average number of primary and secondary infectious cases has shown a significant decrease of 32% since 1996. The decrease in infectious cases can be attributed to the decentralization of the Ministry of Health's services to regional offices; more widely available same-day treatment; better syphilis screening; work done by Contact Investigators in case findings, contact tracing and outreach; peer counselling outreach within the communities; and donor coordination within the national AIDS/STD Prevention and Control Program. Next year's reporting for this indicator will be broken out by age cohorts. The Ministry of Health has trained 58 peer educators to provide behavioral change interventions throughout the island in line with the MOH decentralization policies (*Indicator 3.1.4*). The program has almost achieved the five-year target of training 60 peer educators in its first year of implementation.

ii. Enhanced socio-economic preparedness of "at-risk" youths (IR 3.2)

Significant progress has been made in reaching the target group of "at-risk" youth. The number of NGOs working with UAP to deliver packages of services (*Indicator 3.2.1*) far exceeded planned targets. The increased capabilities of these NGOs which have received directed training under the project can be seen in their program management, record keeping principles, accountability, networking, and their potential for self-sustainability through their new abilities to access resources. This resulted in the retention/re-instatement in school of just over 3,000 youths (age 10-14), who either had dropped out of school or were attending very irregularly (*Indicator 3.2.2*). While this is slightly less than the 3,000 "at-risk" youth and 380 special "at-risk youth targeted, these numbers are expected to increase significantly over the next few years as project interventions reach more youths. The shortfall in the number of beneficiaries reached is due primarily to the lack of available facilities and the need to often work one-on-one with troubled youth.

The drop-out rate for beneficiaries under UAP (*Indicator 3.2.3*), which was 60% in 1996, was reduced to 24% in 1997, far exceeding projected rates. While the "special population" youngsters are reported as 100% drop-outs under UAP, they are regular attenders at an NGO institution which works with them to improve their readiness for re-instatement into a primary school. Their drop-out label will change once they have returned to the formal primary school system.

iii. Improved literacy and numeracy at the primary school level (IR 3.3)

Activities toward achieving this IR will begin in mid 1998. However, accomplishments realized under the Primary Education Assistance Project (PEAP II) which ended in November 1996 have laid the groundwork upon which the Mission's new basic education activity will

build. In 1997, the Ministry of Education increased the total number of mathematics resource teachers (MRTs) trained to 200, of which 140 were trained under PEAP II. Supplementing the MOE effort, USAID provided mathematics teachers with opportunities for participant training and targeted observation travel abroad to study model programs and learn new techniques for teaching mathematics. More importantly, student performance in mathematics at grades three and six either remained stable or showed increases of up to 4%, with the exception of the rate for boys in grade 6. Boys in Jamaican primary schools, unlike those of many other countries, have traditionally performed below girls' standards. In response, boys, rather than girls, are the emphasis in our future planned interventions.

2. Expected Progress Through FY 2000 and Management Actions

After extensive consultations with representatives from the Jamaican Ministry of Education and Culture, the National Council on Education, NGOs and institutional contractors, the Mission concluded that its program would be best served by making education and health two separate strategic objectives. The new proposed strategic objectives for education and health are SO 3, "Improved Reproductive Health of Youth," and SO 4, "Increased Literacy and Numeracy among Jamaican Youth in Targeted Primary Schools." (These SOs are presented in detail in Results Frameworks in Annexes D and E.) The change focuses on clearer, more precise and objectively measurable Strategic Objectives. The related intermediate results and performance monitoring plans have been collaboratively developed by the representative groups noted above.

Based on the proposed SOs and their supporting intermediate results, the Mission expects the following results to be achieved by 2000:

- At least six more Jamaican NGOs providing packages of services to at-risk youth under the Uplifting Adolescents Project (UAP);
- An additional 400 primary school mathematics and language arts teachers trained;
- Mathematics proficiency and achievement are expected to rise an average of 4% between 1997 and 1999 in targeted schools. For male sixth grade students, the aim is a 10% increase;
- Reading proficiency and achievement are expected to rise an average of 4% between 1997 and 2000. For sixth grade males, the goal is a 14% increase; and
- HIV/AIDS legislation on legal and ethical issues will be drafted and presented to Parliament.

RESULTS FRAMEWORK

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 3: YOUNG JAMAICANS BETTER-EQUIPPED FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (0-24 YEARS)

- 3.0.1 Youth Fertility
- 3.0.2 HIV Seroprevalence among STD Clinic attenders
- 3.0.3 Better prepared primary school students

INTERMEDIATE RESULTS (IR)

3.1 Healthier lifestyle for youth

3.2 Enhanced Socio-Economic Preparedness for "at-risk" youth

3.3 Improved literacy and numeracy at primary school level

I.R. Level Performance Indicators

3.1.1. Age at first sexual intercourse

3.2.1. NGOs strengthened to work with "at-risk" youth

3.3.1 Improved teaching methods in primary schools

3.1.2. Contraceptive Prevalence (15-24 years)

3.2.2. "At-risk" youths benefitting from packages of services

3.3.2. Mathematics proficiency and achievement

3.1.3. Reduction in primary and secondary
syphilis cases

3.2.3. School drop-out rates among "at-risk" youths
in targeted population

3.3.3. Reading proficiency and achievement

3.1.4. Enhanced Behavioral Change

3.2.4. Literacy rate of Jamaican "at-risk"
youths in targeted population

CROSS-CUTTING THEMES

COMMUNITY
BASED
DEVELOPMENT

DONOR
COOPERATION

INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY

**PERFORMANCE DATA TABLE
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 3**

Strategic Objective 3: Young Jamaicans Better Equipped for the 21st Century APPROVED: COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Jamaica				
RESULT NAME: Young Jamaicans Better Equipped for the 21st Century				
INDICATOR: 3.0.1. Youth Fertility				
UNIT OF MEASURE: Live births per 1,000 women currently married or "in union" - (a) 15-19 and (b) 20-24 SOURCE: Reproductive Health Survey & Registrar General's Department INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: * Estimates COMMENTS: The estimates for 1995 and 1996 are based on projections from the 1993 Contraceptive Prevalence Survey (CPS). The 1997 figures are preliminary results from the Reproductive Health Survey conducted every four years.		YEAR 1993 (B)	PLANNED	ACTUAL (a) 107 (b) 160
		1995*	(a) 108 (b) 160	(a) 114 (b) 170
		1996*	(a) 108 (b) 160	(a) 108 (b) 160
		1997	(a) 108 (b) 160	(a) 112 (b) 163
		1998	(a) 107 (b) 159	
		1999	(a) 106 (b) 158	
		2000	(a) 105.5 (b) 158.5	
		2001	(a) 105 (b) 157	

Strategic Objective 3: Young Jamaicans Better Equipped for the 21st Century APPROVED: COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Jamaica				
RESULT NAME: Young Jamaicans Better Equipped for the 21st Century				
INDICATOR: 3.0.2 HIV Seroprevalence among STD Clinic Attenders				
UNIT OF MEASURE: Percentage of STD Clinic Attenders SOURCE: Ministry of Health/Epidemiology Unit INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: HIV Seroprevalence is the percentage of population (both old and new attenders) who have been tested for HIV using blood samples and are positive at the time of testing. COMMENTS:		YEAR 1990 (B)	PLANNED -	ACTUAL 2
		1995	8	5.9
		1996	9	4.6
		1997	10	6.4
		1998	11	
		1999	12	
		2000	13	
		2001	14	

Strategic Objective 3: Young Jamaicans Better Equipped for the 21st Century APPROVED: COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Jamaica				
RESULT NAME: Young Jamaicans Better Equipped for the 21st Century				
INDICATOR: 3.0.3. Better Prepared Primary School Students				
UNIT OF MEASURE: Percentage of students passing MOE’s Grade Four Literacy Test - (a) male (b) female SOURCE: Ministry of Education/National Assessment Program INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: COMMENTS: These indicators will be reviewed in 1998 and new baseline could be set with data from a baseline study to be conducted under the New Horizons for Primary Schools activity. Performance measurement will focus on the 72 schools in the New Horizons activity.		YEAR 1996 (B)	PLANNED	ACTUAL (a) 48 (b) 58
		1997	(a) 48 (b) 58	(a) 48 (a) 58
		1998	(a) 51 (b) 60	(a) - (b) -
		1999	(a) 54 (b) 63	
		2000	(a) 57 (b) 66	
		2001	(a) 60 (b) 70	

Strategic Objective 3: Young Jamaicans Better Equipped for the 21st Century APPROVED: COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Jamaica				
RESULT NAME: Healthier Lifestyle for Youth				
INDICATOR: 3.1.1. Age at first sexual intercourse				
UNIT OF MEASURE: Age (years) at first sexual intercourse - (a) male (10-14); (b) female (10-14) SOURCE: Baseline from Trevor Hamilton Study and onward from UAP INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: This indicator targets 3,000 at-risk youth who will be reached through the Uplifting Adolescents Project (UAP). The effects of these interventions will become evident in 1998. COMMENTS: The "ACTUAL" describes a small group of 3000 at-risk youths while the "PLANNED" is a baseline for the National population. Therefore, the "ACTUAL" is an indication of how this at-risk group compares to the national situation. This indicator will not be continued in subsequent R4s.		YEAR 1995 (B)	PLANNED	ACTUAL (a) 13.0 (b) 14.3
		1996	(a) 13.0 (b) 14.3	(a) 13.0 (b) 14.3
		1997	(a) 13.2 (b) 14.5	(a) 13.3 (b) 13.4
		1998	(a) 13.2 (b) 14.5	
		1999	(a) 13.4 (b) 14.7	
		2000	(a) 13.5 (b) 14.8	
		2001	(a) 13.6 (b) 14.9	

Strategic Objective 3: Young Jamaicans Better Equipped for the 21st Century APPROVED: COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Jamaica				
RESULT NAME: Healthier Lifestyle for Youth				
INDICATOR: 3.1.2 Contraceptive Prevalence (15 - 24 years)				
UNIT OF MEASURE: Percentage - (a) males (15-19); (b) females (15-19); (c) males (20-24); (d) females (20-24) SOURCE: 1997 Reproductive Health Survey preliminary results INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: The Contraceptive Prevalence Rate is the percentage of sexually active males and currently married or "in-union" women of reproductive age who use any form of contraception. The estimates for 1996 are based on the 1993 CPS. The 1997 figures are preliminary results from the Reproductive Health Survey. * Estimates COMMENTS:		YEAR 1993 (B)	PLANNED	ACTUAL (a) 44.2 (b) 32.4 (c) 62.6 (d) 50.1
		1996 *	(a) 44.2 (b) 32.4 (c) 62.6 (d) 50.1	(a) 44.2 (b) 32.4 (c) 62.6 (d) 50.1
		1997	(a) 44.7 (b) 32.9 (c) 62.8 (d) 50.6	(a) 25.1 (b) 58.9 (c) 53.4 (d) 67.2
		1998	(a) 45.2 (b) 32.9 (c) 62.8 (d) 5.6	
		1999	(a) 44.7 (b) 33.4 (c) 63.0 (d) 51.1	
		2000	(a) 45.2 (b) 33.4 (c) 63.0 (d) 51.1	
		2001	(a) 45.7 (b) 33.9 (c) 63.2 (d) 51.6	

Strategic Objective 3: Young Jamaicans Better Equipped for the 21st Century APPROVED: COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Jamaica				
RESULT NAME: Healthier Lifestyle for Youth				
INDICATOR: 3.1.3 Infectious (Primary & Secondary) Syphilis Cases				
UNIT OF MEASURE: Cases/100,000 population - (a) male and (b) female SOURCE: Ministry of Health/Epidemiology Unit INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Infectious (primary and secondary) syphilis are the contagious stages of syphilis. At the tertiary level it is only harmful to the individual and not his/her sexual partner. Next year’s reporting will be broken out into age cohorts. COMMENTS: This information is a consolidation of reports from all 13 STD Clinics nationwide. * Adjustments in planned targets (1997-2001) reflect adjustments made by the MOH/Epidemiology Unit based on updated official population statistics from the Statistical Institute.		YEAR 1987(B)	PLANNED	ACTUAL (a) 94.7 (b) 85.1
		1996	(a) 30.5 (b) 31.0	(a) 20.3 (b) 21.1
		1997*	(a) 19.0 (b) 19.5	(a) 13.9 (b) 14.7
		1998*	(a) 17.5 (b) 18.0	
		1999*	(a) 16.0 (b) 16.5	
		2000*	(a) 14.5 (b) 15.0	
		2001*	(a) 13.0 (b) 13.5	

Strategic Objective 3: Young Jamaicans Better Equipped for the 21st Century APPROVED: COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Jamaica				
RESULT NAME: Healthier Lifestyle for Youth				
INDICATOR: 3.1.4 Enhanced Behavioral Change				
UNIT OF MEASURE: Total number of peer counselors trained (cumulative) and implementing BCC interventions		YEAR 1996(B)	PLANNED	ACTUAL 0
SOURCE: Ministry of Heath/Epidemiology Unit		1997	12	58*
INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Peer Counselors are employed by the Ministry of Health to educate the public at the community level on condom use and safe sex.		1998	24	
		1999	36	
* Males - 11 and females - 47		2000	48	
COMMENTS:		2001	60	

Strategic Objective 3: Young Jamaicans Better Equipped for the 21st Century APPROVED: COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Jamaica				
RESULT NAME: Enhanced Socio-Economic Preparedness for "At-risk" Youth				
INDICATOR: 3.2.1. NGOs strengthened to work with "at-risk" youths				
UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of NGOs - (a) # of NGOs delivering packages of services to "at-risk" youths (ages 10-14) and (b) # of NGOs delivering services to special populations (ie drug abusers, pregnant teenagers, reformed drug addicts, etc.)(10-14). SOURCE: Uplifting Adolescent Project INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: NGOs will be trained and monitored in the delivery of packages of services (Personal and Family Development, Vocational Education, Literacy and Reproductive Health) to "at-risk" youths. These are youths who have dropped out or are at-risk of dropping out of school into unemployment, crime and violence, and early pregnancy. COMMENTS:		YEAR 1996 (B)	PLANNED	ACTUAL (a) 0 (b) 0
		1997	(a) 3 (b) 2	(a) 11 (b) 4
		1998	(a) 7 (b) 4	
		1999	(a) 9 (b) 5	
		2000	(a) 10 (b) 5	
		2001	(a) 10 (b) 5	

Strategic Objective 3: Young Jamaicans Better Equipped for the 21st Century APPROVED: COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Jamaica				
RESULT NAME: Enhanced Socio-Economic Preparedness for "At-risk" Youth				
INDICATOR: 3.2.2. "At-risk" youths benefitting from packages of services				
UNIT OF MEASURE: Youths - (a) # of "at-risk" youths receiving Packages of Services (10-14) and (b) - # of special "at-risk" youths, eg. pregnant teenagers and reformed drug addicts, receiving special packages of services (age 10-14) SOURCE: Uplifting Adolescent Project INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: "At-risk" youths (ages 10-14) will receive technical packages of services in Personal and Family Development, Vocational Education, Literacy and Reproductive Health. COMMENTS: This indicator will not be reported on in the subsequent R4 but will be retained for project management purposes and reflected in the narrative discussion on the UAP.		YEAR 1996 (B)	PLANNED	ACTUAL (a) 0 (b) 0
		1997	(a) 3000 (b) 500	(a) 2701 (b) 380
		1998	(a) 6000 (b) 1100	
		1999	(a) 9300 (b) 1700	
		2000	(a) 9300 (b) 1700	
		2001	(a) 9300 (b) 1700	

Strategic Objective 3: Young Jamaicans Better Equipped for the 21st Century APPROVED: COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Jamaica				
RESULT NAME: Enhanced Socio-Economic Preparedness for "At-risk" Youth				
INDICATOR: 3.2.3 School drop-out rates among "at-risk" youths in targeted population				
UNIT OF MEASURE: Percentage of youths - (a) percentage of targeted youth who drop out of school and (b) percentage of special youth, i.e. pregnant teenagers and reformed drug addicts, who drop out of school SOURCE: Uplifting Adolescent Project INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: The target population includes the 11,000 at-risk youths who will receive packages of services in Personal and Family Development, Vocational Education, Literacy and Reproductive Health under UAP. COMMENTS:		YEAR 1996 (B)	PLANNED	ACTUAL (a) 60 (b) 60
		1997	(a) 50 (b) 55	(a) 24 (b) 100
		1998	(a) 35 (b) 40	
		1999	(a) 20 (b) 30	
		2000	(a) 10 (b) 20	
		2001	(a) 10 (b) 15	

Strategic Objective 3: Young Jamaicans Better Equipped for the 21st Century APPROVED: COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Jamaica				
RESULT NAME: Enhanced Socio-Economic Preparedness for "At-risk" Youth				
INDICATOR: 3.2.4. Literacy rate of "at-risk" youths in targeted population				
UNIT OF MEASURE: Percentage of targeted youths who are literate - (a) percentage of "at-risk" youths and (b) percentage of special "at-risk" youths, such as pregnant teenagers and reformed drug addicts.		YEAR 1996 (B)	PLANNED	ACTUAL (a) 50 (b) 50
SOURCE: Uplifting Adolescents Project		1997	(a) 55 (b) 55	(a) 46.7 (b) *
INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Targeted population includes youths who receive UAP technical packages of services in Literacy and Remedial Education, Vocational and Technical Education, Personal and Family development and Reproductive Health. The youngster is considered literate if s/he achieves a passing score on the grade four level literacy test.		1998	(a) 63 (b) 60	
		1999	(a) 70 (b) 65	
COMMENTS: Please note that the data for Indicator 3.2.4 are based on a limited sample from the populations which the sub-grantees serve, and are in no way meant to represent the situation in the general Jamaican population. All data are for the year 1997, the first year in which the UAP provided sub-grants, and on which data, although limited, are available.		2000	(a) 75 (b) 70	
		2001	(a) 75 (b) 70	
* The data for the special at risk population are not available because the sub-grant was made to the NGOs late in 1997 and would have very limited time within which to produce a result attributable to the UAP interventions.				

Strategic Objective 3: Young Jamaicans Better Equipped for the 21st Century APPROVED: COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Jamaica				
RESULT NAME: Improved Literacy and Numeracy at Primary School Level				
INDICATOR: 3.3.1. Improved teaching methods in primary schools				
UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of teachers who receive training - (a) # of teachers receiving special in-service training and (b) # of teachers receiving special pre-service training SOURCE: National Assessment Program INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: A number of primary school teachers will be trained in innovative methods of instruction. This includes both pre-service training for those in teachers' colleges and in-service training for teachers already working in the classroom. COMMENTS:		YEAR 1995 (B)	PLANNED	ACTUAL (a) 140 (b) 0
		1996	(a) 140 (b) 0	(a) 140 (b) 0
		1997	(a) 140 (b) 0	(a) 200 (b) 0
		1998	(a) 340 (b) 200	
		1999	(a) 740 (b) 300	
		2000	(a) 1140 (b) 400	
		2001	(a) 1440 (b) 500	

Strategic Objective 3: Young Jamaicans Better Equipped for the 21st Century APPROVED: COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Jamaica				
RESULT NAME: Improved Literacy and Numeracy at Primary School Level				
INDICATOR: 3.3.2. Mathematics proficiency and achievement				
UNIT OF MEASURE: Percent of students achieving a passing grade on MOE’s mathematics mastery test - (a) Grade 3 males; (b) Grade 3 females; (c) Grade 6 males and (d) Grade 6 females SOURCE: National Assessment Program - Annual Diagnostic Test for Grade 3 and Achievement Test for Grade 6 INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Students in selected primary schools will be exposed to new curriculum and innovative methods of instructions to improve performance in mathematics. COMMENTS:		YEAR 1996 (B)	PLANNED	ACTUAL (a) 49 (b) 57 (c) 42 (d) 48
		1997	(a) 49 (b) 57 (c) 42 (d) 48	(a) 53 (b) 60 (c) 38 (d) 48
		1998	(a) 50 (b) 59 (c) 45 (d) 50	
		1999	(a) 53 (b) 61 (c) 48 (d) 53	
		2000	(a) 57 (b) 66 (c) 51 (d) 57	
		2001	(a) 60 (b) 68 (c) 55 (d) 60	

Strategic Objective 3: Young Jamaicans Better Equipped for the 21st Century APPROVED: COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Jamaica				
RESULT NAME: Improved Literacy and Numeracy at Primary School Level				
INDICATOR: 3.3.3. Reading proficiency and achievement				
UNIT OF MEASURE: Percent of students achieving a passing grade on MOE's reading mastery test - (a) Grade 3 males; (b) Grade 3 females; (c) Grade 6 males and (d) Grade 6 females SOURCE: National Assessment Program INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Students in selected primary schools will benefit from enhanced curriculum and/or teaching methodologies aimed at improved performance in reading. COMMENTS:		YEAR 1996 (B)	PLANNED	ACTUAL (a) 47 (b) 60 (c) 48 (d) 58
		1997	(a) 47 (b) 60 (c) 48 (d) 58	(a) 55 (b) 65 (c) 38 (d) 50
		1998	(a) 48 (b) 62 (c) 50 (d) 60	
		1999	(a) 51 (b) 65 (c) 53 (d) 64	
		2000	(a) 55 (b) 68 (c) 57 (d) 67	
		2001	(a) 58 (b) 70 (c) 60 (d) 70	

D. Caribbean Regional Program Special Support Objective : Increased Caribbean capacity to address regional development problems

This is the second reporting period for the Caribbean Regional Program managed by USAID/Jamaica. The strategic objective of the program is to assist the Caribbean to increase its capacity to address regional development problems, initially in the areas of environmental management and disaster management. The regional focus emerges from the Summit of the Americas Declaration of Principles signed by 34 heads of state, including President Clinton, and from the need to complete and continue the implementation of select programs previously managed by RHUDO. Subsequently, and just last year, President Clinton visited the region to attend a meeting with the Caribbean heads of states at what was to become known as the Bridgetown Summit. These heads of state collaboratively produced the Bridgetown Declaration, in which President Clinton committed the U.S. to increased support in multiple areas, including environmental management, disaster management and trade. CRP participated in designing the larger Presidential Initiative and Windward Island Diversification Project (WIDP), and LAC has discussed transferring the management of WIDP activity to CRP. As the transfer of management, accountability and resources has yet to transpire, the Results Framework for this R4 reporting period does not include indicators or intermediate results pertaining to trade or diversification. The beneficiary countries include, but are not necessarily limited to, the 15 member countries of Caribbean Community (CARICOM), six of which are member countries of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), two associate CARICOM member countries, plus Haiti and the Dominican Republic. The beneficiary countries are thus:

CARICOM and OECS Countries

- 1) Antigua and Barbuda (OECS)
- 2) Bahamas
- 3) Barbados
- 4) Belize
- 5) Dominica (OECS)
- 6) Grenada (OECS)
- 7) Guyana
- 8) Jamaica
- 9) Montserrat
- 10) St. Kitts and Nevis (OECS)
- 11) St. Lucia (OECS)
- 12) St. Vincent and the Grenadines (OECS)
- 13) Suriname
- 14) Trinidad and Tobago

Associate CARICOM Members

- 1) British Virgin Islands
- 2) Turks and Caicos Islands

Spanish and French speaking countries

- 1) Dominican Republic
- 2) Haiti

1. Performance Analysis

a: Towards achieving the objective

The special strategic objective focuses on improving the Caribbean's capability in disaster mitigation and preparedness and in environmental and natural resource management. Almost every performance target, at both the strategic objective level and the intermediate results level was exceeded, and only one IR did not quite make target. This means that most every CARICOM country has benefitted in some way from the projects managed by CRP. With the support of CRP, most of them have adopted policies and practices that are deemed important for managing the environment and natural resources and for ensuring disaster preparedness and mitigation. The number of countries that have adopted policies and practices in support of disaster preparedness and mitigation has doubled since last year, increasing from 7 to 14, surpassing the 1997 target of 9 countries by 5. The number of regional institutions that have adopted such disaster related policies and practices has increased from 9 to 11, surpassing the target of 10. The number of countries that have adopted CRP supported environmental policies and practices has increased nearly four fold from 5 to 21 countries during the same period, surpassing the target of 6 countries by 15. The number of regional institutions adopting and implementing CRP supported environmental policies and practices increased by 50%, from 10 regional institutions to 15, and surpassed the target of 14 by 1.

This overall increase in the number of countries and institutions that have adopted key environmental and disaster management policies and practices suggests that the capacity to solve regional problems in these areas has improved. As has been one goal of CRP, environmental and disaster management are increasingly becoming integral components of the economic development process in the region, rather than add-on or after-thought concerns. The trajectory suggests even more improvements in the future.

b. Intermediate Results:

Specific measures of progress toward achieving this special objective are reflected in the following accomplishments under three intermediate results:

i. Adoption of mitigation and preparedness techniques, technologies and practices by the public and private sector (IR)

Collaborating institutions and agencies have continued to adopt and appropriately amend policies for achieving hazard mitigation at both the national and regional levels, as the figures of IR4.1.1 confer. Eleven regional institutions were adopting key policies during 1997. This far exceeded the target number of 4 institutions envisioned for 1997, and the actual number of

3 institutions that were adopting key policies during the previous year. The impacts of this success are extremely far reaching given the nature of key institutions that CRP, through CDMP has influenced. CRP through the CDMP project has assisted major multilateral banks, the World Bank and the Caribbean Development Bank in particular, to develop lending policies that encourage hazard protected investments. For example, projects that include the building of structures must abide by the appropriate building codes that best ensure that the structures are capable of resisting the damaging effects of natural hazards. Also, the Caribbean Development Bank has consolidated all of its guidelines and procedures in a document which officially outlines the Bank's policy on disaster preparedness, mitigation and response. The World Bank has also developed mitigation guidelines for lending funds to the CDB with the assistance of the CDMP. In 1996 the CDMP conducted a regional mitigation planning workshop which had a very positive effect on initiating the mitigation planning process at the regional and national level. Through these actions, disaster preparedness and mitigation has been further institutionalized and integrated into the Caribbean development process.

Community Participation in Disaster Mitigation

A key element in achieving lasting local impact regarding vulnerability reduction in the CDMP Dominican Republic activity involves assisting communities with local projects under the project's community initiative activity. The CDMP is presently assisting 11 communities in the Dominican Republic in the development and implementation of community-based mitigation projects, such as small anti-flooding levee construction, landslide containment walls, and embankments of drainage for rainwater.

3,504 households, or approximately 19,000 people, are benefitting directly from these initiatives, with another 32,500 people benefitting indirectly. The total cost of the project is US\$194,776, of which the communities have contributed 52% in the form of labor and sometimes technical expertise. Other entities, such as NGOs and local governments, have contributed another 13%, with the CDMP contributing the remaining 34.4%.

In each of the eleven community initiatives of 1997, the NGOs and community groups have played decisive roles in the identification, development, presentation and implementation of each project. As a result of their participation and the positive impact on NGOs and community groups, a significantly greater commitment towards further community development has emerged. The NGOs and community groups assist the communities in promoting, organizing and fund raising for additional projects and programs to continue vulnerability reduction. The communities involved will apply their new skills towards other problems, such as: structural problems for housing, poor designs of latrines, trash and waste water accumulation, landslides, and disaster preparedness and awareness in schools, churches and businesses. All but one of the project areas have both a local NGO and a community group. All are holding regular and ongoing meetings and activities. This program has served as a catalyst for other community projects which will assure continued local impact even after the CDMP has ended.

The use or replication rates of mitigation practices, procedures, new technologies and pilot activities has increased significantly (IR4.1.2), with a near doubling to 75 compared to the target of 40, and having more than doubled from the actual performance of 35 in the previous year. Many of the products such as the hazard maps and storm forecasting models (TAOS) were being completed and offered for use during this period. At the same time, a great deal of training on the use of these products was taking place. As a result, there was an increasing demand for the products, even outside of the formal adoption channels. The convergence of these developments led to exceptional performance beyond what was anticipated for 1997.

The training figures (IR4.1.3) greatly surpassed the target due largely to the great multiplier effect of the "train the trainer" activity in the Dominican Republic. This activity has been resoundingly successful, multiplying the training benefits almost seven times more than what was initially envisioned, and 8-fold above actual performance the previous year. The exceptional performance was in large part due to having selected highly motivated manager for the Dominican Republic activity. The enthusiasm and know-how meant for high productivity and the creation of an exceptional productive relationship between the public and private sector. The Dominican Republic activity is now run through an NGO and charges it charges for training provided to the public and private sector.

Also, the people level impact figures (IR4.1.4) have greatly surpassed initial targets because of the increase and expansion of the community initiatives in the Dominican Republic. The project supports eleven (11) activities at present and this has resulted in vulnerability reduction for a tremendous number of people, 10,213 people as measured. This is more than 11 times greater than what was envisioned for last year, and almost 13 times greater than what was achieved the previous year. Almost all of the 11 activities came on stream during last year. So when an activity constitutes the building of containment walls, hundreds or thousands of household for example can be protected from flooding and there may be several people in each households. The numbers can accumulate rapidly.

ii. Improved capability in environmental and natural resource management (IR 4.2)

Training and sensitization programs focusing on coastal and marine resource management have successfully targeted communities, professional groups and practitioners of multiple sectors and especially the tourism industry. This has increased regional capacity as defined by the number of people trained and sensitized to address environmental management concerns, above target by more than 60% and above the previous year's performance by more than 50%. (*Indicator 4.2.1*)

The ENCORE project has met the targeted number of local revenue generation activities for 1997 through its continued focus of mobilizing community groups and NGOs. With 5 environmental revenue generation programs in place, the number of such programs more than doubled compared to the previous year. These activities included compost making in

Dominica, the establishment of tour guide organizations for ecotourism sites in Dominica and St. Lucia and the completion of a concession facility for small scale craft sales at the Indian River ecotourism site in Dominica (IR 4.2.2).

During 1997, there have been significant strides made in the adoption of environmental policies, programs and guidelines, with adoption rates by various countries and by various regional institutions, exceeding our targets and the previous year's performance both by over 50% (IR4.2.3). Environmental policies, programs and guidelines are increasingly regarded as integral and essential components of successful development, and as such the adoption of these policies, programs and guidelines is moving more quickly than originally anticipated. Particular emphasis on environmental monitoring has resulted in the adoption of coastal water quality monitoring guidelines and the establishment of a sanitary survey program. In addition, combined efforts from both the ENCORE and CEN projects have succeeded in the adoption of a regional strategy for sustainable tourism by key regional political and tourism organizations.

Community Initiative in Soufriere Gains International Recognition

The Soufriere Marine Management Authority (SMMA) in St. Lucia, a community-based organization supported by the ENCORE project, received the 1997 British Airways Tourism for Tomorrow award, as well as the World Conservation Union (IUCN) special award for national parks and protected areas. These awards recognize the achievement of SMMA to further emphasize its institutional role to guide the community activities in tourism, fishing and environmental management.

The SMMA is the first recipient of this award. In addition to national recognition, this award will facilitate regional and international promotion for the SMMA as the work of the organization will be featured in British Airways publications and the awards ceremony will be televised to over 14,000 million viewers in the United Kingdom. Furthermore, the awards ceremony will garner publicity through the British Airways worldwide communication network, thus putting "one of the world's best designed reserve fishery systems" and the world's number one holiday destination on the global map.

As for practices of improved environmental management (IR4.2.4), 445 households have benefitted as a result of CRP initiatives, compared to 500 intended for the rating period, and the 280 which benefitted last year. The actual number for 1997 very closely met target, and represents a near doubling from the previous year. 48 institutions comprised of hotels, NGOs and community based organizations adopted new practices for improved environmental management. This represents nearly a 3-fold increase over target and a 6-fold increase over last year's performance.

**iii. Progress towards creating a Caribbean trade environment that is free, fair and environmentally favorable (IR 4.3) -
No longer in the Results Framework**

USAID/Jamaica participated with LAC in designing the Presidential initiative and the resulting Windward Island Diversification Project. Discussion had ensued about LAC transferring management responsibility for some of these economic and trade activities to USAID/Jamaica. In preparation for this, USAID/Jamaica established components in its Results Framework to accommodate activities in these areas. However, since these management responsibilities and associated resources were not transferred to the Mission, there is nothing to report in these categories at this time.

2. Expected Progress through FY2000 and Management Actions

On the environmental side, we expect the ENCORE and CEN projects to continue to produce beneficial results consistent with projected targets, throughout their project life, with both projects ending by December 1998. It is expected that results generated by both projects in the areas of institutional strengthening, policy development and training will continue to generate beneficial impacts beyond the PACD. With the Caribbean Regional Strategy now being developed, we anticipate having clear guidance about an optimum 5-8 year Caribbean environmental portfolio for LAC and USAID/Jamaica. This combined with funding decisions will determine the nature and degree of progress to be expected through FY2000 and the subsequent short term period.

As for disaster preparedness and mitigation, most of the countries and regional institutions in the Caribbean have adopted policies supported by CRP and CDMP. It is conceivable however that each and every target country in the region, as well as any key remaining regional institutions, participate as a result of the project by the PACD in September 1999. This would entail 15 CARICOM countries, 2 associate member states, Haiti and the Dominican Republic; 19 countries in all, and about 15 regional institutions. As the use rate of disaster mitigation practices has either doubled or tripled per year, we would see a similar pattern of increased use for the out-years. While we see an increase in the cumulative number of persons trained, we expect the numbers to be high, but not necessarily increasing by 8-fold as has been seen in this past year. Since CDMP has completed the implementation of its community activities focused on vulnerability reduction activities, there would not be additional households benefitting from such activities. BHR/OFDA is completing the development of its LAC regional strategy. This process will also identify and determine the Caribbean results packages and activities that shall be supported with funding for implementation.

RESULTS FRAMEWORK
CARIBBEAN REGIONAL PROGRAM (CRP)
INCREASED CARIBBEAN CAPACITY TO ADDRESS REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS

- 4.1 Improved disaster mitigation capability
4.2 Improved regional environmental management capability

INTERMEDIATE RESULTS (IR)

4.1. Improved capability in disaster mitigation and preparedness

4.2 Improved capability in environmental and natural resource management

I.R. Level Performance Indicators

4.1.1 Adoption of hazard mitigation policies

4.2.1 Persons trained and sensitized in coastal and marine resource management

4.1.2 Use and replication of disaster mitigation practices

4.2.2. Local revenue generation programs developed to support sustained natural resource management

4.1.3. Caribbean persons trained in Disaster Management

4.2.3 Guidelines, policies and programs for improved environmental management

4.1.4 Households benefitting from CDMP vulnerability reduction activities

4.2.4 Practices adopted for improved environmental management

CROSS-CUTTING THEMES

COMMUNITY
BASED
DEVELOPMENT

DONOR
COOPERATION

INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY

PERFORMANCE DATA TABLE CARIBBEAN REGIONAL PROGRAM

Special Strategic Objective: Increased Caribbean Capacity to Address Regional Development Problems			
APPROVED: COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Jamaica			
RESULT NAME: Increased Caribbean Capacity to Address Regional Development Problems			
INDICATOR: 4.1 Improved disaster mitigation capability			
UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of CDMP targeted countries and regional institutions adopting improved disaster policies and practices - (a) countries and (b) regional institutions SOURCE: National Disaster Reports, CDERA Reports and OFDA Reports INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: This indicator reflects the breadth of countries throughout the region with improved capacity in disaster mitigation. COMMENTS:	YEAR 1993(B)	PLANNED (a) 0 (b) 0	ACTUAL (a) 0 (b) 0
	1994	(a) 5 (b) 5	(a) 0 (b) 4
	1995	(a) 5 (b) 6	(a) 5 (b) 9
	1996	(a) 7 (b) 9	(a) 7 (b) 9
	1997	(a) 9 (b) 10	(a) 14 (b) 11
	1998	(a) 12 (b) 11	
	1999	(a) 14 (b) 12	
	2000	(a) 15 (b) 13	
	2001	(a) 15 (b) 14	

Special Strategic Objective: Increased Caribbean Capacity to Address Regional Development Problems APPROVED: COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Jamaica				
RESULT NAME: Increased Caribbean Capacity to Address Regional Development Problems				
INDICATOR: 4.2 Improved capability in environmental and natural resource management				
UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of CEN/ENCORE targeted countries adopting improved environmental management policies and practices - (a) countries and (b) regional institutions SOURCE: Regional, National, Local and Project Environmental Reports INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: This indicator reflects the breadth of countries throughout the region with improved capacity to manage environmental and natural resources. COMMENTS:		YEAR 1993 (B) 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001	PLANNED (a) - (b) 2 (a) 2 (b) 3 (a) 4 (b) 5 (a) 5 (b) 10 (a) 6 (b) 14 (a) 6 (b) 15 (a) 7 (b) 16 (a) 8 (b) 17 (a) 8 (b) 18	ACTUAL (a) - (b) 2 (a) 2 (b) 3 (a) 4 (b) 5 (a) 5 (b) 10 (a) 21 (b) 15

Special Strategic Objective: Increased caribbean Capacity to Address Regional Development Problems APPROVED: COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Jamaica				
RESULT NAME: Improved capability in disaster mitigation and preparedness				
INDICATOR: 4.1.1. Adoption of hazard mitigation policies				
UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of policies and/or procedures adopted - (a) regional and (b) national SOURCE: CDMP Quarterly Reports, CDB Reports, National Disaster Organization Reports, CDERA Reports INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Collaborating institutions, both regional and national, have adopted or amended policies for achieving hazard mitigation. COMMENTS:		YEAR 1993 (B) 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001	PLANNED (a) - (b) - (a) - (b) - (a) 1 (b) - (a) 3 (b) - (a) 4 (b) 7 (a) 5 (b) 9 (a) 6 (b) 11 (a) 7 (b) 13 (a) 8 (b) 15	ACTUAL (a) 0 (b) 0 (a) 0 (b) 0 (a) 1 (b) 2 (a) 3 (b) 5 (a) 11 (b) 15

Special Strategic Objective: Increased Caribbean Capacity to Address Regional Development Problems APPROVED: COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Jamaica				
RESULT NAME: Improved capability in disaster mitigation and preparedness				
INDICATOR: 4.1.2. Use and replication of disaster mitigation practices				
UNIT OF MEASURE: Instances of uses/replication SOURCE: CDMP Quarterly Reports, National Disaster Organization Reports, CDERA Reports, CMI Reports and CDMP DR NGO Reports INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Mitigation practices and procedures, and new technologies developed by the project are being used by regional and national institutions. Pilot activities are also being replicated. COMMENTS:		YEAR 1993 (B)	PLANNED 0	ACTUAL 0
		1994	3	3
		1995	6	10
		1996	15	35
		1997	40	75
		1998	45	
		1999	50	
		2000	55	
		2001	60	

Special Strategic Objective: Increased Caribbean Capacity to Address Regional Development Problems APPROVED: COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Jamaica				
RESULT NAME: Improved capability in disaster mitigation and preparedness				
INDICATOR: 4.1.3. Caribbean persons trained in Disaster Management				
UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of persons trained SOURCE: CDMP Quarterly Reports, OFDA Caribbean Training Reports, CDERA Reports, National Disaster Organization Reports and RDA Reports INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: The CDMP is conducting specialized disaster management training at the regional, national and community level in several of the activities streams. The project has also linked up with the OFDA/LAC training program in the DR and Haiti. COMMENTS:		YEAR 1993 (B)	PLANNED -	ACTUAL 200
		1994	400	500
		1995	900	1,200
		1996	1,400	1,800
		1997	2,200	14,747
		1998	2,600	
		1999	3,000	
		2000	3,400	
		2001	3,800	

Special Strategic Objective: Increased Caribbean Capacity to Address Regional Development Problems APPROVED: COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Jamaica				
RESULT NAME: Improved capability in disaster mitigation and preparedness				
INDICATOR: 4.1.4. Households benefitting from CDMP vulnerability reduction activities				
UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of households benefitting at the community level SOURCE: CDMP Quarterly Reports, NDFD Reports - St. Lucia, NDFD Reports- Antigua INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Many of the CDMP activities focus on reducing vulnerability at the community level. These mitigation activities whether of a structural or non-structural nature, benefit several low income households in the project area. COMMENTS:		YEAR 1993(B)	PLANNED -	ACTUAL 0
		1994	200	150
		1995	400	600
		1996	700	800
		1997	900	10,213
		1998	1,000	
		1999	1,500	
		2000	1,800	
		2001	2,000	

Special Strategic Objective: Increased Caribbean Capacity to address regional development problems APPROVED: COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Jamaica				
RESULT NAME: Improved capability in environmental and natural resource management				
INDICATOR: 4.2.1. Persons trained and sensitized in coastal and marine resource management				
UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of persons trained SOURCE: Project quarterly reports, UNEP, OECS-NRMU INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Training and sensitization programs include short-term courses, workshops, seminars and public awareness programs. NB. Funding for these projects ends September 1998. COMMENTS:		YEAR 1994 (B)	PLANNED 100	ACTUAL 150
		1995	300	300
		1996	400	500
		1997	600	972
		1998	750	
		1999	-	
		2000	-	
		2001	-	

Special Strategic Objective: Increased Caribbean Capacity to Address Regional Development Problems APPROVED: COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Jamaica				
RESULT NAME: Improved capability in environmental and natural resource management				
INDICATOR: 4.2.2. Local revenue generation programs developed to support sustained natural resource management				
UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of new local revenue generation program SOURCE: Project quarterly reports INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: This will be achieved through CBOs and other organizations focused on natural resource management, undertaking natural resource-based revenue generation programs. COMMENTS:		YEAR 1994 (B) 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001	PLANNED - 2 2 5 7 - - -	ACTUAL - 2 2 5

Special Strategic Objective : Increased Caribbean Capacity to Address Regional Development Problems APPROVED: COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Jamaica				
RESULT NAME: Improved capability in environmental and natural resource management				
INDICATOR: 4.2.3. Guidelines, policies and programs for improved environmental management				
UNIT OF MEASURE: Instances of adoption of guidelines, policies and programs by: (a) countries and (b) regional institutions SOURCE: Project quarterly report and OECS-NRMU INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Examples include new guidelines proposed for environmental impact assessments, policies on pesticide management and sustainable tourism and programs and procedures for coastal water quality monitoring. COMMENTS:		YEAR 1994 (B) 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001	PLANNED (a) 6 (b) 4 (a) 10 (b) 5 (a) 18 (b) 6 (a) 22 (b) 8 (a) 40 (b) 6 (a) - (b) - (a) - (b) - (a) - (b) -	ACTUAL (a) 8 (b) 5 (a) 13 (b) 6 (a) 22 (b) 6 (a) 38 (b) 14

Special Strategic Objective: Increased Caribbean Capacity to Address Regional Development Problems APPROVED: COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Jamaica				
RESULT NAME: Improved capability in environmental and natural resource management				
INDICATOR: 4.2.4. Practices adopted for improved environmental management				
UNIT OF MEASURE: (a) number of households benefitting from new practices for improved environmental management and (b) number of hotels, NGOs and community-based organizations adopting practises SOURCE: Project Quarterly Reports, Caribbean Tourism Organization, Caribbean Hoteliers Association, National Hotel Association, CBOs INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Many of the practices focus on improved waste and waste-water disposal practices that encourage use of grey water for gardening, solid waste disposal practices that promote recycling and sightseeing practices that reduce destruction of coral reefs. COMMENTS:		YEAR 1994 (B) 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001	PLANNED (a) 80 (b) 2 (a) 180 (b) 4 (a) 280 (b) 8 (a) 500 (b) 14 (a) 650 (b) 20 (a) - (b) - (a) - (b) - (a) - (b) -	ACTUAL (a) 80 (b) 2 (a) 180 (b) 4 (a) 280 (b) 8 (a) 435 (b) 48

III. Status of the Management Contract

A. Status of Management Contract Agreements

Recommendations and agreements were made between LAC and USAID/Jamaica concerning both the bilateral and the Caribbean regional programs. Each agreement is summarized below, as is the current status of each associated activity.

1. Bilateral Program

a. Review/revalidation of the Mission's Economic Growth Strategy

Recommendation - The DAEC cable recommended that the Mission conduct an assessment to determine the validity of its economic growth SO and, if indicated, to recast the SO's results packages.

Current Status - With the assistance of LAC Bureau economist Bob Burke, the Mission conducted the recommended assessment. As a result of the assessment, a new economic growth Strategic Objective (SO) "Increased employment in targeted and small businesses" is proposed to replace the previous SO "Increased participation for economic growth". The proposed SO is described in detail Annex B.

2. Caribbean Regional Program

a. Caribbean Marine Research and Resource Management - U.S./Japan Common Agenda

Agreement - The DAEC cable indicates that USAID/W (LAC and G) would provide funding to support further analysis and stakeholder dialogue for determining needs for additional regional Caribbean marine research and marine resource management capability, as part of a U.S./Japan Common Agenda Program. This activity was to have been managed by the Global Bureau which had already obligated \$150,000 towards this effort. The increased funding was to take total funding to \$250,000.

Current Status - At the U.S./Japan Common Agenda meeting held last year, agreement was reached to pursue collaboration on Caribbean environmental programs. G Bureau allocated \$78,000 toward the development of a USAID Caribbean Regional Environmental Strategy which will include an assessment of the need for additional regional marine research and of marine resource management capability in the region. Strategy preparation is currently underway.

b. Five Year Regional Environmental Strategy

Agreement - The Bureau agreed to fund the development of a five year Caribbean Regional Environmental Strategy that would be managed by USAID/Jamaica in collaboration with LAC and G.

Current Status - The Mission has begun the process of developing the strategy. A detailed Scope of Work has been completed, laying out the strategy development process into three phases. Phase I focuses on the acquisition and organization of all background materials and reports from throughout the region. Phase II entails the actual development of the core strategy. Phase III is the development of a results package or activity package for implementation by USAID/Jamaica/CRP. Phase I is underway, as is the assimilation of a team to carry out Phase II.

c. Transfer of the ENCORE Project to USAID/Jamaica/CRP

Agreement - LAC agreed to have the ENCORE Project transferred to USAID/Jamaica, in concert with a review/evaluation of the project to be carried out by the Mission and assisted by LAC and G to determine the best use and mechanism for proceeding with the remaining obligated funds.

Current Status - The ENCORE Project was officially transferred to USAID/Jamaica on July 9, 1997. USAID/Jamaica has actively managed this activity since this time, correcting many of the problems previously associated with the project and successfully supporting the implementation of several project elements. However, other project elements have been frustrated due to the difficulty in having the remaining funds obligated to ENCORE, transferred to USAID/Jamaica to complete project implementation.

d. Caribbean Disaster Mitigation Project

Agreement - BHR planned to provide \$700,000 of FY97 funding once its assessment of the OFDA/LAC program was completed and the results reviewed. LAC referred to the high priority given to this area of work by the Bureau and the USG, acknowledging President Clinton's commitment expressed in the May 10, 1998 Joint Communique with the other leaders of the Caribbean.

Current Status - The Caribbean Disaster Mitigation Project has been extended and fully funded through the end of FY99. USAID/Jamaica/CRP received \$700,000 for FY98, and we have received the commitment to receive 600,000 in FY99, the final year of the project.

e. HFTE

Agreement - There were plans for LAC/RSD, through HFTE, to work closely with the Mission to identify activities which would contribute most to helping countries in the region to prepare for FTAA accession.

Current Status - During the past year no activities were identified. However, opportunities may arise for collaboration with HFTE consistent with the new regional program strategy currently being developed by the Mission and LAC Bureau.

f. Caribbean Scholarship Program

Agreement - To determine how to best manage the Caribbean scholarship program which was developed out of the President's Caribbean Initiative, it was agreed that an analysis of the cooperating organization's capacity should be conducted. USAID/Jamaica management of the activity was to be considered.

Current Status - The analysis was done and the Bureau decided that UWI, Cave Hill, Barbados should have management responsibility for the activity.

B. Proposed Changes

It is proposed that the Mission's SO3, "Young Jamaicans better equipped for the 21st century," be split into two separate SOs: SO3: Improved reproductive health of youth and SO4: Increased literacy and numeracy among Jamaican youth in targeted primary schools.

While the bifurcation of the original SO represents a significant change in terms of program presentation, this does not represent a fundamental change in Mission strategy. The SO level results remain the same and implementation strategy is unchanged. This modification does not result in any increase in the number of management units, does not require an increase in mission or contractor personnel, and does not create a need for any increase in FTEs.

Splitting the original SO better clarifies and articulates the planned development results in the health and education sectors as well as establishing a set of Results Frameworks which function as true management and monitoring tool as intended by the ADS. During the past two years the SO "Young Jamaicans Better Equipped for the 21st Century" came under increasing questioning from the GOJ, from other development partners, and within USAID. The result statement is too vague, not measurable, and leaves to many open questions in the mind of the reader. After much discussion and debate it was unanimously concluded that the statement was an attempt to "package" two separate and distinct results under one results statement, thus the proposed correction. The Mission feels strongly that the two proposed results statements accurately state the on-the-ground development reality and implementation strategy in a manner that is clear and precise to any reader.

IV. RESOURCE REQUEST

A. Financial Plan

USAID/Jamaica's bilateral operational year budget (OYB) levels has consisted of Development Assistance (DA) averaging about \$11.1 million for the last three years, down from about \$13 million in the three previous years. A small amount of Economic Support Funds (ESF) were used to support national elections in the country in December 1997. Despite pressures on resources, the Mission has managed to maintain its program in key strategic areas by focusing on discrete results and activities.

SO1: Due to directive pressures, aging portfolio of activities, and an unstable and deteriorating economic environment within the country, the Mission is in the process of reorganizing this strategic objective. A new strategy is being presented as part of this R4 submission which will refocus this SO on microenterprise development, support to small business firms, and potential activities that will be supported by ESF funds.

SO2: The financial projections for this SO looks increasingly promising over the next three years. The Mission will continue to concentrate on environmental programs which target improved quality of natural resources in areas of economic significance - e.g. tourism areas. A new activity, the Coastal Water Quality Improvement Program, will work with the GOJ and NGOs to develop a coordinated approach to coastal zone management in Jamaica, while focusing on sustainable tourism development. The anticipated level of resources enable the program to further expand the SO to address critical environmental problems in the upper watershed which are directly affecting coastal water quality and the coral reef. This activity is currently under design.

SO3: Over the past few years, earmark funds in the areas of Population and AIDS have been fairly consistent. Due to these maintained levels, this SO has benefitted positively and has made notable achievements in the areas of HIV/STD prevention, reduction of the fertility rates, and an increase in the contraceptive prevalence rates. SO3's continued focus on youth will be emphasized in the new adolescent reproductive health program that is currently being designed and through a new basic education program, New Horizons for Disadvantaged Youth, that will begin implementation in upcoming months. However, a noticeable decrease can be seen in the earmarks for Population and Basic Education over the next few years. While the Mission can sustain a limited decrease in Population funds for a short time, the Basic Education portfolio will suffer if there is not a significant increase in this directive.

Caribbean Regional Program: Some of the projects in CRP will be coming to an end this year. Based on our work in the field, we have identified additional regional concerns which merit further attention and assessments to determine the optimum USAID response. These concerns are consistent with conclusions issuing from the recent Bridgetown Summit in

Barbados attended by President Clinton and the heads of states from the Caribbean nations, and the Summit of the Americas in Chile, also attended by President Clinton and heads of states from the nations of the western hemisphere. As such, we request the following financial resources as specified below:

Environmental Management: The development of a Caribbean Regional Environmental Strategy is currently underway. This strategy will provide a 5-8 year road map primarily, but not exclusively for USAID, that identifies priority regional environmental and natural resource interventions that support broad based sustainable development. The strategy will present two to three scenarios for an action response. One scenario will define a set of priority actions that can be funded with US\$1 million and another scenario will define a US\$2 million package. Depending on the findings uncovered through developing the strategy, a third and more expensive scenario could be presented. The process of strategy development will also generate a Results Package/activity for implementation by CRP. Given the size of the region and the complexity of already known existing environmental problems and opportunities, CRP would need at the very minimum US\$1 million a year for five years. Ideally, we would seek US\$3 million a year, confident that the resources could be constructively absorbed. Also, we would seek to produce a development return on the investment made to produce the strategy.

Disaster Management: The OFDA funded Caribbean Disaster Mitigation Project (CDMP) which has been very successful, has been extended through 1999. By the PACD, it will have received the full of the project's US\$5 million. OFDA is currently completing its strategy for the LAC region, which will assist in defining specific programs and projects for funding in the Caribbean. We will welcome at minimum straight line financing of US\$1 million per year, though the region would benefit and could absorb more.

Poverty Eradication: Poverty eradication was a central concern at the Summit of the Americas. Some poverty assessments have been undertaken in the region and some explicit poverty eradication programs are being implemented with varying degrees of success. Thirty years of "development work" is providing data about what really works and does not work, showing that while growth is critical it is a certain type and structure of growth that best ensures poverty reduction. The Caribbean can stand to benefit from these lessons. We propose that LAC finance the development of a Caribbean Regional Poverty Eradication Strategy, to assist LAC and the Caribbean Regional Program clarify how we can most effectively contribute to eradicating this most persistent problem. We request US\$130,000 for this purpose.

USAID FY 2000 BUDGET REQUEST BY PROGRAM/COUNTRY

16-Sep-98
09:46 AMCountry/Program:
Scenario: Base Level

u:\opdpdpub\docs\r42000\pf-xxxx.wk4

S.O. # , Title	Approp. Acct	Bilateral/Field Support	Est. SO Pipeline End of FY 99	Estimated Total	FY 2000													Future Cost (POST 2000)	Year of Final Oblig.
					Basic Education	Agric.	Other Growth	Pop	Child Survival	Infectious Diseases	HIV/AIDS	Other Health	Environ	D/G	Est. Expend. FY 00	Est. Total Cost life of SO			
SO 1: Increased Participation for Economic Growth																			
		Bilateral Field Spt	2,058	2,5250	25		2,225					275				0	2,001		
		Total	2,058	2,525	25		2,225	0	0		0	275	0	2,881	8,880	1,757			
SO 2: Increased Protection of Key Natural Resources in Environmentally and Economically Significant Areas																			
		Bilateral Field Spt	1,777	4,2250								4,225				0	2,001		
		Total	1,777	4,225	0		0	0	0		0	4,225	0	2,550	14,208	4,387			
SO 3: Young Jamaicans Better-Equipped for the 21st Century																			
		Bilateral Field Spt	2,227	5,850200	1,475		275	2,400100			1,700100					00	2,001		
		Total	2,477	6,050	1,475		275	2,500	0		1,800	0	0	0	5,900	22,810	9,543		
SO 4: Caribbean Regional Program																			
		Bilateral Field Spt		00								0				0	2,001		
		Total	0	0	0		0	0	0		0	0	0		925	0			
		Bilateral Field Spt		00												0	XX		
		Total	0	0	0		0	0	0		0	0	0			0			
		Bilateral Field Spt		00												0	XX		
		Total	0	0	0		0	0	0		0	0	0			0			
		Bilateral Field Spt		00												0			
		Total	0	0	0		0	0	0		0	0	0			0			
		Bilateral Field Spt		00												0			
		Total	0	0	0		0	0	0		0	0	0			0			
Total Bilateral																			
			6,062	12,600	1,500		2,500	2,400	0		1,700	0	4,500	0			15,687		
Total Field Support			250	200	0		0	100	0		100	0	0	0					
TOTAL PROGRAM			6,312	12,800	1,500		2,500	2,500	0		1,800	0	4,500	0					

FY 2000 Request Sector Totals -- DA		
Econ Growth	4,000	
[Of which Microenterpris	1,000	
HCD		
PHN	4,300	
Environment	4,500	
[Of which Biodiversity]		
Democracy	0	
Humanitarian	0	

FY 2000 Request Sector Totals -- ESF		
Econ Growth	0	
[Of which Microenterprise		
HCD		
PHN	15,687	
Environment	0	
[Of which Biodiversity]		
Democracy	0	
Humanitarian	0	

FY 2001 Target Program Level	0
FY 2002 Target Program Level	0
FY 2003 Target Program Level	0

Program Funding

USAID FY 1999 Budget Request by Program/Country

16-Sep-98
09:46 AM

Country/Program:
Scenario: Base Level

S.O. # , Title					FY 1999													Future Cost (POST 2000)	Year of Final Oblig.
Approp. Acct	Bilateral/Fi eld Support	Est. SO Pipeline End of FY 98	Estimated Total	Basic Education	Agric.	Other Growth	Pop	Child Survival	Infectious Diseases	HIV/AIDS	Other Health	Environ	D/G	Est. Expend. FY 99	Est. Total Cost life of SO				
SO 1: Increased Participation for Economic Growth																			
	Bilateral	3,005	4,775	25		1,475						275	3,000			0	2,001		
	Field Spt		0																
	Total	3,005	4,775	25		1,475	0	0		0	0	275	3,000	1,975	8,880	0			
SO 2: Increased Protection of Key Natural Resources in Environmentally and Economically Significant Areas																			
	Bilateral	3,223	3,038									3,038				0	2,001		
	Field Spt	120	0																
	Total	3,343	3,038	0		0	0	0		0	0	3,038	0	6,471	14,208	0			
SO 3: Young Jamaicans Better-Equipped for the 21st Century																			
	Bilateral	3,176	5,033	1,001		475	1,857			1,700						0	2,001		
	Field Spt	650	250				250									0			
	Total	3,826	5,283	1,001		475	2,107	0		1,700	0	0	0	5,171	22,810	0			
SO 4: Caribbean Regional Program																			
	Bilateral		800									800				0	2,001		
	Field Spt		0																
	Total	0	800	0		0	0	0		0	0	800	0	800	925	0			
	Bilateral		0													0	XX		
	Field Spt		0																
	Total	0	0	0		0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral		0													0	XX		
	Field Spt		0																
	Total	0	0	0		0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral		0																
	Field Spt		0																
	Total	0	0	0		0	0	0		0	0	0	0			0			
	Bilateral		0																
	Field Spt		0																
	Total	0	0	0		0	0	0		0	0	0	0						
Total Bilateral		9,404	13,646	1,026		1,950	1,857	0		1,700	0	4,113	3,000			0			
Total Field Support		770	250	0		0	250	0		0	0	0	0						
TOTAL PROGRAM		10,174	13,896	1,026		1,950	2,107	0		1,700	0	4,113	3,000			0			

FY 1999 Request Sector Totals -- DA		
Econ Growth	2,976	
[Of which Microenterpris	450	
HCD		
PHN	3,807	
Environment	4,113	
[Of which Biodiversity]		
Democracy	0	
Humanitarian	0	

FY 1999 Request Sector Totals -- ESF		
Econ Growth	0	
[Of which Microenterprise		
HCD		
PHN	0	
Environment	0	
[Of which Biodiversity]		
Democracy	3,000	
Humanitarian	0	

FY 2001 Target Program Level	0
FY 2002 Target Program Level	0
FY 2003 Target Program Level	0

Program Funding

USAID FY 1998 Budget Request by Program/Country

16-Sep-98
09:46 AM

Country/Program:
Scenario: Base Level

S.O. # , Title	FY 1998																Future Cost (POST 2000)	Year of Final Oblig.	
	Approp. Acct	Bilateral/Field Support	Est. SO Pipeline End of FY 97	Estimated Total	Basic Education	Agric.	Other Growth	Pop	Child Survival	Infectious Diseases	HIV/AIDS	Other Health	Environ	D/G	Est. Expend. FY 98	Est. Total Cost life of SO			
SO 1: Increased Participation for Economic Growth																			
		Bilateral	6,291	1,950	25		1,600						25	300			0	2,001	
		Field Spt		0															
		Total	6,291	1,950	25		1,600	0	0	0	0	0	25	300	5,011	8,880	0		
SO 2: Increased Protection of Key Natural Resources in Environmentally and Economically Significant Areas																			
		Bilateral	6,889	2,895									2,895				0	2,001	
		Field Spt		120									120						
		Total	6,889	3,015	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	3,015	0	8,250	14,208	0		
SO 3: Young Jamaicans Better-Equipped for the 21st Century																			
		Bilateral	6,287	5,600	1,445			2,375			1,780						0	2,001	
		Field Spt	1,295	650				450			200						0		
		Total	7,582	6,250	1,445		0	2,825	0		1,980	0	0	0	6,750	22,810	0		
SO 4: Caribbean Regional Program																			
		Bilateral		125									125				0	2,001	
		Field Spt		0															
		Total	0	125	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	125	0	125	925	0		
		Bilateral		0													0	XX	
		Field Spt		0															
		Total	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0		
		Bilateral		0													0	XX	
		Field Spt		0															
		Total	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0		
		Bilateral		0															
		Field Spt		0															
		Total	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0		
		Bilateral		0															
		Field Spt		0															
		Total	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0		
Total Bilateral			19,467	10,570	1,470		1,600	2,375	0		1,780	0	3,045	300					
Total Field Support			1,295	770	0		0	450	0		200	0	120	0					
TOTAL PROGRAM			20,762	11,340	1,470		1,600	2,825	0		1,980	0	3,165	300			0		

FY 1998 Request Sector Totals -- DA		
Econ Growth		3,070
[Of which Microenterpris		600
HCD		
PHN		4,805
Environment		3,165
[Of which Biodiversity]		0
Democracy		300
Humanitarian		0

FY 1998 Request Sector Totals -- ESF		
Econ Growth		0
[Of which Microenterprise		0
HCD		
PHN		0
Environment		0
[Of which Biodiversity]		0
Democracy		300
Humanitarian		0

FY 2001 Target Program Level	0
FY 2002 Target Program Level	0
FY 2003 Target Program Level	0

B. Prioritization of Bilateral Strategic Objectives

The USAID/Jamaica development priorities remain essentially unchanged from last year. USAID views equitable economic growth as Jamaica's key development problem. Consequently this is our number one development priority and objective. Unfortunately the distribution of budgetary directives to SO1 is not consistent with the development needs of the country.

Environmental protection remains a priority and the Mission is encouraged to see the level of resources commensurate with the level of development importance to the country. Since the quality of the environment - especially coastal water quality - is intimately and directly related to tourism, and by extension economic growth, SO2 program activities will remain a Mission priority.

Basic education will also continue to be a priority given the importance of this sector to economic growth and stability. USAID/Jamaica's view of development priorities and remaining program challenges has shifted towards this sector given new analysis and widespread concerns about declining educational standards - especially at the primary school level. Poor education performance is seen as a root cause of poverty and potential investors are increasingly concerned with the trainability of the workforce.

Conversely, Jamaica has almost first world health standards but is receiving significant resources in the areas of family planning and AIDS. While there are real and critical issues in family planning and AIDS, in terms of contextual development needs these two areas are lesser development priorities for the country.

C. Field Support Linkage

The Mission plans to draw on USAID/W technical support for the following activities:

SO1:

- ISO standards training;
- microenterprise institutional development and outreach programs;

SO2:

- coastal zone management;
- technical assistance on sustainable management of a protected area;
- involvement of communities in income earning activities compatible with sustainable management of natural resources;
- technical assistance on sustainable tourism -- energy;

SO3:

- logistics planning for reproductive health;
- commercial social marketing program;
- voluntary surgical contraception program;
- HIV/AIDS prevention programs for youth

CRP:

- coastal zone resource management;
- design of monitoring systems for marine resources;
- monitoring and evaluation systems for hazard mitigation activities;

GLOBAL FIELD SUPPORT

Objective Name	Field Support: Activity Title & Number	Priority *	Duration	Estimated Funding (\$000)					
				F Y 1 9 9 8		F Y 1 9 9 9		F Y 2 0 0 0	
				Obligated by:		Obligated by:		Obligated by:	
				Operating Unit	Global Bureau	Operating Unit	Global Bureau	Operating Unit	Global Bureau
SO3	ARCSS (QA) 936-5992	high	1 year		35				
SO3	Family Planning Logistics Management CDC 936-3038.01	high	1 year		100				
SO3	CAPS 936-3085	high	1 year		150				
SO3	AVSC 936-3068	high	1 year		100				
SO3	AIDS - Impact Project 936-3090.02	high	1 year		200				
SO3	FHI Contra Tech 936-3079	high	1 year		65				
SO2	Parks in Peril	high	2 years		120				
SO3	AVSC 936-3068	high	2 years				150		
SO3	CAPS 936-3085	high	1 year				100		
SO3	AIDS - Impact Project 936-3090.02	high	1 year						100
SO3	AVSC 936-3068	high	2 years						100
GRAND TOTAL.....					770		250		200

*For Priorities use high, medium-high, medium, medium-low, low

D. Operating Expense and Workforce Narrative

USAID/Jamaica is a Full Service Mission staffed by nine USDHs, one internationally recruited TCN, 39 locally hired staff and 14 program funded US and FSNPSCs for a total of 83. In addition, we have 20 staff employed under manpower contracts. This combined staff has been adequate to support the program in Jamaica which consists of three SO teams, one strategic support objective and three support offices. However, with OE budget levels being reduced for FYs 99,00 and 01, from the FY98 level by \$340,000, overall staff levels will have to be reduced to meet budget restrictions.

Workforce

As reported in last year's R4, USAID/Jamaica was restructured into SO teams, one strategic support objective and three traditional support offices with a USDH ceiling of 10. Further rightsizing has eliminated our Deputy Mission Director position leaving a ceiling of nine. However, the LAC bureau has confirmed that the Mission will be granted a ceiling of 10 for FYs 99 and 00. FY01's ceiling will then be reduced to nine. These ceilings have been established to meet the planned increase in Jamaica's program. There will be a turnover of five USDH positions in FY98 which will see a new Mission Director, Program Officer, Project Development Officer, SO#3 Team Leader and Executive Officer arrive at post.

Locally hired employees and staff hired under manpower contracts continue to consume a very large portion of the Mission's operating expenses. Even though ceilings no longer exist for these employee categories, we will, in the very near future, review each and every position to ensure that the service(s) being provided are absolutely necessary. It may be more cost effective to employ directly employees needed or contract out for individual services to provide the necessary support without incurring the overhead under the existing manpower contracts.

Operating Expenses/Trust Fund

The Operating Expense(OE)/Trust Fund (TF) targets and requests for FYs 98, 99 and 00 are as follows:

	<u>TARGETS</u>		
	FY98	FY99	FY00
OE -	\$1,000.0	\$1,400.0	\$1,400.0
TF -	<u>2,040.0</u>	<u>1,300.0</u>	<u>1,300.0</u>
TOTAL	\$3,040.0	2,700.0	2,700.0

REQUESTS

	FY98	FY99	FY00
OE -	\$1,000.0	\$1,742.4	\$1,546.8
TF -	<u>2,240.0</u>	<u>1,300.0</u>	<u>1,448.2</u>
	\$3,240.0	\$3,042.4	\$2,995.0

Despite planning for decreased workforce levels and corresponding cuts in the OE budget, the Mission's OE request for FYs 98-00 will exceed targets collectively for the three years by nearly \$840,000. These increases are caused by several factors. During the three year period, there will be approximately seven new employees arriving at post and the same amount departing all for reassignment to Washington or retirement which means that 14 transfers will be charged to Mission OE funds for a total of nearly \$300,000. The next big ticket charges to OE will be the anticipated FSN salary increases for the three year period which will average nearly \$80,000 yearly. Add in severance pay requirements, unplanned away-from-post school allowances and planned non-expendable property procurement (residential and office furniture, ADP equipment) and the amount of our requests could be easily obligated. The Mission will, of course, continue to implement as many cost savings measures as possible without increasing associated vulnerabilities.

ICASS

USAID/Jamaica's total ICASS costs for FY98 are estimated to be \$115,927 split between \$77,820 from OE funds and \$38,107 from program funds. This amount represents the Mission's participation only in the ICASS basic package and other required services. Upon the arrival of the new Mission Director and Executive Officer, it is envisioned that the Mission will conduct a comprehensive review of the ICASS program.

Y2K Compliance (Year 2000)

The Mission has received and reviewed the most recent IRM/Washington guidance regarding Y2K (Year 2000) compliance and we have determined that the cost of procuring the necessary hardware, additional computers and servers and software (Microsoft Office Suite) is estimated at \$238,000 in FY99. This extraordinary expense is reflected in our budget tables as an NXP procurement entry. We will continue to develop contingency plans later in FY99 in the event that the procurement of Y2K compliant hardware/software must be charged to the Mission's OE and not centrally funded by USAID/W. As noted by other Missions, USAID/Jamaica does not have Y2K problems related to the use of the Mission Accounting and Control System (MACS) as no other applications are resident on the Mission's MACS server.

Workforce

Org: USAID/Kingston FY 1998 On-Board Estimate	SO/SpO Staff							Total SO/SpO Staff	Management Staff						Total Mgmt.	Grand Total Staff
	SO 1	SO 2	SO 3	SO 4	SpO 1	SpO 2	SpO 3		Org. Mgmt.	Con- troller	AMS/ EXO	Con- tract	Legal	All Other		
U.S. Direct Hire	1	1	1		0.6			3.6	1	1	1			2.4	5.4	9
Other U.S. Citizens: 1/ OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited Program		1			1			2			1			1	2	2
FSN/TCN Direct Hire: OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited		1	2					3		1					1	4
FSN/TCN Non-Direct Hire: OE Internationally Recruited								0		1					1	1
OE Locally Recruited Program	3	2	3		1			9	2	9	10			3	24	33
	2	1	3					6							0	6
Total Staff Levels	6	6	9	0	2.6	0	0	23.6	3	12	12	0	0	6.4	33.4	57
TAACS								0							0	0
Fellows								0							0	0

1/ Excluding TAACS and Fellows

Workforce

Org: USAID/Kingston FY 1999 Target On-Board Estimate	SO/SpO Staff							Total SO/SpO Staff	Management Staff						Total Mgmt.	Grand Total Staff
	SO 1	SO 2	SO 3	SO 4	SpO 1	SpO 2	SpO 3		Org. Mgmt.	Con- troller	AMS/ EXO	Con- tract	Legal	All Other		
U.S. Direct Hire	1	1	1		0.6			3.6	1	1	1			3.4	6.4	10
Other U.S. Citizens: 1/ OE Internationally Recruited OE Locally Recruited Program			1		1			0 0 2						1	0 1 0	0 1 2
FSN/TCN Direct Hire: OE Internationally Recruited OE Locally Recruited			1	1				0 2		1					0 1	0 3
FSN/TCN Non-Direct Hire: OE Internationally Recruited OE Locally Recruited Program	3 4	2 1	3 6		1 1			0 9 12	1	1 9	10			3	1 23 0	1 32 12
Total Staff Levels	8	6	11	0	3.6	0	0	28.6	2	12	11	0	0	7.4	32.4	61
TAACS Fellows								0 0							0 0	0 0

1/ Excluding TAACS and Fellows

Org: USAID/Kingston FY 1999 Request On-Board Estimate	SO/SpO Staff							Total SO/SpO Staff	Management Staff						Total Mgmt.	Grand Total Staff
	SO 1	SO 2	SO 3	SO 4	SpO 1	SpO 2	SpO 3		Org. Mgmt.	Con- troller	AMS/ EXO	Con- tract	Legal	All Other		
U.S. Direct Hire	1	1	1		0.6			3.6	1	1	1			3.4	6.4	10
Other U.S. Citizens: 1/ OE Internationally Recruited OE Locally Recruited Program			1		1			0 0 2						1	0 1 0	0 1 2
FSN/TCN Direct Hire: OE Internationally Recruited OE Locally Recruited			1	1				0 2		1					0 1	0 3
FSN/TCN Non-Direct Hire: OE Internationally Recruited OE Locally Recruited Program	3 4	2 1	3 6		1 1			0 9 12	1	1 9	10			3	1 23 0	1 32 12
Total Staff Levels	8	6	11	0	3.6	0	0	28.6	2	12	11	0	0	7.4	32.4	61
TAACS Fellows								0 0							0 0	0 0

1/ Excluding TAACS and Fellows

Workforce

Org: USAID/Kingston FY 2000 Target On-Board Estimate	SO/SpO Staff							Total SO/SpO Staff	Management Staff						Total Mgmt.	Grand Total Staff
	SO 1	SO 2	SO 3	SO 4	SpO 1	SpO 2	SpO 3		Org. Mgmt.	Con- troller	AMS/ EXO	Con- tract	Legal	All Other		
U.S. Direct Hire	1	1	1		0.6			3.6	1	1	1			3.4	6.4	10
Other U.S. Citizens: 1/ OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited Program		1			1			0						1	1	1
								2							0	2
FSN/TCN Direct Hire: OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited		1	1					2		1					1	3
FSN/TCN Non-Direct Hire: OE Internationally Recruited								0		1					1	1
OE Locally Recruited	3	2	3		1			9	1	9	10			3	23	32
Program	4	1	6		1			12							0	12
Total Staff Levels	8	6	11	0	3.6	0	0	28.6	2	12	11	0	0	7.4	32.4	61
TAACS								0							0	0
Fellows								0							0	0

1/ Excluding TAACS and Fellows

Org: USAID/Kingston FY 2000 Request On-Board Estimate	SO/SpO Staff							Total SO/SpO Staff	Management Staff						Total Mgmt.	Grand Total Staff
	SO 1	SO 2	SO 3	SO 4	SpO 1	SpO 2	SpO 3		Org. Mgmt.	Con- troller	AMS/ EXO	Con- tract	Legal	All Other		
U.S. Direct Hire	1	1	1		0.6			3.6	1	1	1			3.4	6.4	10
Other U.S. Citizens: 1/ OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited								0						1	1	1
Program		1			1			2							0	2
FSN/TCN Direct Hire: OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited		1	1					2		1					1	3
FSN/TCN Non-Direct Hire: OE Internationally Recruited								0		1					1	1
OE Locally Recruited	3	2	3		1			9	1	9	10			3	23	32
Program	4	1	6		1			12							0	12
Total Staff Levels	8	6	11	0	3.6	0	0	28.6	2	12	11	0	0	7.4	32.4	61
TAACS								0							0	0
Fellows								0							0	0

1/ Excluding TAACS and Fellows

Workforce

Org: USAID/Kingston FY 2001 On-Board Estimate	SO/SpO Staff							Total SO/SpO Staff	Management Staff						Total Mgmt.	Grand Total Staff
	SO 1	SO 2	SO 3	SO 4	SpO 1	SpO 2	SpO 3		Org. Mgmt.	Con- troller	AMS/ EXO	Con- tract	Legal	All Other		
U.S. Direct Hire	1	1	1		0.6			3.6	1	1	1			3.4	6.4	10
Other U.S. Citizens: 1/ OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited Program		1			1			2						1	1	1
FSN/TCN Direct Hire: OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited		1	1					2		1					1	3
FSN/TCN Non-Direct Hire: OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited Program	3	2	3		1			9	1	9	10			3	23	32
	4	1	6		1			12							0	12
Total Staff Levels	8	6	11	0	3.6	0	0	28.6	2	11	11	0	0	7.4	31.4	60
TAACS Fellows								0							0	0
								0							0	0

1/ Excluding TAACS and Fellows

Org: USAID/Kingston Summary On-Board Estimate	SO/SpO Staff							Total SO/SpO Staff	Management Staff						Total Mgmt.	Grand Total Staff
	SO 1	SO 2	SO 3	SO 4	SpO 1	SpO 2	SpO 3		Org. Mgmt.	Con- troller	AMS/ EXO	Con- tract	Legal	All Other		
FY 1998:																
U.S. Direct Hire	1	1	1	0	0.6	0	0	3.6	1	1	1	0	0	2.4	5.4	9
OE Internationally Recr	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1
OE Locally Recruited	3	3	5	0	1	0	0	12	2	10	11	0	0	4	27	39
Total OE Funded Staf	4	4	6	0	1.6	0	0	15.6	3	12	12	0	0	6.4	33.4	49
Program Funded	2	2	3	0	1	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8
Total FY 1998	6	6	9	0	2.6	0	0	23.6	3	12	12	0	0	6.4	33.4	57

FY 1999 Target:																
U.S. Direct Hire	1	1	1	0	0.6	0	0	3.6	1	1	1	0	0	3.4	6.4	10
OE Internationally Recr	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1
OE Locally Recruited	3	3	4	0	1	0	0	11	1	10	10	0	0	4	25	36
Total OE Funded Staf	4	4	5	0	1.6	0	0	14.6	2	12	11	0	0	7.4	32.4	47
Program Funded	4	2	6	0	2	0	0	14	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	14
Total FY 1999 Target	8	6	11	0	3.6	0	0	28.6	2	12	11	0	0	7.4	32.4	61

FY 1999 Request:																
U.S. Direct Hire	1	1	1	0	0.6	0	0	3.6	1	1	1	0	0	3.4	6.4	10
OE Internationally Recr	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1
OE Locally Recruited	3	3	4	0	1	0	0	11	1	10	10	0	0	4	25	36
Total OE Funded Staf	4	4	5	0	1.6	0	0	14.6	2	12	11	0	0	7.4	32.4	47
Program Funded	4	2	6	0	2	0	0	14	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	14
Total FY 1999 Request	8	6	11	0	3.6	0	0	28.6	2	12	11	0	0	7.4	32.4	61

FY 2000 Target:																
U.S. Direct Hire	1	1	1	0	0.6	0	0	3.6	1	1	1	0	0	3.4	6.4	10
OE Internationally Recr	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1
OE Locally Recruited	3	3	4	0	1	0	0	11	1	10	10	0	0	4	25	36
Total OE Funded Staf	4	4	5	0	1.6	0	0	14.6	2	12	11	0	0	7.4	32.4	47
Program Funded	4	2	6	0	2	0	0	14	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	14
Total FY 2000 Target	8	6	11	0	3.6	0	0	28.6	2	12	11	0	0	7.4	32.4	61

Workforce

FY 2000 Request:																	
U.S. Direct Hire	1	1	1	0	0.6	0	0	3.6	1	1	1	0	0	3.4	6.4	10	
OE Internationally Recr	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	
OE Locally Recruited	3	3	4	0	1	0	0	11	1	10	10	0	0	4	25	36	
Total OE Funded Staf	4	4	5	0	1.6	0	0	14.6	2	12	11	0	0	7.4	32.4	47	
Program Funded	4	2	6	0	2	0	0	14	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	14	
Total FY 2000 Request	8	6	11	0	3.6	0	0	28.6	2	12	11	0	0	7.4	32.4	61	

FY 2001 Estimate:																	
U.S. Direct Hire	1	1	1	0	0.6	0	0	3.6	1	1	1	0	0	3.4	6.4	10	
OE Internationally Recr	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
OE Locally Recruited	3	3	4	0	1	0	0	11	1	10	10	0	0	4	25	36	
Total OE Funded Staf	4	4	5	0	1.6	0	0	14.6	2	11	11	0	0	7.4	31.4	46	
Program Funded	4	2	6	0	2	0	0	14	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	14	
Total FY 2000 Target	8	6	11	0	3.6	0	0	28.6	2	11	11	0	0	7.4	31.4	60	

MISSION : USAID/Kingston

USDH STAFFING REQUIREMENTS BY SKILL CODE

BACKSTOP (BS)	NO. OF USDH EMPLOYEES IN BACKSTOP FY 98	NO. OF USDH EMPLOYEES IN BACKSTOP FY 99	NO. OF USDH EMPLOYEES IN BACKSTOP FY 2000	NO. OF USDH EMPLOYEES IN BACKSTOP FY 2001
01SMG	1	1	1	1
02 Program Off.	1	1	1	1
03 EXO	1	1	1	1
04 Controller	1	1	1	1
05/06/07 Secretary				
10 Agriculture.	1	1	1	1
11Economics	1	1	1	1
12 GDO	1	1	1	1
12 Democracy				
14 Rural Dev.				
15 Food for Peace				
21 Private Ent.	1	1	1	1
25 Engineering				
40 Environ				
50 Health/Pop.				
60 Education				
75 Physical Sci.				
85 Legal				
92 Commodity Mgt				
93 Contract Mgt				
94 PDO	1	2	2	1
95 IDI				
Other*				
TOTAL	9	10	10	9

*please list occupations covered by other if there are any

TRUST FUNDS & FSN SEPARATION FUND

Orgno: 25532
Org. Title: USAID/Kingston

Foreign National Voluntary Separation Account

Action	FY 98			FY 99			FY 00		
	OE	Program	Total	OE	Program	Total	OE	Program	Total
Deposits			0.0			0.0			0.0
Withdrawals			0.0			0.0			0.0

Unfunded Liability (if any)
at the end of each FY.

Local Currency Trust Funds - Regular (\$000s)

	FY 98	FY 99	FY 00
Balance Start of Year	4,592.0	3,357.3	2,563.9
Obligations	2,040.0	1,300.0	1,300.0
Deposits	805.3	506.6	384.6
Balance End of Year	3,357.3	2,563.9	1,648.5

Exchange Rate(s) Used 36.5 37.0 39.0

Trust Funds in Dollar Equivalents, not in Local Country Equivalents

Local Currency Trust Funds - Real Property (\$000s)

	FY 98	FY 99	FY 00
Balance Start of Year		0.0	0.0
Obligations			
Deposits			
Balance End of Year	0.0	0.0	0.0

Trust Funds in Dollar Equivalents, not in Local Country Equivalents

Operating Expenses

Org. Title: 25532			Overseas Mission Budgets														
Org. No: USAID/JAMAICA			FY 1998			FY 1999 Target			FY 1999 Request			FY 2000 Target			FY 2000 Request		
OC			Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total

Org. Title: 25532			Overseas Mission Budgets														
Org. No: USAID/JAMAICA			FY 1998			FY 1999 Target			FY 1999 Request			FY 2000 Target			FY 2000 Request		
OC			Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total

Operating Expenses

Org. Title: 25532		Overseas Mission Budgets														
Org. No:	USAID/JAMAICA	FY 1998			FY 1999 Target			FY 1999 Request			FY 2000 Target			FY 2000 Request		
OC		Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total
11.1	Personnel compensation, full-time permanent	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
11.1	Base Pay & pymt. for annual leave balances - FNDH		171.4	171.4	76	86.9	162.9	76	86.9	162.9	13.8	144.4	158.2		171.7	171.7
	Subtotal OC 11.1	0	171.4	171.4	76	86.9	162.9	76	86.9	162.9	13.8	144.4	158.2	0	171.7	171.7
11.3	Personnel comp. - other than full-time permanent	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
11.3	Base Pay & pymt. for annual leave balances - FNDH			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 11.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
11.5	Other personnel compensation	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
11.5	USDH			0			0			0			0			0
11.5	FNDH		13.5	13.5		14.5	14.5		14.5	14.5		14.1	14.1		15.3	15.3
	Subtotal OC 11.5	0	13.5	13.5	0	14.5	14.5	0	14.5	14.5	0	14.1	14.1	0	15.3	15.3
11.8	Special personal services payments	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
11.8	USPSC Salaries	157.4		157.4	66.3		66.3	66.3		66.3	54.9		54.9	54.9		54.9
11.8	FN PSC Salaries	49.4	809.5	858.9	53.3	842	895.3	53.3	842	895.3	54.9	822.6	877.5	54.9	870	924.9
11.8	IPA/Details-In/PASAs/RSSAs Salaries			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 11.8	206.8	809.5	1016.3	119.6	842	961.6	119.6	842	961.6	109.8	822.6	932.4	109.8	870	979.8
12.1	Personnel benefits	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
12.1	USDH benefits	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
12.1	Educational Allowances	58.7		58.7	75		75	109.3		109.3	123.9		123.9	123.9		123.9
12.1	Cost of Living Allowances	12		12	15		15	15		15	15		15	15		15
12.1	Home Service Transfer Allowances	2.8		2.8			0	0.7		0.7	2.1		2.1	2.1		2.1
12.1	Quarters Allowances			0			0			0			0			0
12.1	Other Misc. USDH Benefits			0			0			0			0			0
12.1	FNDH Benefits	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
12.1	Payments to the FSN Separation Fund - FNDH			0			0			0			0			0
12.1	Other FNDH Benefits		1.7	1.7		2.1	2.1		2.1	2.1		2.1	2.1		2.1	2.1
12.1	US PSC Benefits	15		15			0			0			0			0
12.1	FN PSC Benefits	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
12.1	Payments to the FSN Separation Fund - FN PSC			0			0			0			0			0
12.1	Other FN PSC Benefits	5	189.9	194.9	8.2	184	192.2	8.2	184	192.2	8.2	180.3	188.5	8.2	227.7	235.9
12.1	IPA/Detail-In/PASA/RSSA Benefits			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 12.1	93.5	191.6	285.1	98.2	186.1	284.3	133.2	186.1	319.3	149.2	182.4	331.6	149.2	229.8	379
13	Benefits for former personnel	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
13	FNDH	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
13	Severance Payments for FNDH	13.4		13.4			0			0			0			0
13	Other Benefits for Former Personnel - FNDH			0			0			0			0			0
13	FN PSCs	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
13	Severance Payments for FN PSCs			0			0			0			0			0
13	Other Benefits for Former Personnel - FN PSCs			0			0			0			0			0

Operating Expenses

Org. Title: 25532		Overseas Mission Budgets														
Org. No: USAID/JAMAICA		FY 1998			FY 1999 Target			FY 1999 Request			FY 2000 Target			FY 2000 Request		
OC		Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total
	Subtotal OC 13.0	13.4	0	13.4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21	Travel and transportation of persons	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
21	Training Travel	7.5		7.5	7.9		7.9	7.9		7.9	5.2		5.2	7.7		7.7
21	Mandatory/Statutory Travel	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
21	Post Assignment Travel - to field	8.4		8.4			0	1.2		1.2	3.6		3.6	4.8		4.8
21	Assignment to Washington Travel	2		2			0			0			0			0
21	Home Leave Travel	2.8		2.8	1.6		1.6	1.6		1.6	8.2		8.2	8.2		8.2
21	R & R Travel	2.4		2.4	6		6	7.2		7.2	5.2		5.2	5.2		5.2
21	Education Travel	0.7		0.7	0.7		0.7	0.7		0.7			0			0
21	Evacuation Travel			0			0			0			0			0
21	Retirement Travel			0			0			0			0			0
21	Pre-Employment Invitational Travel			0			0			0			0			0
21	Other Mandatory/Statutory Travel	11		11	17.1		17.1	17.1		17.1	12.4		12.4	12.4		12.4
21	Operational Travel	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
21	Site Visits - Headquarters Personnel	11.6		11.6	11.3		11.3	11.3		11.3	5.2		5.2	11.1		11.1
21	Site Visits - Mission Personnel		21.8	21.8		21	21		21	21		10.3	10.3		20.6	20.6
21	Conferences/Seminars/Meetings/Retreats	20		20	21		21	21		21	15.5		15.5	20.6		20.6
21	Assessment Travel			0			0			0			0			0
21	Impact Evaluation Travel			0			0			0			0			0
21	Disaster Travel (to respond to specific disasters)			0			0			0			0			0
21	Recruitment Travel			0			0			0			0			0
21	Other Operational Travel	45	3.3	48.3	40		40	40		40	15		15	30.9		30.9
	Subtotal OC 21.0	111.4	25.1	136.5	105.6	21	126.6	108	21	129	70.3	10.3	80.6	100.9	20.6	121.5
22	Transportation of things	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
22	Post assignment freight	141.5		141.5			0	19.7		19.7	79.7		79.7	100		100
22	Home Leave Freight	3.1		3.1	2.5		2.5	2.5		2.5	9.3		9.3	9.3		9.3
22	Retirement Freight			0			0			0			0			0
22	Transportation/Freight for Office Furniture/Equip.	3.5		3.5			0			0			0			0
22	Transportation/Freight for Res. Furniture/Equip.	3.5		3.5			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 22.0	151.6	0	151.6	2.5	0	2.5	22.2	0	22.2	89	0	89	109.3	0	109.3
23.2	Rental payments to others	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
23.2	Rental Payments to Others - Office Space			0			0			0			0			0
23.2	Rental Payments to Others - Parking Lot		14	14	7.9		7.9	7.9		7.9	16.6		16.6	16.6		16.6
23.2	Rental Payments to Others - Residences	185.3		185.3	187.6		187.6	211.6		211.6	197		197	215		215
	Subtotal OC 23.2	185.3	14	199.3	195.5	0	195.5	219.5	0	219.5	213.6	0	213.6	231.6	0	231.6
23.3	Communications, utilities, and miscellaneous charge	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
23.3	Office Utilities		72	72		71.4	71.4		71.4	71.4		69.7	69.7		69.7	69.7
23.3	Residential Utilities		45	45	42.6		42.6	47.9		47.9	46.8		46.8	46.8		46.8
23.3	Telephone Costs		118.7	118.7	101.3		101.3	101.3		101.3	60		60	63		63
23.3	ADP Software Leases			0			0			0			0			0
23.3	ADP Hardware Lease			0			0			0			0			0

Operating Expenses

Org. Title: 25532		Overseas Mission Budgets														
Org. No: USAID/JAMAICA		FY 1998			FY 1999 Target			FY 1999 Request			FY 2000 Target			FY 2000 Request		
OC		Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total
23.3	Commercial Time Sharing			0			0			0			0			0
23.3	Postal Fees (Other than APO Mail)			0			0			0			0			0
23.3	Other Mail Service Costs			0			0			0			0			0
23.3	Courier Services		2.1	2.1		2.1	2.1		2.1	2.1		2.2	2.2		2.1	2.1
	Subtotal OC 23.3	0	237.8	237.8	143.9	73.5	217.4	149.2	73.5	222.7	106.8	71.9	178.7	109.8	71.8	181.6
24	Printing and Reproduction		5.2	5.2		2.6	2.6		2.6	2.6		2.6	2.6		2.6	2.6
	Subtotal OC 24.0	0	5.2	5.2	0	2.6	2.6	0	2.6	2.6	0	2.6	2.6	0	2.6	2.6
25.1	Advisory and assistance services	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
25.1	Studies, Analyses, & Evaluations			0			0			0			0			0
25.1	Management & Professional Support Services			0			0			0			0			0
25.1	Engineering & Technical Services			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 25.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
25.2	Other services	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
25.2	Office Security Guards	67		67	71		71	71		71	73.1		73.1	73.1		73.1
25.2	Residential Security Guard Services	170		170	174.2		174.2	192.2		192.2	176.7		176.7	176.7		176.7
25.2	Official Residential Expenses			0	5.5		5.5	5.5		5.5	5.5		5.5	5.5		5.5
25.2	Representation Allowances	1		1	1		1	1		1	1		1	1		1
25.2	Non-Federal Audits			0			0			0			0			0
25.2	Grievances/Investigations			0			0			0			0			0
25.2	Insurance and Vehicle Registration Fees			0			0			0			0			0
25.2	Vehicle Rental			0			0			0			0			0
25.2	Manpower Contracts		287	287	345		345	345		345	348		348	373		373
25.2	Records Declassification & Other Records Services			0			0			0			0			0
25.2	Recruiting activities			0			0			0			0			0
25.2	Penalty Interest Payments			0			0			0			0			0
25.2	Other Miscellaneous Services		30.2	30.2	24.5		24.5	24.5		24.5	24.8		24.8	24.8		24.8
25.2	Staff training contracts		6.8	6.8	10.5		10.5	10.5		10.5	5.2		5.2	5.2		5.2
25.2	ADP related contracts			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 25.2	238	324	562	631.7	0	631.7	649.7	0	649.7	634.3	0	634.3	659.3	0	659.3
25.3	Purchase of goods and services from Government ac	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
25.3	ICASS			0			0			0			0			0
25.3	All Other Services from Other Gov't. accounts	0		0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 25.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
25.4	Operation and maintenance of facilities	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
25.4	Office building Maintenance		20	20	18.2		18.2	18.2		18.2	10		10	10		10
25.4	Residential Building Maintenance		24	24	3.3		3.3	3.3		3.3	3.2		3.2	3.2		3.2
	Subtotal OC 25.4	0	44	44	21.5	0	21.5	21.5	0	21.5	13.2	0	13.2	13.2	0	13.2

Operating Expenses

Org. Title: 25532		Overseas Mission Budgets														
Org. No: USAID/JAMAICA		FY 1998			FY 1999 Target			FY 1999 Request			FY 2000 Target			FY 2000 Request		
OC		Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total
25.7	Operation/maintenance of equipment & storage of goods	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
25.7	ADP and telephone operation and maintenance costs			0			0			0			0			0
25.7	Storage Services			0			0			0			0			0
25.7	Office Furniture/Equip. Repair and Maintenance		0	0			0			0			0			0
25.7	Vehicle Repair and Maintenance		10.5	10.5		10.1	10.1		10.1	10.1		11.8	11.8		11.8	11.8
25.7	Residential Furniture/Equip. Repair and Maintenance			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 25.7	0	10.5	10.5	0	10.1	10.1	0	10.1	10.1	0	11.8	11.8	0	11.8	11.8
25.8	Subsistence and support of persons (by contract or Gov't.)			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 25.8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
26	Supplies and materials		59.2	59.2		63.3	63.3		63.3	63.3		39.9	39.9		54.6	54.6
	Subtotal OC 26.0	0	59.2	59.2	0	63.3	63.3	0	63.3	63.3	0	39.9	39.9	0	54.6	54.6
31	Equipment	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
31	Purchase of Residential Furniture/Equip.		8	8	5.5		5.5	5.5		5.5			0	3.7		3.7
31	Purchase of Office Furniture/Equip.			0			0			0			0			0
31	Purchase of Vehicles		46.2	46.2			0			0			0	60		60
31	Purchase of Printing/Graphics Equipment			0			0			0			0			0
31	ADP Hardware purchases		80	80			0	238		238			0			0
	Subtotal OC 31.0	0	134.2	134.2	5.5	0	5.5	243.5	0	243.5	0	0	0	63.7	0	63.7
32	Lands and structures	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
32	Purchase of Land & Buildings (& construction of bldgs.)			0			0			0			0			0
32	Purchase of fixed equipment for buildings			0			0			0			0			0
32	Building Renovations/Alterations - Office			0			0			0			0			0
32	Building Renovations/Alterations - Residential			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 32.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
42	Claims and indemnities			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 42.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL BUDGET		1000	2040	3040	1400	1300	2700	1742.4	1300	3042.4	1400	1300	2700	1546.8	1448.2	2995
Dollars Used for Local Currency Purchases		13.4			610.9			616.2			506.6			520.8		
Exchange Rate Used in Computations		36	36		37	37		37	37		39	39		39	39	
ICASS NOT INCLUDED - PROGRAM		38,107			52,000			52,000			56,000			56,000		

Cost of Controller Operations

Org. Title: USAID/Jamaica			Overseas Mission Budgets											
Org. No: CO25532			FY 1998			FY 1999 Target			FY 1999 Request			FY 2000 Target		
OC			Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total
Org. Title: USAID/Jamaica			Overseas Mission Budgets											
Org. No: CO25532			FY 1998			FY 1999 Target			FY 1999 Request			FY 2000 Target		
OC			Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total

Cost of Controller Operations

Org. Title: USAID/Jamaica Org. No: CO25532 OC		Overseas Mission Budgets														
		FY 1998			FY 1999 Target			FY 1999 Request			FY 2000 Target			FY 2000 Request		
		Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total
11.1	Personnel compensation, full-time permanent	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
11.1	Base Pay & pymt. for annual leave balances - FNDH	21.3	21.3		21.4	21.4		21.4	21.4		21	21		25.1	25.1	
	Subtotal OC 11.1	0	21.3	21.3	0	21.4	21.4	0	21.4	21.4	0	21	21	0	25.1	25.1
11.3	Personnel comp. - other than full-time permanent	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
11.3	Base Pay & pymt. for annual leave balances - FNDH		0			0			0			0			0	
	Subtotal OC 11.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
11.5	Other personnel compensation	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
11.5	USDH		0			0			0			0			0	
11.5	FNDH		2.5	2.5		2.5	2.5		2.5	2.5		2.4	2.4	0	2.9	2.9
	Subtotal OC 11.5	0	2.5	2.5	0	2.5	2.5	0	2.5	2.5	0	2.5	2.4	0	2.9	2.9
11.8	Special personal services payments	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
11.8	USPSC Salaries		0			0			0			0			0	
11.8	FN PSC Salaries	49.4	228	277.4	53.3	230	283.3	53.3	230	283.3	54.9	224.2	279.1	54.9	269	323.9
11.8	IPA/Details-In/PASAs/RSSAs Salaries			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 11.8	49.4	228	277.4	53.3	230	283.3	53.3	230	283.3	54.9	224.2	279.1	54.9	269	323.9
12.1	Personnel benefits	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
12.1	USDH benefits	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
12.1	Educational Allowances		0			0			0			0			0	
12.1	Cost of Living Allowances	2.6		2.6	2.7		2.7	2.7		2.7	2.8		2.8	2.8		2.8
12.1	Home Service Transfer Allowances		0			0			0			0			0	
12.1	Quarters Allowances		0			0			0			0			0	
12.1	Other Misc. USDH Benefits		0			0			0			0			0	
12.1	FNDH Benefits	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
12.1	Payments to the FSN Separation Fund - FNDH		0			0			0			0			0	
12.1	Other FNDH Benefits		0			0			0			0			0	
12.1	US PSC Benefits		0			0			0			0			0	
12.1	FN PSC Benefits	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
12.1	Payments to the FSN Separation Fund - FN PSC		0			0			0			0			0	
12.1	Other FN PSC Benefits	5	24	29	8.2	24.2	32.4	8.2	24.2	32.4	8.2	23.5	31.7	8.2	28.25	36.45
12.1	IPA/Detail-In/PASA/RSSA Benefits			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 12.1	7.6	24	31.6	10.9	24.2	35.1	10.9	24.2	35.1	11	23.5	34.5	11	28.25	39.25
13	Benefits for former personnel	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
13	FNDH	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
13	Severance Payments for FNDH		0			0			0			0			0	
13	Other Benefits for Former Personnel - FNDH		0			0			0			0			0	
13	FN PSCs	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
13	Severance Payments for FN PSCs		0			0			0			0			0	
13	Other Benefits for Former Personnel - FN PSCs		0			0			0			0			0	
	Subtotal OC 13.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Cost of Controller Operations

Org. Title: USAID/Jamaica Org. No: CO25532 OC		Overseas Mission Budgets														
		FY 1998			FY 1999 Target			FY 1999 Request			FY 2000 Target			FY 2000 Request		
		Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total
21	Travel and transportation of persons	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
21	Training Travel	0			0			0			0			0		
21	Mandatory/Statutory Travel	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
21	Post Assignment Travel - to field	0			0			0			0			0		
21	Assignment to Washington Travel	0			0			0			0			0		
21	Home Leave Travel	0			0			0			0.8		0.8	0.8		0.8
21	R & R Travel	0.8		0.8	0			0			0			0		
21	Education Travel	0			0			0			0			0		
21	Evacuation Travel	0			0			0			0			0		
21	Retirement Travel	0			0			0			0			0		
21	Pre-Employment Invitational Travel	0			0			0			0			0		
21	Other Mandatory/Statutory Travel	0			0			0			0			0		
21	Operational Travel	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
21	Site Visits - Headquarters Personnel	0			0			0			0			0		
21	Site Visits - Mission Personnel	0			0			0			0			0		
21	Conferences/Seminars/Meetings/Retreats	1.4		1.4	1.4		1.4	1.4		1.4	1.4		1.4	1.4		1.4
21	Assessment Travel	0			0			0			0			0		
21	Impact Evaluation Travel	0			0			0			0			0		
21	Disaster Travel (to respond to specific disasters)	0			0			0			0			0		
21	Recruitment Travel	0			0			0			0			0		
21	Other Operational Travel	4.8	1.8	6.6	5	2	7	5	2	7	5	2	7	5	2	7
	Subtotal OC 21.0	7	1.8	8.8	6.4	2	8.4	6.4	2	8.4	7.2	2	9.2	7.2	2	9.2
22	Transportation of things	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
22	Post assignment freight	0			0			0			17.1		17.1	17.1		17.1
22	Home Leave Freight	0			0			0			1.1		1.1	1.1		1.1
22	Retirement Freight	0			0			0			0			0		
22	Transportation/Freight for Office Furniture/Equip.	0			0			0			0			0		
22	Transportation/Freight for Res. Furniture/Equip.	0			0			0			0			0		
	Subtotal OC 22.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	18.2	0	18.2	18.2	0	18.2
23.2	Rental payments to others	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
23.2	Rental Payments to Others - Office Space	0			0			0			0			0		
23.2	Rental Payments to Others - Warehouse Space	0			0			0			0			0		
23.2	Rental Payments to Others - Residences	46.2		46.2	48		48	48		48	50		50	50		50
	Subtotal OC 23.2	46.2	0	46.2	48	0	48	48	0	48	50	0	50	50	0	50
23.3	Communications, utilities, and miscellaneous charges	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
23.3	Office Utilities	0			0			0			0			0		
23.3	Residential Utilities	6		6	6.3		6.3	6.3		6.3	6.6		6.6	6.6		6.6
23.3	Telephone Costs	0			0			0			0			0		
23.3	ADP Software Leases	0			0			0			0			0		
23.3	ADP Hardware Lease	0			0			0			0			0		
23.3	Commercial Time Sharing	0			0			0			0			0		

Cost of Controller Operations

Org. Title: USAID/Jamaica		Overseas Mission Budgets														
Org. No:	CO25532	FY 1998			FY 1999 Target			FY 1999 Request			FY 2000 Target			FY 2000 Request		
OC		Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total
23.3	Postal Fees (Other than APO Mail)			0			0			0			0			0
23.3	Other Mail Service Costs			0			0			0			0			0
23.3	Courier Services			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 23.3	0	6	6	6.3	0	6.3	6.3	0	6.3	6.6	0	6.6	6.6	0	6.6
24	Printing and Reproduction			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 24.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
25.1	Advisory and assistance services	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
25.1	Studies, Analyses, & Evaluations			0			0			0			0			0
25.1	Management & Professional Support Services			0			0			0			0			0
25.1	Engineering & Technical Services			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 25.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
25.2	Other services	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
25.2	Office Security Guards			0			0			0			0			0
25.2	Residential Security Guard Services	32		32	33.6		33.6	33.6		33.6	35.3		35.3	35.3		35.3
25.2	Official Residential Expenses			0			0			0			0			0
25.2	Representation Allowances			0			0			0			0			0
25.2	Non-Federal Audits			0			0			0			0			0
25.2	Grievances/Investigations			0			0			0			0			0
25.2	Insurance and Vehicle Registration Fees			0			0			0			0			0
25.2	Vehicle Rental			0			0			0			0			0
25.2	Manpower Contracts			0			0			0			0			0
25.2	Records Declassification & Other Records Services			0			0			0			0			0
25.2	Recruiting activities			0			0			0			0			0
25.2	Penalty Interest Payments			0			0			0			0			0
25.2	Other Miscellaneous Services		2.5	2.5	2.6		2.6	2.6		2.6	2.7		2.7	2.7		2.7
25.2	Staff training contracts			0			0			0			0			0
25.2	ADP related contracts			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 25.2	32	2.5	34.5	36.2	0	36.2	36.2	0	36.2	38	0	38	38	0	38
25.3	Purchase of goods and services from Government accounts	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
25.3	ICASS			0			0			0			0			0
25.3	All Other Services from Other Gov't. accounts			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 25.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
25.4	Operation and maintenance of facilities	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
25.4	Office building Maintenance			0			0			0			0			0
25.4	Residential Building Maintenance		0.2	0.2	0.2		0.2	0.2		0.2	0.2		0.2	0.2		0.2
	Subtotal OC 25.4	0	0.2	0.2	0.2	0	0.2	0.2	0	0.2	0.2	0	0.2	0.2	0	0.2
25.7	Operation/maintenance of equipment & storage of goods	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
25.7	ADP and telephone operation and maintenance costs			0			0			0			0			0

Cost of Controller Operations

Org. Title: USAID/Jamaica Org. No: CO25532 OC		Overseas Mission Budgets														
		FY 1998			FY 1999 Target			FY 1999 Request			FY 2000 Target			FY 2000 Request		
		Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total
25.7	Storage Services			0			0			0			0			0
25.7	Office Furniture/Equip. Repair and Maintenance			0			0			0			0			0
25.7	Vehicle Repair and Maintenance			0			0			0			0			0
25.7	Residential Furniture/Equip. Repair and Maintenance			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 25.7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
25.8	Subsistence and support of persons (by contract or Gov't.)			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 25.8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
26	Supplies and materials		5	5		5.5	5.5		5.5	5.5		6	6		6	6
	Subtotal OC 26.0	0	5	5	0	5.5	5.5	0	5.5	5.5	0	6	6	0	6	6
31	Equipment	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
31	Purchase of Residential Furniture/Equip.			0			0			0			0			0
31	Purchase of Office Furniture/Equip.			0			0			0			0			0
31	Purchase of Vehicles			0			0			0			0			0
31	Purchase of Printing/Graphics Equipment			0			0			0			0			0
31	ADP Hardware purchases			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 31.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
32	Lands and structures	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
32	Purchase of Land & Buildings (& construction of bldgs.)			0			0			0			0			0
32	Purchase of fixed equipment for buildings			0			0			0			0			0
32	Building Renovations/Alterations - Office			0			0			0			0			0
32	Building Renovations/Alterations - Residential			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 32.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
42	Claims and indemnities			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 42.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL BUDGET		142.2	291.3	433.5	161.3	285.6	446.9	161.3	285.6	446.9	186.1	279.2	465.2	186.1	333.25	519.35
Dollars Used for Local Currency Purchases					2.6			2.6			2.7			2.7		
Exchange Rate Used in Computations		36	36		37	37		37	37		39	39		39	39	

**USAID/Jamaica
R4
1999 - 2000**

ANNEX

Annex Summary.....	1
I. Strategic Objective # 1: New Economic Growth Strategy.....	6
a) Strategy	
b) Results Framework	
II. Strategic Objective # 2.....	30
a) Strategy Modification Narrative	
b) Revised Results Framework	
II. Strategic Objective # 3	40
a) Strategy Modification Narrative	
b) Revised Results Framework	
III. Strategic Objective # 4	48
a) Strategy Modification Narrative	
b) Revised Results Framework	
IV. Strategic Support Objective	53
a) Strategy Modification Narrative	
b) Revised Results Framework	

USAID/Jamaica

1999 - 2000 R4 ANNEX

This annex to the USAID/Jamaica Year 2000 R4 is being provided to present several significant changes to the mission 1997-2001 Country Strategic Plan (CSP). It is intended that these modifications will be reviewed and ultimately approved within the context of this years DAEC review.

Summary of CSP Modifications

A new economic growth Strategic Objective (SO1) "Increased employment in targeted and small businesses" is proposed to replace the previous SO1 "Increased participation for economic growth". This represents a significant change as an entire new SO is being proposed.

A new SO is being developed for several key reasons. The original economic growth SO was developed, in large, to accommodate the portfolio of existing mission activities in the economic growth (EG) area. The EG portfolio is "aging" with all of the programs ending during FY 97 and FY 98. Consequently there is a need and opportunity to develop a new EG program to respond to todays current needs of the country. This coincidental timing was fortuitous given the rapidly changing, and deteriorating macroeconomic situation in Jamaica. The past two DAEC reviews called for the mission to reassess the EG strategy in light of the current situation and prospects for the future. Consequently the new strategy was developed.

As the new SO statement infers, the new USAID/Jamaica economic growth strategy focusses on two important sectors with significant economic growth potential, the micro and small business sectors. Employment generation will occur in these two sectors through: 1) improving management & technical capacity of selected businesses in targeted subsectors to increase productivity & competitiveness 2) improvement & expansion of services to micro enterprenurs, and 3) reduction and/or streamlining of bureaucratic "red tape".

The mission environmental Strategic Objective (SO2) "Increased protection of key natural resources in environmentally and economically significant areas" is being modified to read "Improved quality of key natural resources in selected areas that are both environmentally and economically significant". Modifications are also being made to the Results Framework. These modifications, while necessary, do not represent a departure from the original strategy - they are simply meant to clarify and make the RF more precise.

As with the economic growth SO, with the exception of one activity, the portfolio of activities in SO2 came to conclusion in FY 97. This created an opportunity for development of new activities. Unlike SO1, however, the environmental strategy developed in the 1997-2001 Country Strategic Plan was very forward thinking and accurately projects the close environmental/economic linkages which face Jamaica and form the foundation for the current strategy. Consequently the modifications presented in the revised framework do not alter the development strategy but refine and clarify many aspects of the planned results.

The most significant refinement is the heightened awareness and emphasis on improvement of coastal water quality as both an essential, direct result and as a barometer of environmental health for the entire watershed from the "ridge" of the mountain top to the "reefs" in the coastal waters - hence the "ridge-to-reef" management approach.

It is proposed that the mission Strategic Objective 3 (SO3) "Young Jamaicans better equipped for the 21st century" be split into two separate, independent SOs:

- (a) SO3: Improved reproductive health of youth in selected parishes
- (b) SO4: Increased literacy and numeracy among Jamaican youth in targeted primary schools.

While the bifurcation of the original SO represents a significant change in terms of program presentation, this does not, repeat not, represent a fundamental change in mission strategy. The SO level results remain the same and implementation strategy is unchanged. This modification does not result in any increase in the number of management units, does not require an increase in mission or contractor personnel and does not create a need for any increase in FTEs.

This splitting of the original SO is necessary in order to better clarify and articulate the planned development results in the health and education sectors as well as establishing a set of Results Frameworks which function as true management and monitoring tool as intended by the ADS. During the past two years the SO "Young Jamaicans Better Equipped for the 21st Century" came under increasing questioning from the GOJ, from other development partners, and within USAID. The result statement is too vague, not measurable, and leaves too many open questions in peoples minds. After much discussion and debate, it was concluded that the S.O. statement was an attempt to "package" two separate and distinct results under one results statement, thus the proposed correction. The mission feels strongly that the two proposed results statements accurately state the on-the-ground development reality and implementation strategy in a manner that is clear and precise.

The Caribbean Regional Program (CRP). The two CRP environmental projects, ENCORE and CEN will be ending this year. Also, the disaster mitigation project, CDMP, will be reviewed in the context of a broader OFDA strategy for the LAC region this year. A Caribbean Regional Environmental Strategy is currently being designed which will give

guidance to LAC for subsequent Caribbean regional initiatives. With these converging developments, USAID/Jamaica invited Caribbean environmental and disaster management experts working with key Caribbean regional institutions, to join us as partners to identify a regional strategic objective that might be in the manageable interest of USAID/Jamaica. Following much discussion, it is proposed that the original Strategic Support Objective (SSO) "Increased capacity to address regional development problems" be modified to "Selected protocols and practices for reduced vulnerability to natural disasters and environmental degradation implemented across the region".

Results Frame Workshops

Much of the initiative for modifying the various Results Frameworks (RFs) for the mission Strategic Objectives came about during teambuilding exercises conducted by the mission during the summer and fall of 1997. These teambuilding exercises were aimed at refocussing the internal USAID/Jamaica SO Teams and extended teams around the results frameworks for each SO. As part of the continuing reengineering "learning" process all Team members became more familiar with the function and utility of the RF as a daily management template. During the process it became increasingly clear that the existing results frameworks were inadequate to serve as a management tool. Many "indicators" were in fact activities, many of the causal linkages between the Intermediate Results levels were vague, and in general the RFs were not serving as driving force in making daily management and program decisions. All SO Teams then decided to undertake a reassessment and modification of the respective SOs.

A series of Results Frame Workshops were launched. An outside contractor which specializes in "managing for results" was engaged to facilitate the workshops. Each SO developed and enlisted the participation of the respective extended team. Each 4 day session was widely attended by GOJ counterparts, partners from the local community groups and NGOs, institutional contractors and grantees, and the AID/W LAC Bureau. A systematic review and dissection of the SO level result, intermediate results, and all lower level results were undertaken. In the end a modified RF was developed for each SO which represented a true reflection of the extended team. Critical ownership was developed. A series of intensive follow-up meetings and session were also held by each extended SO in development of detailed performance monitoring plans. These are in various stages of development and are to be completed this FY.

USAID/Jamaica Economic Growth Strategic Objective:

Increased Employment in Targeted Micro and Small Businesses

I. Introduction

This revised Strategic Objective (SO) results directly from the May 28, 1997 guidance cable which noted the increasing disconnect between the Mission's economic growth strategic objective (SO1) and the key assumptions embodied in the Mission's previous Strategy. In particular, the existing strategy presupposed a far higher level of funding than that which now appears likely and it assumed that sound GOJ macroeconomic policy would provide a platform of steady growth in which the Mission's targeted objectives could flourish. These assumptions have proven to be woefully incorrect. An overvalued exchange rate and real lending interest rates of over 30 percent have made it extremely difficult for promising labor-intensive, non-traditional exports to compete in the U.S. market. Inadequate demand management on the part of the GOJ combined with weaknesses in bank and insurance regulation has produced a financial system crisis which has led to a GOJ takeover of a significant part of the financial system. In short, the Jamaican macroeconomy has experienced massive shocks since the time the original strategy was developed.

In response to the deteriorating economy, and AID/Washington guidance following the 1997 R4 review, USAID Jamaica undertook a comprehensive assessment of its existing strategy and programs. This assessment found that, in addition to the slow growth and now recession in the Jamaican economy, there were a number of structural problems which needed to be addressed. These included weak institutions, particularly those supporting small and microenterprises, the high cost of credit, absence of important types of training, and an attitude on the part of many parts of government that was not helpful for small business expansion.

In late January of this year the Mission and AID/W representatives met with key development partners to review what goals and intermediary results were both possible and achievable given likely levels of funding over the strategic planning period. A strong consensus emerged that USAID could best help by implementing a program which maintained a clear focus on job creation through promotion of micro and small enterprises. There was also a consensus that USAID has an important role in improving the interaction between the GOJ and the Jamaican in facilitating trade and investment by streamlining GOJ regulations and procedures which inhibit trade and investment.

In developing the strategy, USAID has coordinated closely with the GOJ and other donors. The resulting USAID approach must be seen in the context of other donor activities and as an attempt to maximize the impact of the sorts of activities that only USAID can provide. In the critical areas of macroeconomic policy reform USAID expects to play a significant role in using its influence, and that of the U.S. Embassy, to encourage the GOJ to enact badly needed reforms.

II. Strategic Perspectives:

A. U.S. Policy

U.S. foreign policy interests in Jamaica cover a wide variety of areas and reflect the degree to which the United States and Jamaica interact in a wide variety of political, economic, social, and cultural contexts. These interest are detailed in the U.S. Embassy's most recent Mission Performance Plan (MPP). First on the Embassy's listing of U.S. interests is the importance of orderly regulation and facilitation of legitimate travel both from Jamaica to the U.S. and of U.S. citizens coming to Jamaica and by implication the importance of stemming illegal immigration. Second is the role that Jamaica plays as both a source country and a transit country for illegal drugs, as well as the need for close law-enforcement cooperation in other areas. Third, the plan discusses the importance of the growth of Jamaica's economy through economic reform and its relationship to the economic prosperity of the United States (the U.S. is Jamaica's largest trading partner and enjoy a substantial surplus in bilateral trade). Finally, the MPP proposes several initiatives which address the importance and role of improved governance in Jamaica.

The proposed new SO1 addresses each of the four USG priority foreign policy interests in Jamaica: 1) Stemming the incentives for illegal immigration through increased employment, 2) providing viable, sustainable economic opportunities for targeted, vulnerable populations involved in the drug trade, 3) facilitation of GOJ economic and regulatory reform measures needed for economic growth, and 4) mission programs which promote good governance and respect for political norms which contribute to an improved investment climate, while reducing crime and incentive for immigration.

B. Government of Jamaica

The position of the Government of Jamaica on economic recovery and growth is articulated and summarized in the GOJ document, "National Industrial Policy (NIP); a Strategic Plan for Growth and Development." Despite its occasionally dirigiste tone, the document recognizes the critical importance of strong macroeconomic policy and the role of government in

providing infrastructure and an adequate enabling environment. It recognizes the critical role of exports in any growth strategy and the necessity to focus on the specific advantages that give the country an edge in international markets.

In the area of macroeconomic policy, the NIP recognizes the important role of stable and predictable monetary policy, and the damage done in the past by erratic policies. It also recognizes the critical importance of separating the Treasury functions of the Bank of Jamaica (BOJ), its role as banker to the Government, at least as these functions deal with domestic transactions. It stops short of recommending a passive monetary policy, and states that "monetary policies will continue to be used."

The GOJ strategy recognizes the importance of neutral application of incentives and the critical importance of an export-oriented development policy. It recognizes the critical role of the state in establishing an adequate enabling environment, through investment in physical infrastructure, human infrastructure, and science and technology.

The National Industrial Policy identifies five "clusters": (1) tourism and music and entertainment; (2) shipping and berthing, information technology, and financial services, (3) agriculture and agro-processing; (4) textiles and apparel; and (5) minerals, chemicals, and alternative energy. While these are mostly areas in which Jamaica is already successfully engaged, there appears to be little prioritization in the strategy.

In the area of investment promotion, the Policy gives a prominent role to export promotion by the state, including the need to rationalize investment and export incentives. However, there is little recognition of the extent to which the Government of Jamaica is the problem rather than the solution. The willingness of the GOJ to actively engage in streamlining of bureaucratic procedures will have to be established.

C. Other Donors

The most important donors in the area of economic growth and development are the IDB and the World Bank. The IDB has, at the moment, \$300 million in projects in implementation and a further \$300 million in projects in preparation. A very large part of this total is in highway construction and maintenance. The IDB is also providing grant assistance, under the Ministry of Finance, to the Financial Sector Adjustment Company (FINSAC), to deal with the financial sector crisis. A large part of this assistance is directed to the Insurance Regulatory

Department of the Ministry of Finance, described by other observers as non-functional. The Government of Canada has provided assistance to the Superintendency of Banks on the implementation of banking regulation.

The World Bank is the other major donor to Jamaica. The Bank is about to prepare a new country assistance strategy. Major Bank projects include support to the Social Investment Fund which supports small scale social and productive infrastructure. A major Bank initiative is support for modernization of the public sector. The project aims at improving the functioning, efficiency, and effectiveness of specific public sector agencies by converting them into executive agencies on the British model. Executive agencies are headed by a chief executive officer with considerable autonomy with respect to budget and human resources functions who are held responsible for meeting performance targets with respect to the operations of their department. Such reforms are probably necessary for any improvement in the problem of red tape for the private sector.

This new SO is very complementary with many donor programs currently underway. In the areas of microenterprise development (Intermediate Result #1) USAID will work with a number of bilateral donors, especially the Dutch and including the World Bank, to share experiences and maximize impact. In the small business sector (Intermediate Result #2), the European Union provides assistance in small scale export development. Intermediate # 3, which focuses on improved governance and employment generation in targeted garrison communities, is now attracting a number of potential donors, including the IDB.

D. Summit of the Americas

The Santiago Summit focused on the "Second Generation" of Economic and Political reforms. The economic reforms include the completion of the macroeconomic foundation and further steps toward economic integration of the hemisphere. The Summit underscored the need to remove barriers that deny the poor access to economic opportunity, primarily through increasing access to credit and other financial services. The new USAID/Jamaica Economic Growth Strategy is directly aligned to, and supportive of, the Summit Declaration of Principles and Action plan which, among other initiatives, targets the Promotion of Micro Enterprises and Small and Medium-Sized Businesses. Most of the strategic approaches highlighted by the Summit Action Plan are being embraced by the revised SO: ensuring an expansion of microenterprises who have access to financial services; developing the managerial and technical capacities of micro and small businesses to increase productivity; and simplifying Government regulations and procedures which impact the micro and small businessman.

II. Problem Analysis

A. Poverty in Jamaica

Although Jamaica's poverty indicators are significantly better than those for other LAC countries, both rural and urban poverty remain serious social and political problems. Historically, Jamaica's poverty indicators showed steady improvement from independence until the mid-1970s, due to the expansion of employment opportunities in the tourism industry and in the labor-intensive early stages of the bauxite expansion. The economic crisis, which, in the case of Jamaica, began in the late 1970s, had a severe impact on the welfare of the poor. From 1975 through 1984, the income share of the poorest fifth of Jamaican households declined 15 percent, slightly less than the decline for all Jamaican households (17.1 percent) but a severe decline for a population ill-equipped to deal with it.

Since the mid-1980s, the level of poverty has continued at just under 30 percent of households with the exception of a brief spike upward to 38.9 percent following the 1991 devaluation¹. As of November 1993, 28.4 percent of households lived in poverty on a national basis. The "poverty gap" the amount of additional income which would be needed to bring poor households up to the poverty line, was approximately 10 percent of GDP.

Although the Jamaican population is almost evenly divided between urban and rural, poverty is more prevalent in rural areas. Fifty-eight percent of poor households live in rural areas; twenty-two percent of poor households live in the Kingston Metropolitan Area; while the remaining 20 percent live in other urban areas.

Since poor households tend to be somewhat larger than non-poor households, poverty has a disproportionate impact on children and youth. Sixty-one percent of the poor population are below 25 years of age and 40 percent are below 14. For the nation as a whole, female-headed households are only slightly more likely to be poor than all households. In metropolitan Kingston, however, the incidence of poverty is twice as high among female-headed households as among other households.

¹Since many of the poor earn their living from non-tradable services in the informal sector, appreciation of the real exchange rate often tends to reduce poverty and depreciation to increase it.

The rural poor earn their living either as smallholders or as agricultural laborers. The urban poor are typically self-employed or employed as casual laborers or domestic servants. Although the poor typically have less education than the non-poor, 30 percent of the employed poor have some secondary education.

Open unemployment plays a relatively small role in poverty. Only 15 percent of the poor in the labor force are poor and 70 percent of them below the age of 25.

B. Current Macroeconomic Situation

The Government of Jamaica's domestic and international debt remains at troublingly high levels. Although total public sector debt has declined by a third since 1993, interest on debt remains a major burden on the fiscal accounts. Total annual debt payments have risen to approximately 53 percent of central government expenditures. Add to this expenditures in public sector salaries, and the Government is left with very little in discretionary spending for economic development.

Despite good fiscal performance by the central government, inflation remained high throughout the first half of this decade. Inflation averaged 55.9 percent in 1992. It was brought down to 15.8 percent in 1996 and under ten percent in 1997. This reduction in the inflation rate has been accomplished with a fixed exchange rate policy as opposed to a more traditional money based approach. At the same time, the fiscal deficit has reemerged and has undermined public confidence in the ability of the Bank of Jamaica to maintain the monetary peg. This has left Jamaican producers facing prices that reflect an appreciated currency and interest rates that anticipate a devaluation in the near future.

The artificially managed exchange rate policy has led to an overvalued Jamaican currency. Estimates vary from between 10 and 50 percent overvaluation. But what is more important is that the private sector does not regard the exchange rate as a major constraint to growth. Some industries have been negatively effected, but the question must be asked as to the competitiveness of these industries in the first place. Jamaican firms have for decades enjoyed protective GOJ policies as well as an often undervalued currency allowing firms to make windfall profits. This has inhibited increased investment and efficiencies in existing and new industries.

The high cost of credit has been identified by the private sector as a major constraint to investment, hence constraining economic growth. Although rates are easing downward, interest rates on medium-term credit were at approximately 45 percent during the second half

of 1997. With inflation running at less than 1% per month, these borrowing rates are unaffordable for all except the most profitable firms. Many companies which continue to borrow are fast becoming insolvent.

C. Financial System Crisis

Beginning in mid-1996, serious weaknesses began to appear in Jamaica's financial system. High real interest rates resulting from the combination of the Central Bank's tight monetary policy and a widening fiscal deficit undermined the financial condition of many borrowers. At the same time, interlocking ownership among banks, insurance companies, and non-financial companies, combined with division of prudential regulation between the Central Bank (which regulates banks and most non-bank financial institutions) and the Ministry of Finance (which regulates insurance companies), and the technical inadequacies of the latter, obscured the weaknesses of the system until the deterioration was very far advanced. Moreover, inadequacies in banking legislation initially made it difficult for the GOJ to take corrective action other than on very favorable terms for the existing owners (and very unfavorable terms for the fisc).

To date, the GOJ has intervened and taken partial or complete ownership of four commercial banks, four insurance companies, and a merchant bank. The total fiscal cost of these operations are conservatively estimated at 14 percent of GDP.

Although the crisis now appears to have run its course, the GOJ must substantially improve its financial regulatory structure and dispose of its newly acquired banks to private bankers with the background and skill to prevent a repetition. The IDB is providing substantial assistance in this effort.

D. Crime and Violence

It is difficult to overstate the negative impact which the high level of crime and violence have on both the level of economic activity, the incidence of poverty, and on confidence in democratic institutions. The problem has gotten steadily worse since independence. In the 1950s and 1960s, the homicide rate was approximately 7 per 100 thousand people. By the mid-1980s that rate had tripled. In the two-year period 1961-1962, there were 183 homicides in Jamaica. In the single year 1996, there were 922. Other violent crimes have shown similar or even greater increases. Although violence is clearly not confined either to urban areas or to the poor, violent crimes are geographically concentrated in poor urban communities.

The association of violence and politics in urban Jamaica has a long history. Until the mid-1960s, the political violence tended to be committed by ad hoc groups of partisans armed with sticks, stones, and similar weapons. After 1967, partisan violence was increasingly committed by well organized political gangs, armed with guns, and led by "dons" motivated by rewards from the political leadership for their efforts. The level of political violence peaked in the election of 1980, when an estimated 900 died as a result of political violence. In this historical context, the December 1997 election was notable for the determination of the political parties, with the help of Citizens for Free and Fair Elections (CAFEE), a newly founded NGO, to avoid electoral violence.

A recent World Bank report documented that there is a vicious circle connecting crime and violence with joblessness and growth. Unemployed youth with poor prospects in any legitimate activity are easily drawn into criminal activities, particularly given the temptations of the drug trade. This is especially true in the Kingston/St. Andrew garrison communities where these circumstances are amplified. Although violence is clearly not confined to either urban areas or poor people, violent crime tends to be geographically concentrated in poor urban garrison communities. Over one half of all violent crime is committed in the garrison areas of Kingston and St. Andrew and almost three quarters of murders and 80% of shootings take place in Kingston, St. Andrew or Spanish Town.

Jamaican business leaders, as well as foreign investors, recognize the negative impact crime and violence has on the economy. Violent crime limits job growth through a wide variety of mechanisms. Crime adds to security costs making Jamaica less competitive in relation to its competitors within the region. Crime has a particularly negative effect on small and micro-business that are the source of most new jobs in Jamaica as elsewhere. Small business owners report that they are unable to add second shifts because employees living in high-crime "garrison" areas are unable to travel safely at night. Other workers must travel circuitous routes to avoid areas controlled by rival groups. Even workers with jobs are unable to improve their prospects through job training provided at night because of the dangers of night travel in high-crime areas. Crime is particularly a problem for small business. Unlike larger firms who simply bear the additional security costs, including guards and alarm systems, small businesses bear the brunt of robberies, assaults, and even murders.

E. Problems Related to the Structure of the Real Economy

As is to be expected, there is a wide range of problems in the private sector which vary with the size of the firm and the sector. Small firms views differ from those of larger firms. Jamaican firms face a different set of constraints from those faced by foreign firms. Firms

selling to the Jamaican market face a different set of constraints from those faced by exporters. Nonetheless, there was a surprising degree of unanimity expressed by private sector representatives themselves.

First among the constraints specified was the high cost of credit. The sources of this problem have been discussed in the macroeconomic section but the consequences are severe. Firms point out the need to update plant and equipment in order to meet the challenge of foreign competition but the cost of medium-term credit is beyond their means.

The appreciation in the real exchange rate in the past eighteen months, has had very different effects on different sectors. The apparel industry has been most effected. Even within the apparel industry, there seem to be firms who find that their level of productivity allows them to compete with foreign (mainly Honduran and Mexican) competition. There was, however, a recognition that the shrinkage of the Jamaican apparel industry, in contrast to the slowed growth elsewhere in the Caribbean, in response to Mexican competition, was due to the cost disadvantages resulting from the appreciation of the Jamaican dollar.

The one, universally raised constraint by the private sector is government regulation or "red tape". Most governmental requirements arise from legitimate government functions. The impression one gets from the private sector is of a bureaucracy which is indifferent to or even hostile to the private sector; who do not understand that for the private sector "time is money", or worse, do not care. Moreover, it does not seem to be the sheer number of requirements to which the private sector principally objects. Rather it is the delays and lack of responsiveness of the bureaucracy. Therefore what may need to be studied is not just the requirements with a view to streamlining them, but also to examine with the GOJ the incentive system to explore ways to make government officials more responsive to their customers while still carrying out their legitimate functions.

A final set of constraints identified by the private sector relate to a lack of high-quality management training. A variety of problems identified, such as inability to access credit and poor quality of workforce, seem to be, on closer examination, lack of basic management skills on the part of the proprietor and lack of a proper business plan. Credit is available to small and micro-enterprises from a variety of sources, but business and management skills are often a severe constraint. The desire to own one's own business has a strong tradition in Jamaican society where employment is often seen as a stepping stone to starting one's own business. In an open competitive market, business skills are a critical requirement for survival and expansion.

III. Proposed USAID Strategy

The program areas addressed in USAID/Jamaica's previous economic growth strategy continue to remain relevant, but the strategy as a whole is inappropriate because:

- the Strategic Objective, "Increased Participation for Economic Growth" is vague and cannot be reasonably measured,
- the objective and four intermediate results were overly ambitious in light of limited USAID resources,
- the strategy involved too many objectives in too many areas,
- indicator measures were not always attributable to USAID assistance.

After last year's R4 review, USAID/Washington instructed the Mission to consider a reformulation of its strategic objective. As most of the SO activities either ended in FY 97 or will end in FY 98, it is an opportune time to do this. Beginning in October, 1997, the Mission has assessed Jamaica's constraints to economic growth through individual interviews with a wide range of individuals and through participatory group discussions. It should surprise no one that Jamaica's constraints are numerous and serious. With two consecutive years of negative economic growth and the inevitable transition to unprotected markets looming, Jamaica has major economic challenges ahead of it. Given the likely levels of funding for this SO, USAID must carefully consider where it can have the most impact, how it can best cooperate with other donors to assist the GOJ in improving macroeconomic and financial system management, and how it can promote activities that are relatively immune from the effects of the current recession.

A. Summary of Strategic Approach

The most pressing need of Jamaica today is to create improved job opportunities for the 25 to 30 percent of the population who are currently unable to earn an adequate income. The obstacles to doing this are considerable. As discussed above, the combination of tight monetary policy and a fiscal deficit equal to 6 percent of GDP has produced a crowding out of private sector credit and resulted in very high real rates of interest. This has attracted capital flows from abroad which has appreciated the real exchange rate and undercut the competitiveness of key sectors, especially the very price-sensitive assembly manufacturing.

This is not a propitious environment in which to advance employment opportunities for the poor. Added to this are continuing structural problems of infrastructure deterioration, a regulatory structure which is perceived as hostile, particularly to small, formal sector business, and a continuing very high level of crime and violence.

The strategic options open to USAID/Jamaica are also severely constrained by the prospective levels of funding. Ideally, USAID would play a supporting role with the IDB, World Bank, and the IMF, in providing assistance to the GOJ in improving such critical areas as financial system regulation, and restructuring of failed financial institutions. There are key aspects of these problems where AID's ability to provide grant funding would be very useful. Given the severe constraints on unrestricted Economic Growth DA funding, USAID must make difficult choices. Assistance to the GOJ in these areas would require curtailing assistance to microfinance and small business support activities in which AID has a considerable investment, which show great promise over the medium term, and in which USAID's ability to provide grant technical assistance directly to NGOs and producer groups has no parallel in the multilateral institutions. Essentially, USAID must concentrate our very scarce grant resources on those activities which the major multilateral donors cannot do or cannot do nearly as well as we can.

This is not to say that USAID Jamaica and the U.S. Embassy do not have an critical role to play in the macroeconomic arena. On the contrary, it is vital that USAID and the Embassy clearly understand the dimensions of Jamaica's macroeconomic dilemma and that the USG use its considerable influence to encourage the GOJ to take necessary measures in a timely and effective way. In part this will be done through our (the broader U.S. Mission) coordination with the Washington-based international financial institutions (IFIS - the IMF, World Bank, and Inter-American Development Bank). These institutions will play the lead role in assisting the Jamaican government in restructuring failed financial institutions and in advising on needed changes in macroeconomic policy needed to allow a resumption of economic growth (once the current government is prepared to accept that advice). Once policy changes are in train, the IFIs are also prepared to step in with necessary financial support. The U.S. Mission is also playing a role in persuading the Jamaican government to adopt the necessary policy changes in a timely and effective manner; the U.S. Treasury Department has begun policy dialog with the Jamaican Prime Minister.

Beyond this, USAID will use its very limited program resources in two very important ways. First, the Mission can continue to use very small amounts of funding to inform Jamaicans in general, and opinion leaders in particular, about the choices the country faces. The current USAID-funded speakers series, which has brought prominent outside speakers to talk to Jamaicans about timely policy topics, should be continued and, if possible, expanded. Public understanding is often the vital missing element in successful policy reform. The more difficult the choices faced by government, the more important is public understanding of alternatives.

The second role for USAID in broader policy issues is that of "facilitator" between the GOJ and the private sector, especially the small business private sector which is such an important

source of jobs and which often has more difficulty obtaining a hearing from government for its problems. This role is discussed more fully as Sub-IR 2.1. This being said, USAID's strategy will address the following constraints:

- Inadequate formal sector employment opportunities,
- uncompetitive non-traditional industries,
- burdensome bureaucratic regulations and poor quality Government service to the private sector.

The new strategy has the following characteristics:

- Developed in a highly participatory manner with Jamaican customers, counterparts and the Jamaican Government,
- builds on ongoing institutions and programs, and involves direct collaboration with other donors, especially the World Bank, CIDA, and UNDP,
- highly focussed in areas where USAID has considerable experience and can maximize its resources.

B. USAID Jamaica Economic Growth Strategic Objective: Increased Employment in Targeted Micro and Small Businesses

As evidenced in the above Strategic Approach Summary, and given the level of resources available, the most productive and effective role that USAID can play in stimulating economic growth in Jamaica is through targeted programs and activities which increase employment and create jobs. The poor have been hardest hit by Jamaica's protracted recession. Unemployment rates continue to rise in urban and rural areas alike, especially among youth. USAID's economic growth strategic objective focusses on providing employment opportunities in two important sectors with significant growth potential, the micro and small business sectors. Employment generation will be accomplished through these two avenues by: 1) improving management & technical capacity of selected businesses in targeted subsectors to increase productivity & competitiveness 2) improvement & expansion of services to micro entrepreneurs, and 3) reduction and/or streamlining of bureaucratic "red tape". These initiatives are sufficient for the SO to reach the intended results. These will be complemented, if additional Economic Support Funding (ESF) becomes available, by a special initiative to increase employment in targeted economically depressed urban areas through programs to increase security, enhance investment opportunities, improve local governance, and training and job placement activities.

The achievement of this SO will be measured by the number of jobs and increased incomes directly attributable to USAID assistance. Increases in employment will occur through growth

in USAID assisted small companies. Increases in income will be tracked through a proxy measure of microenterprises' assets.

This Strategic Objective will be necessarily limited to an initial 3 year implementation plan so as to coincide with the approved Mission 1997 - 2001 CSP.

Intermediate Result Number 1 (IR1): Expanded Delivery of Microenterprise Support Services

According to a national survey financed jointly by USAID and the Dutch Government, about 100,000 Jamaicans have responded to the lack of formal sector employment opportunities by opening their own microenterprises. The survey also demonstrates the number of microenterprises is growing, and that nearly two thirds are outside of the Kingston area. Self-employment represents a vital alternative source of employment for many Jamaicans, although this income is marginal for most due to lack of access to credit and to a lack of business skills.

IR1 will build capacity within the institutions delivering financial and non-financial services to microenterprises. USAID assistance will focus on a limited number of institutions based on the quality of their services, outreach and potential sustainability.

1. Financial Services

In the financial area, USAID will build on an existing activity with the Workers Bank. The Bank will provide 100 percent of loan financing, while USAID will provide the required technical assistance and limited operating expenses. With access to an island-wide network of over 200 postal units, Workers has the potential to provide tens of thousands of poor microentrepreneurs with permanent financial services within five years. At the time of this writing the program had been launched for about one year, and the bank's microfinance unit boasted the highest payback rate of any financial institution or program in the country. If successful, USAID's initial modest investment will lead to commercial financing of Workers Bank and future microfinance industry competitors. There are currently no sustainable microfinance programs in Jamaica.

2. Non-financial Services

In the non-financial area, the Mission has conducted in-depth institutional surveys of a dozen and a half major service providers to microenterprises. Financial support will be provided to a select number of these service providers to improve services, expand outreach and

strengthen their institutional viability . These institutions will provide demand driven training and technical services in the areas of product development, accounting, basic management skills and marketing.

3. Sector-wide Support

As a lead donor in the microenterprise development field, USAID will increase its role in coordinating with, supporting and educating donors, the GOJ and other institutions involved with the sector. The objective will be to promote a better environment for growth of the sector and improved practices. USAID will work with the Ministry of Industry and the Bank of Jamaica to strengthen policies and regulations. USAID will finance local and international training for policy makers and practitioners in best practices. A third national survey of the microenterprise sector, jointly funded and implemented by USAID, the Dutch and the GOJ, will provide more useful information for the development of policies and programs.

Judging Success

Success in IR1 will be measured through increases in income and employment, both reported at the SO level. At the IR1 level, impact will be measured through indicators in two basic areas, outreach and institutional strengthening. Data for these indicators will be collected and reported by implementing institutions, at relatively low cost and high reliability. The following information will be collected by the implementing institutions:

- Number of microenterprises supported,
- Financial self-sufficiency (fees for services/operational costs)
- Cost per client/beneficiary

These indicators are mutually compatible and give valuable insight into program success. The more businesses supported, the greater the program's impact will be on improving the viability and growth of microenterprises. The indicators for institutional efficiency and cost-effectiveness also provide vital information. First, as cost-effectiveness increases, we can conclude that the quality of services provided are meeting the demand of microenterprises. Experience has demonstrated that microenterprises will only pay for training they believe will have a significant impact on their businesses. Second, improvements in institutional efficiencies and cost-effectiveness lead to increased institutional sustainability and therefore increased sustainability of services to the microenterprise sector.

In addition, indicators for the financial institutions will be collected to measure solvency and financial performance, two fundamental areas for institutional viability.

Critical Assumptions

The most important assumption for this IR is that the current reorganization of Workers Bank, which results from events and lending practices which had nothing to do with the autonomous microfinance unit, will not have an adverse impact on the operations of that unit. A second critical assumption is that the current economic downturn will not have an adverse effect on the income earning potential of micro-enterprise. In the very short run, the overvalued exchange rate probably helps microenterprise by raising the price of their services relative to tradable goods. However, the accelerating economic downturn is bound to have an impact at some point.

Three year program cost: \$US 1,800,000

Intermediate Result Number 2 (IR2): Increased Sales by Small Businesses in Targeted Niches

Jamaica has begun to feel the impact of its continued dependence upon traditional factors of competitive advantage and on preferential trade agreements. The private and public sectors alike agree Jamaica must improve its competitiveness in targeted non-traditional industries. The Mission has identified three industry clusters from the Government's National Industrial Policy which are program candidates under IR2. These are agro-processing, textiles and sewn products, and eco-tourism. The program will not be limited to these sub-sectors, though. Any industry or sub-sector which fulfills the following criteria will be considered for assistance:

- product differentiation and market potential,
- labor intensiveness,
- industry and firm level commitment,
- potential international competitiveness,
- donor collaboration/leverage, and
- environmental sustainability.

The objective of this activity is to assist in the growth of high potential small companies, leading directly to the creation of jobs. The impact of this program will extend beyond employment generated by assisted firms and sub-sectors. It will provide a demonstration model to other firms and will lead to increased domestic and foreign investment.

1. Technical Support to Small Enterprises

Implementation follows proven methodologies used by USAID and others throughout the world. USAID and its partners will assess the strengths and weaknesses of targeted firms. This will be followed by a program of customized technical assistance and/or training. Our recent assessment reveals a wide range of weaknesses from product development to marketing. Many firms, consumed by their efforts to stay afloat, have not conducted an objective analysis of their own strengths and weaknesses. With the assistance of a technically qualified USAID contractor, these firms will identify and prioritize areas of improvement. Assistance will be provided on a cost share basis. The following list gives a sense of the requirements small businesses have:

- business planning
- product development
- improved productivity and efficiencies
- improved management information systems
- financial analysis
- personnel development and labor management
- accessing markets
- conformance to international standards

USAID/Jamaica initiated the approach above in mid-1997 under the Small Business Export Development (SBED) Activity, and there are early signs of success. Many firms, despite lack of access to credit, have expanded into new markets over the past year. In a recent survey, the firms expressed a high degree of satisfaction compared with other donor programs and with the first phase of SBED.

2. Sub-sector Assistance

Inter-firm cooperation will be promoted where potential exists and where clear benefits will result. One obvious opportunity relates to regulatory constraints. The private sector as well as relevant Government representatives recognize the need to simplify and improve the regulations and processes affecting private sector companies. There is also a need for key Government entities to gain more knowledge about Jamaican industries and the environment in which they operate. USAID will help facilitate private-public sector partnerships to eliminate constraints and to help build a facilitative regulatory and trade environment. Another area in which inter-firm cooperation could provide substantial returns is through making greater impacts on vertical marketing channels, whether by establishing a foreign distribution channel or by simply enhancing information flow. Selected assistance will also be provided to improve industry specific readiness for integration into the FTAA.

Judging Success

Program impact will be measured through increased sales of assisted firms and sub-sectors attributable to USAID assistance. This is expected to enable these same firms both to hire more workers and to enable their suppliers to do the same. Any firm's participation in the program will be conditioned its capability and willingness to provide reliable financial information. USAID will conduct annual independent audits on project data to ensure its accuracy and reliability.

Critical Assumptions: The areas of activity to be chosen under IR2, at least initially are primarily those which are relatively insensitive to the current high costs of financial intermediation and high exchange rate. To the extent that these firms are adversely affected by these two factors, or to the extent that these conditions worsen, program results may be impaired

Three year program cost (excluding IR2.1, below): \$US 3,000,000

Sub-IR2.1 Improving the Enabling Environment for Small Business through Improved Governance

In discussions with customers and partners in the course of developing this revised strategy the one, universally raised constraint was government regulation or "red tape". As might be expected, the nature and importance of red tape differs from industry to industry and from firm to firm. In some ways, this complaint is surprising, since there has been a very substantial deregulation of the business in Jamaica over the last 15 years. But Jamaica's regional competitors have gone even farther in relaxing controls on business, leaving Jamaica at a relative disadvantage, particularly in the competition for foreign investment. As one foreign investor put it succinctly in a U.S. Department of Commerce survey of actual and potential U.S. investor attitudes toward Jamaica, "in the Dominican Republic they roll out the red carpet, in Jamaica they roll out the red tape." The perception by many of overlapping bureaucratic requirements, administered arbitrarily and even capriciously, and delays of months and even years, was probably the most common constraint mentioned by the private sector. The issue clearly requires further study. Most governmental requirements arise from legitimate government functions. The impression one gets from the private sector is of a bureaucracy which is indifferent to or even hostile to the private sector; who do not understand that for the private sector "time is money", or worse, do not care. Moreover, it does not seem to be the sheer number of requirements to which the private sector principally objects. Rather it is the delays and lack of responsiveness of the bureaucracy. Therefore what may need to be studied is not just the requirements with a view to streamlining them, but also to examine with the GOJ the incentive system to explore ways to make government

officials more responsive to their customers while still carrying out their legitimate functions.

Although there has already been dialogue between government and private sector, it clearly has not gone far enough. The problem appears to be most serious for smaller firms and self employed individuals. Larger firms, particularly those in a position to employ prominent legal firms and customs brokers report having little problem with bureaucratic requirements. Smaller firms, and particularly smaller Jamaican firms selling into the export market, seem to have the most difficulty. In particularly small exporters seeking the legally-provided-for customs exoneration from customs duties on imported inputs, reported arbitrary and inconsistent application of current law. The alternative of a duty drawback system, in which exporters receive a refund of duty paid on imported inputs, was described as totally non-functional. Finally, the most important problem faced by private sector firms is simple inaction and delay.

In implementing this Sub-IR, the Mission plans to use a mechanism like the G Bureau Implementing Policy Reform Project, which has worldwide experience in smoothing excessive bureaucracy and improving incentives. AID will survey the small private sector to gain their view of the specific government requirements which are obstacles to small business development. AID will then get small groups of key government officials and representative of the small businesses affected to sit down and examine alternatives which are less intrusive and costly to the private sector in order to achieve the needed government functions. The key here is that USAID is uniquely able to and as a facilitator and a go-between to help the GOJ and the private sector to explore problems in a constructive manner and develop mutually satisfactory solutions. AID may also provide technical assistance directly to the GOJ in areas of critical importance to the development of the small and microenterprise private sector.

Judging Success

Indicators will be developed following the survey of the private sector which will establish specific policy reforms to be implemented, their priority, and a timetable for implementation.

Critical Assumptions: Although new leadership in JAMPRO is a cause for optimism, the success of this sub-IR depends critically on the continued willingness of the GOJ to support administrative reforms and to see that they are implemented at all levels of the bureaucracy.

Five year program cost: \$US 600,000

Intermediate Result Number 3 (IR3): Improved Investment Climate and Employment in Targeted Urban Communities

Jamaican business leaders, as well as foreign investors, recognize the negative impact crime and violence has on the economy. Violent crime limits job growth through a wide variety of mechanisms. Crime adds to security costs making Jamaica less competitive in relation to its competitors within the region. Crime has a particularly negative effect on small and micro-business that are the source of most new jobs in Jamaica as elsewhere. Small business owners report that they are unable to add second shifts because employees living in high-crime "garrison" areas are unable to travel safely at night. Other workers must travel circuitous routes to avoid areas controlled by rival groups. Even workers with jobs are unable to improve their prospects through job training provided at night because of the dangers of night travel in high-crime areas. Crime is particularly a problem for small business. Unlike larger firms who simply bear the additional security costs, including guards and alarm systems, small businesses bear the brunt of robberies, assaults, and even murders.

It has been repeatedly emphasized that the problem of crime throughout the island has its origin in a relatively small number of neighborhoods, not more than fifteen, typically measuring not more than ten blocks on a side in the Kingston-St. Andrew metropolitan area. The very concentration of the problem gives hope for a solution based on a coordinated approach to the problem. Typically, the problem of violent crime in Jamaica, as in the United States, has been seen as a problem without a near-term solution. Recent successes in American cities through a combination of improved community policing, job creation and job placement, and infrastructure improvement give promise that violent crime can be reduced.

Experience with programs in the garrison communities

The recent national electoral process in Jamaica captured international interest as it demonstrated a strong capacity and commitment to work in a non-partisan, non-violent way, resulting in the country's most peaceful and fairest elections in history. The elections seemed to indicate a possible new opportunity to work in an atmosphere of unity and cohesion. CAFFE, a new, non-partisan Jamaican organization which had mobilized thousands of citizens to watch polls and ensure electoral integrity, was pivotal in creating conditions for legitimate, peaceful elections and exemplified this opportunity. However, the elections also revealed the continuing challenge of inner-city "garrison communities," to the electoral process where high levels of violence and intimidation and resulting lopsided voting results clearly represent a threat to the integrity of the electoral process. CAFFE has indicated an interest in using its experience and capabilities demonstrated in mediating

conflicts during the recent elections to address the fundamental social problems present in the garrison areas.

In addition to CAFFE, there are a number of NGOs which have had demonstrable success in addressing the problems of the garrison areas and particularly the problem of lack of employment. One needs to be clear on this point. Employment for people living in garrison areas does not mean jobs in garrison areas. Attractive though that would be, the negatives of the areas are likely to be a dominant consideration for potential investors for a long time. Still, people do not normally work in the same areas where they live and some NGOs with good connections both in the garrison areas themselves and with the confidence of private sector employers have had considerable success in providing training for young men and in placing them in private sector jobs in the larger Kingston-St. Andrews area.

Yet another element of success has been the role of the Kingston Restoration Company (KRC), a GOJ chartered, for-profit company which has had considerable success in restoring the downtown area of Kingston and attracting business back into the area. As the principle implementing agent for the Inner Kingston Development Project, KRC was very successful in revitalizing the 100 block Inner Kingston downtown area in providing work space for economic growth and job generation. The overall strategy of the Project was to make attractively priced industrial and commercial space available in rehabilitated buildings downtown. The rehabilitated space would generate new jobs and trigger increased private investment and a self sustaining restoration process that would revitalize the area and the real estate market.

The success of the USAID/KRC program has been recognized by the wider donor community and has spawned a series of donor funded programs which aim to replicate the KRC model. Most notably is the program expansion into the Jones Town community which is being funded by the British Office of Development Assistance. Most recently another initiative, led by the Inter-American Development Bank, has been launched to design a companion program with much of the same elements as the one being proposed by USAID/Jamaica. The IDB program will select targeted garrison communities for a range of economic growth, civic education, and community policing activities. USAID/Jamaica will be working in close coordination with both the ODA and IDB during the finalization of design and implementation.

A key obstacle to the reduction of violent crime in Jamaica is the poor reputation of the police themselves. Corruption and distrust is widespread. This leads to low rates of reporting of violent crime and a view of those who cooperate with police as "informers". While a difficult problem, the KRC has successfully implemented a community policing

program, elements of which have been replicated by the city of Baltimore and featured in the Lessons Without Borders program.

Proposed IR3 Elements

Within the framework of USAID's strategic planning process, additional ESF resources will be used to establish a third program element in the Economic Growth Strategic Objective which will focus on increasing employment opportunities in garrison areas. To do this, a multi-pronged effort which combines increasing security, enhancing civic action and conflict resolution, and employment skills/placement activities for selected garrison communities will be implemented. The following illustrative program elements are envisioned:

A. Community relations programs. The goal is to decrease violence and crime in the areas, through creating a new relationship between police and citizens. This program would include, among other elements, improved police/community relations; incentives for cooperation by the citizenry; support for police and citizen activities in the communities to build trust (possible emphasis on youth-related activities); development of techniques of support, oversight, etc. often used in community police programs.

B. Conflict Resolution programs. The program could include using CAFFE and the Dispute Resolution Foundation to set up conflict resolution activities, responding to findings of the World Bank Social Investment Fund. This could include civic educational programs, either in the schools or linked to youth groups, health clinics, etc. The goal is to provide mediation methods that provide alternatives to violence when arguments break out.

C. Assistance to NGOs for technical skill training, job preparation, and job placement. Focus groups identified the lack of jobs as a critical reason why youth turn to crime. Unemployment is extremely high among youth, limiting their opportunities and ultimately becoming a serious problem to the economy's growth and stability. Even when young people want to work, they often do not know how to look for a job, are not educated about work expectations, and lack some of the basic skills for interviewing and holding a job. NGOs in Jamaica have a record on which to build and expand in the area of job readiness and job placement in the Kingston area. The possibilities of a partnership between the private sector and the NGO community will be explored in this activity.

D. Micro-enterprise support activities. This activity could expand or complement the plans of the Workers Bank to work in parts of greater Kingston, adjacent to garrison communities, although it could easily involve new groups as well.

Judging Success

Precise indicators will be developed during actual activity design. Measurement of success will most likely be related to:

- Establishment of functioning community policing programs.
- #’s of new businesses relocating or established in the selected areas
- #’s of new microenterprises launched
- #’s of clients receiving vocational job training
- #’s of clients placed in jobs through a program established employment agency

Critical Assumptions

USAID Jamaica has forwarded the IR3 concept paper to the LAC Bureau for review. Reaction was uniformly positive and supportive of the proposed IR. Negotiations are currently underway with the State Department to secure the ESF for this initiative. USAID Jamaica is assuming that these discussion will prove positive and the first tranche of ESF will be forthcoming.

Total 3 Year ESF-Funded IR Requirement: \$3,000,000 million


Strategic Objective No. 1

3 Year Budget: FY99 - FY01

(\$US 000)

	FY 99	FY 00	FY01	Total
D.A. Funding				
I.R. 1 Microenterprise	600	600	600	1,800
I.R. 2 Small Businesses	1,000	1,000	1,000	3,000
I.R. 2.1 Enabling Environment	200	200	200	600
ESF Funding				
I.R. 3 Improved Investment 3,000 Climate/Urban	1,000	1,000	1,000	
Total	2,800	2,800	2,800	8,400

Economic Growth Draft Results Framework



Environmental Strategic Objective Number 2 (SO2):

Improved Quality of Key Natural Resources in Selected Areas That Are Both Environmentally and Economically Significant

I. Overall Changes in Strategic Objective Strategy

Changes were made in the results framework to reflect a new emphasis on the improvement of coastal water quality in targeted areas. The strategic objective statement was modified to reflect the program's commitment to improving the *quality* of Jamaica's natural resources -- going beyond the former focus on protection. One intermediate result (IR) was added to indicate the emphasis on water quality and recognize the fact that sewage is one of the major influences on coastal water quality. Also at the IR level, the wording of some IRs was refined, some IRSs were moved to lower levels and new lower level IRs were added to complete chains of causal relationships and to demonstrate the process toward achieving the strategic objective.

The results framework was modified also to better highlight the Mission's strategy of an integrated "ridge to reef" approach to tackling environmental issues affecting Jamaica's key natural resources, particularly coastal waters. This concept involves addressing problems and opportunities associated with:

- coastal area resources important for tourism, biological diversity, and subsistence resource users;
- resource users managing natural resources in buffer zone areas which are located between the coast and upland areas; and
- upland watersheds and protected areas.

II. Why The Change Was Necessary

A modification in the strategic objective (SO) was needed to reflect a gradual shift in thinking regarding resource management in Jamaica. While the initial results framework SO aimed towards "increased protection" the new results framework SO calls for "improved quality" of key natural resources. This demands greater accountability from the environmental program to achieve tangible results.

The existing results framework did not show the process leading towards achieving the SO. The addition of lower level intermediate results makes it easier to demonstrate a logical progression towards achieving the SO. It will also facilitate the “how/why” questions, that is, how the SO is achieved, or alternatively, why it was not achieved.

III. Results Description

A precise description of the revised SO and intermediate results (IR) are given below. Where appropriate, the changes that have been made to the results framework will be shown.

A. Strategic Objective Level Result: Improved quality of key natural resources in selected areas that are both environmentally and economically significant.

This is an important and needed change as it will encourage all implementation partners to be more accountable for tangible results. The ultimate aim of “increased protection” is the “improved quality” of the natural resources. The natural resource of primary interest is coastal water quality. The performance indicators for the strategic objective are as follows:

- (a) Water quality - Water quality as it impacts on human health and coral reef ecosystems. It will be measured in terms of i) Faecal coliform, and ii) Selected nutrients (e.g. nitrates and phosphates) which affect coral reefs. Coastal water is a key natural resource. It is the foundation of the tourist industry which contributed \$1.2 billion to the Jamaican economy in 1997.
- (b) Quality of coral reef ecosystem - Coral reef ecosystem defined by physical/biological characteristics. It will be measured in terms of, i) % algal cover and ii) % living coral reef cover. Coral reefs are another key natural resource which impact on tourism. They protect the beaches and the coastline where the vast majority of tourism development takes place.

It is important to note that these two indicators also serve as proxy indicators and a barometer for the overall ecological health of the entire targeted watershed. Any environmentally degradating factor occurring in the upland watershed (deforestation, fertilizer/pesticide misuse, poor land management, etc) is likely to ultimately manifest itself and affect specific aspects of the coastal water quality and coral reefs.

B. 1st Level Intermediate Results

The new Results Framework I.R.s are as follows:

- Increased adoption of environmentally sound practices;
- Increased compliance with environmental regulations; and
- Improved effectiveness of wastewater management.

These three I.R.s all have a cause and effect relationship with the SO (improved quality of key natural resources in selected areas that are both environmentally and economically significant) and impact directly on the quality of the natural resource which is the new emphasis of the SO. The emphasis on coastal water quality is reflected in the new IR, “Improved effectiveness of wastewater management” and underscores the potential impact of sewage on coastal water quality.

IR 1: Increased adoption of environmentally sound practices

Instead of “expanded areas of priority under sustainable management” we are interested in focusing our resources in a few geographical areas using a “ridge to reef” approach in order to show more tangible results and maximize the use of scarce financial resources. The adoption of environmentally sound practices which, for example, ensure that effluent/emissions standards are observed and soil conservation measures put in place, will link directly to achievement of the strategic objective.

Performance indicators:

- (a) Percent of targeted hotels applying audit recommendations -- Recommendations arising from hotel and industrial audits. Target group would be hotels/industries audited. Audit recommendations might include improved sewage and gray water treatment systems, developing a recycling program, and installing more energy efficient appliances.
- (b) Percent of targeted resource users (i.e., households/businesses) adopting improved environmental practices -- Specific practices will be identified as activities under the SO2 portfolio are implemented. (This indicator will capture the impact of the new Coastal Water Improvement Program and an upland watershed activity currently under design.) Illustrative practices that might be promoted under these activities include agroforestry, reduced use of agricultural

chemicals, appropriate on-site sanitation solutions, part-time employment for farmers in eco-tourism enterprises and the use of larger sized mesh in fish traps.

The data will be collected by contractors in collaboration with the GOJ agencies and NGOs responsible for the related activity. The data will be collected by routine field observations or specific surveys and reported in the contractor's semi-annual technical reports to the Mission.

IR 2: Increased compliance with environmental regulations

Increased compliance with environmental regulations was felt to be more pertinent than "established environmental policies and regulations" as there are a number of existing pieces of legislation and regulations that are not being enforced. With respect to the strategic objective, it is the compliance with the regulations, rather than their establishment, that impacts on the quality of natural resources.

Performance indicator:

- (a) No. of violations identified per no. of users monitored - Violations of environmental legislation and regulations by resource users. The number of violations will indicate the extent of compliance with regulations.
- (b) Number of permits issued for discharge, construction, etc.
- (c) Percentage of permit holders adhering to permit conditions/standards

The data will be collected by the NRCA which is responsible for monitoring and enforcement of environmental regulations. The Mission does not have an activity directly geared to achieving this IR. The data will be collected by the Mission from the records of the NRCA.

IR3: Improved Effectiveness of Wastewater Management

This is a new I.R. which reflects the emphasis of the environmental portfolio on improving coastal water quality. Wastewater from specific sewage treatment plants will be monitored to ensure that it meets the effluent standards set by the NRCA. Untreated sewage entering the coastal water is a major source of coastal water pollution.

Performance indicator:

- (a) Percentage of effluent samples from selected sewage treatment plants meet NRCA effluent standards. Samples collected at the effluent location meeting the effluent standard set for biological oxygen demand, nitrates, phosphates, chemical oxygen demand, pH, and faecal coliform. The number of samples meeting the effluent standard will indicate the effectiveness of wastewater management. The effluent standard is set in order to reduce the negative impact of wastewater on coastal water quality.

The data will be collected from the NRCA and/or partners, such as, defined laboratories, governmental agencies, or non-government organizations participating in sample collection, transport, and/or analysis. Special studies will be conducted as necessary. The technical assistance contractors for CWIP will be responsible for collating and analyzing the data and reporting to the mission on a semiannual basis.

B. Lower Level I.R.'s

I.R. 1.1: Increased effectiveness of environmental NGOs

- The I.R. moved the previous emphasis from just strengthening the capacity of Jamaican organizations to increasing their effectiveness. The objective or impact of a strengthened capacity should be increased effectiveness. This demands more accountability from the organizations which will be judged in terms of their deliverables rather than their institutional capacity.
- Increased effectiveness of environmental organizations is linked to the strategic objective in so far as the organizations have specific responsibilities, such as, managing key natural resources (parks or protected areas).
- The effectiveness of environmental NGOs is judged in relationship to their management and administrative capacity and their ability to implement field activities.
- Stronger NGOs involved in environmental activities will help to increase adoption of environmentally sound practices (I.R 1).

Performance indicators:

- (a) No. of target NGOs demonstrating tangible benefits to beneficiaries in the field, e.g., activities on the ground, trees planted, mooring bouys in place..
- (b) No. of NGOs increasing their capacity to be effective - Evaluation criteria developed by the Nature Conservancy will be used to rank the administrative and management capacity of NGOs. This measures the individual effectiveness of NGOs on the assumption that stronger NGOs are better able to implement field activities and influence environmental practices.

The source of the data will be community and organizational assessment documents of the CWIP and DEMO projects. Data will be collected by the CWIP TA team and reported to the Mission semi-annually.

I.R. 1.2: Effective economic incentives for environmentally sound practices in place

- Economic incentives (e.g. tax breaks, land tenure, income earning opportunities) which encourage resource users to adopt environmentally sound practices.
- This lower level I.R. supports two upper level I.R.s: “increased adoption of environmentally sound practices,” and “increased compliance with environmental regulations.”
- These economic incentives will encourage hoteliers, manufacturers and local communities to adopt environmentally sound practices which are in compliance with environmental regulations and reduce the emphasis on command and control/enforcement measures to assure compliance and adoption.

Performance Indicator

- (a) No. of targeted resource users (e.g., hotels, manufacturers, households) adopting environmentally sound practices as a result of economic incentives. The Mission will collect the data from the files of the NRCA and reports from the EAST project.

I.R. 2.1: Effective promulgation and enforcement of environmental regulations

The GOJ writes appropriate regulations for targeted areas and puts in place proper monitoring and enforcement systems.

Indicators:

- (a) No. of targeted new regulations in place
- (b) Percent (%) of violations successfully prosecuted
- (c) No. of monitoring/enforcement systems in place

Source of the information will be the records of the NRCA.

I.R. 3.1.: Improved operation and maintenance of wastewater treatment plants

Wastewater treatment plants operating effectively through improved maintenance. Well maintained treatment plants will produce effluent meeting the required standards relating directly to I.R.3.

Performance indicators:

- (a) No. of public/private partnerships established. (The National Water Commission's performance in O&M has been poor. There is an assumption that public/private partnerships will give result in more efficient management and maintenance of wastewater treatment plants.
- (b) No. of trained and certified wastewater plant operators and staff working in sewage treatment capacity in Jamaica. Better trained staff will also improve operation and maintenance of sewage treatment plants.
- (c) No. of treatment plants with discharge meeting effluent standards.

The data will be collected from the records of the National Water Commission by the technical assistance team of CWIP. It will be reported to the Mission in their regular Semi-annual reports.

I.R. 3.2: Wastewater management infrastructure constructed

The GOJ with assistance of the European Union are constructing wastewater treatment plants. These modern plants will be better able to handle the volume of sewage available for treatment and produce effluent that meets the NRCA's effluent standards. The Mission is not responsible for accomplishing this I.R. but will closely monitor due to its importance to the overall SO.

Performance indicator:

- (a) Number of wastewater treatment plants constructed and operational.

The data will be collected by the CWIP TA team from the records of the NWC.

I.R. 2.1.1: Increased capacity of key GOJ agencies

Improving the institutional capacity of key government agencies, such as, the NRCA and NWC to manage Jamaica's natural resources.


This I.R. supports I.R.s 1.1, 1.2, 2.1, and 3.1. It reflects the importance and supportive role of government agencies in the strengthening of NGOs, in developing appropriate environmental policies, monitoring and enforcement, and the operation and maintenance of wastewater treatment plants.

Performance indicators

- (a) Number of sustainable systems in place. Examples of sustainable systems could include, water quality monitoring, fora for promoting coastal zone management, donor coordinating system, and data base management system all of which support various aspects of environmental management.
- (b) Number of sites monitored through NGO-Government partnerships. The sites monitored through NGO-Government partnerships will be largely for water quality. The NGOs will collaborate with government agencies in the collection and analysis of samples.
- (c) Increased capacity of government agencies to conduct laboratory analyses. Among the several government agencies with laboratories are the NRCA, NWC and the Environmental Control Division of the Ministry of Health. These

should all be able to conduct analyses for various water quality parameters producing results that are consistently accurate. There are eleven key water quality parameters, including, faecal coliform, nitrates, and phosphates that will be analyzed in these laboratories.

The data will be collected by the institutional contractors and reported in their semi-annual reports to the Mission.



Health Strategic Objective (SO3)

I. Overall Change in Framework

Strategic Objective 3 (SO3) was changed from "Young Jamaicans Better Equipped for the 21st century" to "Improved Reproductive Health of Youth" and a separate strategic objective was established for education ("Increased literacy and numeracy among Jamaican youth in targeted primary schools"). During our consultative sessions, the overall consensus was that we need a renewed emphasis on youth.

While the national mean for age at first intercourse is 16 for females and 14 for males, community based workers suggest that these ages can be as low as 8 to 9 in some areas. Both the 1993 Contraceptive Prevalence Survey and preliminary results from the 1997 Reproductive Health Survey point to serious concerns with reproductive health among youth. Although the Jamaican contraceptive prevalence rate is high among women of reproductive age (14 - 45 yrs), the prevalence within the younger age group (15 - 19 yrs) is quite low and initiation of sexual activity is early. Thirty percent of all births are to women under the age of 20. Therefore, there is an increasing need to concentrate our limited resources on the youth before or as they become sexually active. Hence, our strategic objective focuses on the age group of 10 - 24 yrs.

II. Why the Change Was Necessary

After consultative sessions with the Ministry of Health's Epidemiology Unit, the National Family Planning Board, the Ministry of Education, and relevant partners in the health and education sectors, USAID personnel concluded that the current portfolio for SO3 which combined the health and education sectors would be better served as two separate SOs. The proposed modified Strategic Objective is focused on protecting youth from pregnancy, HIV and other STDs by increasing their use of reproductive health services and of HIV/STD prevention services and practices. This modification does not represent a change in the reproductive health strategy but rather a fine-tuning.

The existing results framework did not show the strategy's emphasis on increasing the use of services or on addressing the issues of fertility, HIV and STDs specifically.

III. Results Description

A precise description of the revised SO and intermediate results (IR) follows. This highlights the changes made to the results framework.

(A) SO Level Result:

Our Strategic Objective result is "Improved Reproductive Health of Youth." This SO language allows the Mission to encompass both HIV/STD prevention and work on adolescent fertility.

- (a) HIV seroprevalence: This directly reports on the trends of youth (15-19, 20-24) and their contraction of HIV. Our aim will be to reduce the rate of increase for youth in our target age group. This information will be collected for antenatal clients (low risk proxy) and STD clinic attenders (high risk proxy). The data for this indicator will be collected by the MOH/Epi Unit biannually through the Ministry's nationally representative sentinel surveillance program.
- (b) Consistent contraception: This will measure the percentage of sexually active adolescents (10-14, 15-19) consistently using contraception over the past 12 months. The institutional contractor for the new Adolescent Reproductive Health (ARH) activity will assist the Mission to decide how best to collect this information. One possibility would be to carry out periodic surveys both in the selected parishes and in other control parishes where no interventions are planned. The baseline and final levels for this indicator will be determined on the basis of the national Young Adult Reproductive Health Survey to be collected at the beginning and end of the ARH activity.

This indicator was selected instead of the adolescent birth rate because the Mission's technical advisors in adolescent reproductive health did not think that it would be possible to demonstrate a change in the adolescent birth rate over the life of the strategy and because national birth rate data are reported with a two year lag.

- (c) STDs: This will measure the incidence rate of infectious primary and secondary syphilis (cases/100,000 population for age groups 15-19 and 20-24). The data will be collected annually by the MOH/Epi Unit's clinic reports.

B. 1st Level Intermediate Results

The new Results Framework IRs are as follows:

- Increased use of reproductive health and HIV/STD prevention services;
- Improved knowledge and skills in reproduction, contraception and HIV/STD prevention; and
- Improved national policy for reproductive health of youth.

These three IRs have a cause and effect relationship with the SO (improved reproductive health of youth).

IR 1: Increased use of reproductive health and HIV/STD prevention services.

It is our belief that, with the increased use of services, low risk sexual behavior will increase, thereby protecting youth from early pregnancy, HIV and other STDs. This will contribute to higher educational attainment, better job opportunities and lower vulnerability to poverty among youth. Reproductive health and HIV/STD prevention services include counselling, supply of contraceptives, referrals and STD testing and treatment. There have been psychological and cultural barriers which include a lack of motivation to use protection and myths surrounding certain contraceptive usage. At present, youth have limited access to these services. In part, this is because existing services have not been "youth-friendly." Our new ARH activity will experiment with more "youth friendly" programs. Some of the new approaches will include services and contraceptive distribution at traditional and non-traditional outlets, such as clinics, teen centers, sporting events, youth clubs, bars and other places where youth gather.

Performance indicators:

- (a) Number of adolescents seeking reproductive health services - The institutional contractor for the ARH activity will develop the mechanism for collecting this information. The most likely method would be annual reporting consolidated from clinic reports at participating institutions in selected parishes.
- (b) Number of condoms distributed - The Epi Unit of the MOH will provide this information on a quarterly basis for condoms distributed islandwide through all mechanisms. While this is not youth-specific, it provides a proxy indicator of increases in condom availability to youth. It will be supplemented by other indicators (under IR 2) which will focus on youth.

- (c) Number of adolescents provided with emergency contraception in selected parishes - The institutional contractor for the ARH activity will develop the mechanism for collecting this information. The most likely method would be annual clinic reports from service providers in the selected parishes.

IR 2: Improved knowledge and skills in reproduction, contraception and HIV/STD prevention.

It is our belief that reductions in early pregnancies and the spread of HIV and other STDs will occur as youth learn more about and become more capable at addressing these issues. This depends on improving information available and increasing the level of understanding among youth.

Performance indicators:

- (a) Low risk behavior: This will measure the percentage of youth (10-14, 15-19, 20-24) practicing low risk sexual behavior. This is defined as either 12 months abstinence, 12 months with a single partner or 3 months consistent condom use. Baseline and target levels will be obtained from the KAP Survey biennially. In years without these national surveys, the institutional contractor for the ARH activity will collect data from the selected parishes as a proxy measure. These two sources will be supplemented every four years with the national Young Adult Reproductive Health Survey.
- (b) Condom use: This will measure the percent of youth (10-14, 15-19, 20-24) who report using a condom during their last sexual contact. By measuring both last condom use and consistent condom use (see above) for the same respondents, we will be able to see what share of those who used condoms last are also consistent condom users. Baseline and target levels will be obtained from the MOH's biennial KAP survey.
- (c) Percent youth seeking appropriate treatment of STDs: Youth need to be encouraged to recognize and seek treatment for STDs which, if left untreated, become more widespread and lead to poor reproductive health status as they become increasingly sexually active. Data will be collected from the biennial KAP Survey and National Lifestyle Survey on youth who had STDs over the past 12 months (based on self-assessment) and whether they sought appropriate treatment (based on MOH standard).

IR 3: Improved national policy for reproductive health of youth.

Improvements in national policies are important to the achievement of reproductive health of youth because policies establish the framework for all those working on reproductive health and demonstrate the country's commitment to addressing these issues.

Performance indicator:

- (a) Legislation enacted by Parliament to make HIV a notifiable disease by the Year 2001 - This is important because it enables contact tracing and thereby contributes to reducing the spread of the disease more widely. This will be tracked by following legislation through three stages--proposal to Parliament (as a green paper), approval by Parliament and enactment (publication in the official gazette).

C. Lower Level IRs

I.R. 1.1. Increased availability of reproductive health and HIV/STD services

Strengthening the capacity of existing organizations to provide counselling, contraceptives, referrals and STD testing and treatment will be an effective approach to increase the use of these services.

Performance indicators:

- (a) number of new non-traditional condom outlets islandwide - this will monitor new sites for condom distribution, such as bars and nightclubs, community youth gathering sites and gas stations. This is important since youth do not regularly seek out contraceptives from clinical sites. This information will come from distribution reports tracked quarterly by the MOH Epi Unit.
- (b) number of service delivery models evaluated and disseminated - this will monitor new models for delivering reproductive health services to adolescents. At present, few adolescents use existing clinics to obtain reproductive health services. Because service providers are convinced that adolescents will not use clinical services, few efforts have been directed to developing such services. In an effort to overcome adolescent reluctance to use services, the ARH program will introduce and evaluate models for service delivery. To demonstrate to service providers that success is possible, the successful models will be disseminated in order to encourage their adoption more widely. Evaluation will

signify preparation of a written assessment and dissemination will be through informational events with key stakeholders. This will be monitored annually through ARH program reports.

- (c) number of service sites with emergency contraception in selected parishes - since the new ARH activity will introduce this newly approved contraceptive method to health professionals, educators, counselors and the general public, this indicator will track the number of sites where staff are trained and supplies are available to provide emergency contraception. This will be tracked through program reports of the ARH activity.

I.R. 1.2 Increased use of STD testing and treatment

Performance indicators:

- (a) percent of youth attending STD clinics who receive appropriate treatment islandwide - since the MOH is seeking to improve compliance of public and private sector providers with MOH established standards for STD treatment, this indicator will monitor the share of youth (ages 15-19 and 20-24) who seek STD treatment who are treated according to MOH standards. This will be monitored annually by the MOH Epi Unit through sample case audits in the public sector and interviews with practitioners in the private sector.

I.R. 2.1 Increased public information on reproduction, contraception and HIV/STD prevention.

Young people who are better informed about the risks to their reproductive health status will be better able to make healthy choices.

Performance indicator:

- (a) Percent of youth who get information from different sources - this program disseminates information on reproduction, contraception and HIV/STD prevention and STD treatment through mass media including television and radio as well as through community-level sources including clinics. This indicator will track whether the key messages disseminated through the program are reaching the target audience (ages 10-14; 15-19; 20-24) and which of the vehicles are most appropriate. The information will be collected through the ARH survey and the KAP survey carried out under the MOH Epi Unit. These biennial surveys will be carried out in alternating years to provide data


annually. The results will be supplemented with those from the initial and final Young Adult Reproductive Health Survey.

- (b) Percent of youth who know two ways to prevent HIV transmission - this indicator will measure trends in awareness among youth (10-14; 15-19; 20-24) of HIV prevention methods. The MOH Epi Unit will track this information through the biennial KAP survey. These results will be supplemented with those from the initial and final Young Adult Reproductive Health Survey.

I.R. 2.2: Increased understanding to address issues of reproduction, contraception and HIV/STD prevention.

Performance indicators:

- (a) Percent of adolescents who discuss contraception and HIV/STD prevention with sexual partners - because the greatest gap identified in Jamaica for adolescent reproductive health is between knowledge and practice, this indicator seeks to monitor application of knowledge by adolescents in their actual sexual interactions. This will be monitored biennially through a survey of adolescents (10-14; 15-19) in selected parishes under the ARH program.
- (b) Percent of youth who know a nearby source of at least one modern contraceptive - similarly, this indicator seeks to track how well youth (aged 10-14; 15-19; 20-24) apply general knowledge on contraception to their own situations by monitoring whether they know where to obtain a contraceptive for their own use if they so desire. This will be monitored biennially through a survey under the ARH program and biennially through a KAP survey by the MOH Epi Unit. These biennial surveys will be carried out in alternating years to provide data annually.



Basic Education Strategic Objective Number 4 (SO4)

I. Overall Changes in Framework

As reflected in the Result Framework, the education sector will have a distinctive strategic objective of "Increased Literacy and Numeracy among Jamaican Youth in targeted Primary Schools."

The revised results framework clearly highlights a focus on literacy and numeracy and the conditions to create improvements in those two vital areas of primary school education. Chief among these conditions are more effective and relevant in-service teaching training and the utilization of supplementary materials in mathematics and literacy. During April and May, 1997, immediately after the presentation of the R4 in Washington, USAID/Jamaica developed an education sector strategy which, in great part, was both an assessment of present conditions in primary education and an open-minded examination of viable options for the future. The education strategy convinced the Mission of the need to concentrate, relatively, on up to 72 primary schools--roughly 10% of the primary schools in the country--in economically disadvantaged areas. Thus, the emphasis is on poorer youth. While there are less overt synergy and inter-action between education and health activities in this year's R4, school administration and governance and the roles of family and community in providing bulwarks for improved literacy and numeracy are discernably recognized.

II. Why the Change was Necessary

The advantage of more specificity, ease and significance of meaningful measurement of results, and, in retrospect, a few instances where fine tuning is needed with the previous framework are the principal reasons for the modifications.

Extensive consultation and discussion with Ministry of Education and Culture (MOEC) personnel, NGOs, and other donors persuaded USAID/Jamaica to build upon some positively acknowledged initiatives undertaken during the Mission's previous primary education project, the Primary Education Assistance Project II (PEAP II), which terminated in November, 1996. It became particularly evident during an education sector strategy and a successful education roundtable event that the training of additional resource teachers in mathematics and literacy would nicely complement the 144 mathematics resources teachers (MRTs) trained under PEIP

II, and that the National Assessment Programme, which received selected assistance previously, would benefit from targeted help in the systematic collection, processing, utilization and dissemination of student and school learning data.

The School-Community Outreach Program for Education (SCOPE) mobilized community involvement and support in primary schools, and provided some leadership training for school-community leaders in selected communities under PEAP II. The SCOPE model is omnipresent among many MOEC officials and school principals and teachers, and the schools which instituted the program under PEAP II are still carrying on the effort. Thus, New Horizons, our new primary education activity, includes improved school/parent/community involvement, limited allowance for school health and nutrition endeavors, and the effective functioning of PTAs. New Horizons will also extend to more schools the revised primary school mathematics curriculum, and will utilize the educational management information system (EMIS, which greatly assists educational planning), both developed under PEAP II.

The Mission during the last year has constantly had to eliminate educational goals and areas which need bolstering, but which are beyond our financial resources and manageable interests. For instance, there have been much concern and pressure to work in early childhood and pre-school education. While we recognize the immense importance of this area, the Mission feels that potential benefits are greater with youth ages 6-12. Moreover, other donors such as the Netherlands, UNICEF and, perhaps, the World Bank are working in pre-school education. Likewise, the Mission believes it does not have the resources to work in secondary education or technical-vocational education, despite their significance.

III. Results Description

A. SO Level Result: Increased Literacy and Numeracy Among Jamaican Youth in Targeted Primary Schools

Student learning and achievement in Jamaica, especially in mathematics, language arts and reading, have been on a general downward trend for nearly a generation. Boys in Jamaican primary schools, in contrast to other countries, have performed considerably below the level of girls in Mathematics and Language Arts. This gender difference will be addressed under the new education strategic objective activity, with the application of gender specific interventions based on the ongoing assessment of student performance. The anticipated increases in learning and achievement will be approximately equal for boys and girls, though girls begin and will result in having considerably higher scores than boys in all subject areas.

The results in the three above areas will be disaggregated by gender and rural/urban comparisons on standardized examinations given to students.

The SO level results are:

- (a) Increases in language arts scores (grades 3 and 6),
- (b) Literacy scores (grades 4 and 6), and
- (c) Mathematics scores (grades 3 and 6).

The principal source of data for all three will be the National Assessment Programme (NAP), conducted on an annual basis. Some baseline data exist at the NAP, particularly for grades 3 and 6 mathematics and language arts scores. The pilot examinations have yet to be field-tested for literacy in grades 4 and 6. An evaluation and research contractor under the New Horizons activity will assist in data analysis, utilization and reporting. Up to 72 schools will be selected by the MOEC, USAID and others involved in the New Horizons project.

B. First level intermediate results

Improved quality of teaching (IR 1), increased school attendance (IR 2), improved school/parent/community involvement (IR 3) and improved management of schools (IR 4) are the first level intermediate results we seek. Substantial progress in each of these will almost assuredly translate into marked advances with the SO level indicators and the SO itself. The improved quality of teaching will be indicated by student satisfaction levels and participation rates; that is, the percentage of students, disaggregated by gender and rural/urban, reporting a level of satisfaction with the quality of teaching, and observed participating in classwork, respectively. The New Horizons project, especially its monitoring and evaluation component, will be the data source. The PEIP process evaluation model, developed recently under an IDB-financed project, will be the method of data collection.

Increased school attendance will simply be the percentage of students, disaggregated by gender and rural/urban, in targeted schools attending classes five days per week. Assessments and surveys under the New Horizons project will measure progress or lack thereof. IR 3 will be gauged by the percentage of participating schools with a parent/community participation program, the percentage of parents attending grade level meetings, and the percentage of schools with community members/parents being used as resource persons, particularly for study circles. The percentage of target schools implementing a development plan, and the percentage of them meeting performance standards will measure the improved management of


schools (IR 4).

C. All Lower Level Intermediate Results (IRs)

Five IRs substantiate and help measure the improved quality of teaching (IR1). They are teacher mentoring program implemented (IR 1.1), teaching and assessment methods improved (IR 1.2), teachers meeting basic standards in literacy and mathematics (IR 1.3), adequate teaching supplies (IR 1.4), and that pupil-teacher ratios are rationalized in grades 1-3 (IR .5). These, and especially the first three, are significant in improving learning and achievement in literacy and mathematics. IR 1.1 is defined by the percentage of target schools that have mentors (resource teachers, education officers and teacher mentors) in literacy and mathematics. The utilization of teaching methods, practices and assessment activities will measure IR 1.2. Originally the Mission did not plan to supply supplementary school materials, but with the increasingly meager GOJ budget for education, it was decided that target schools should have minimum supplies of texts and instructional materials. All of these IRs will be measured annually through surveys conducted through the New Horizons project.

Implementation of special incentives programs (IR 2.1) and health and nutrition programs (IR 2.2) will help achieve increased school attendance (IR 2). The percentages of schools having programs with incentives to increase school attendance, with nutrition and health activities, and of schools conducting physical examinations/referrals (including learning disabilities) will be barometers of measurement. All targeted schools are expected to participate in a de-worming program, which involves the twice-annual application of a simple oral medicine (albendazole) to all children. It is hoped that the parent and community involvement in creating and maintaining school nutrition programs at selected sites under a previous USAID-assisted project (PEAP II) will be renewed in the coming four years.

Improved effectiveness of school boards (IR4.1), improved effectiveness of school principals and administrators (IR 4.2) and strengthened record keeping and database management (IR 4.3) are all lower level IRs to determine improved management of schools. In this area, as in several others, focused training in Jamaica and observational study in the United States to examine successful programs and useful techniques will be important. The measurement of these lower level IRs will depend in part upon the MOEC creating reliable performance standards that can be gauged by assessment methods. The performance indicators IR 4.3 will be the percentages of schools with accurate (usually computerized) student examination results, and schools with complete data on students. All of these data will be collected annually, principally through surveys and assessments related to the New Horizons project.



Strategic Support Objective (SSO): Caribbean Regional Program

I. Overall Changes in the Framework

The new Results Framework (RF) is more precise and definitive than the existing one. Priority is being given to implementing the protocols and agreements to which Caribbean countries have already committed themselves, rather than to defining new priorities. The priority is also to broadly implement practices that regional institutions have acknowledged as successful and viable. The new RF synthesizes environmental and disaster management. Most of the participants, both from USAID and Caribbean regional institutions, involved in developing the draft CRP Framework, shared a common theoretical foundation in ecology and environmental science. As such, the inclination was to understand and respond to the fundamental "relationships" within existing bio-physical systems. Thus the tendency was to see disaster management as an integral component of environmental management. The resulting synthesis is viewed as optimum for program design and implementation, and for yielding efficiency and sustainability benefits.

One more round of consultations with our partners, with the Caribbean Regional Environmental Strategy Design Team, and with the OFDA/LAC Strategy Team, along with further clarity about CRP budgetary resource levels, will be necessary to further refine and to specify the indicators at the SO and IR levels in the Results Framework. This is work in process. Also, the Mission is prepared to expand the scope of the portfolio beyond environmental and disaster management as appropriate and necessary.

II. Why the change was necessary

The two CRP environmental projects, ENCORE and CEN will be ending this year. A Caribbean Regional Environmental Strategy is currently being designed which shall give guidance to LAC for subsequent Caribbean regional initiatives. Also, the disaster mitigation project, CDMP, has been extended to the end of FY1999 and will be fully funded.

Follow-on and new disaster preparedness and mitigation activities will be designed within the context of a broader OFDA strategy for the LAC region, which will be finalized during the third quarter of FY1998. With these converging developments, it became necessary to define a new CRP portfolio and Results Framework. The new Results Framework reflects current priorities in the region as captured by the existing environmental and disaster management agreements and protocols to which the Caribbean countries have already committed themselves. As such, the Results Framework also reflects inherently regional concerns around which consensus has already been achieved among Caribbean states. Some of these agreements and protocols are not only regional, but also international in that countries from around the world, including the Caribbean, are signatories.

USAID/Jamaica/CRP invited Caribbean environmental and disaster management experts working with key Caribbean regional institutions, to join us as partners to identify strategic objectives that might be in the manageable interest of USAID/Jamaica/CRP. The results of this work will benefit the Environmental Strategy design team. It is also intended to benefit the Bureau and the Mission in determining the direction Caribbean regional programming for FY99 and forward. The participants from the regional institutions came prepared with their documentation to lay out in great detail the various agreements and protocols that merited additional attention. The participants began to look at the needs and then to look at CRP capability (assuming only straight line financing for the time being), in order to define the strategic Objective for CRP.

III. Results Description

A. Strategic Objective Level Result - The SO is "Selected Protocols and practices for reduced vulnerability to natural disasters and environmental degradation implemented across the region." The planned result is the implementation of regional and international protocols and agreements, or select portions of these protocols and agreements, to which the Caribbean countries have committed themselves, and the implementation of viable practices approved by key Caribbean regional institutions (practices which may support implementation of the specified protocols), which at the same time are in CRP/s manageable interests and capability to accomplish. Some of the protocols that have already been identified for focused attention or consideration are the:

- 1) United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS);
- 2) Cartagena Convention;
- 3) United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC);
- 4) Conservation of Biological Diversity (CBD);
- 5) International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (UN Agreement);
- 6) Disaster Mitigation and Sustainable Development (Summit of the Americas elements);

- 7) Association of Caribbean States (Disaster Mitigation Mandate);
- 8) Bridgetown Declaration (environment and disaster elements);
- 9) Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal;
- 10) Montreal Convention;
- 11) Convention on International Trade of Endangered Species (CITES); and
- 12) Caribbean Disaster and Emergency Response Agency (CDERA) Agreement, CARICOM

The source of the data for measuring the SO results will be primarily the regional and national institutions with key responsibility for implementing the protocols and practices. We are aware for example, that some of the regional institutions like CARICOM and OECS, and national institutions like Jamaica's NRCA, have developed matrices to show which elements of which protocols are being accomplished. The preferred practices will need to be identified for ascertaining the level of implementation and performance around these practices.

B. First-Level Intermediate Results:

Three first-level intermediate results have been identified:

- IR1) Improved linkages with the regional framework - In order to achieve optimum results with limited resources, increased and effective coordination, collaboration, and participation across sectoral, and public and private lines, is profoundly necessary to solve pressing problems and harness opportunities. The structures and linkages that are necessary to make this happen must be put in place.
- IR2) Relevant Institutional Capability Developed - The regional, national and local institutions must be equipped with the proper management, skills, equipment, experience to implement the protocols and practices.
- IR3) Financial Resources Allocated for Implementation of Protocols and Practices - Financial resources are also needed to purchase goods and services, and undertake the many interventions required by the protocols, some of which are very complex and capital and labor intensive

C. Lower Level Results


The next lower level of results includes seven IRs. One supports IR1, four support IR2, and two support IR3. Below this level, eight IRs have been identified as demonstrations of what constitutes achievement of the seven IRs above them.

When IR1 is achieved, joint programming mechanisms will have been developed and implemented. Some such mechanisms might include a Sustainable Development Council which includes the public sector, private sector and civil society institutions on its board.

When IR2 is achieved, model sectoral plans, particularly in agriculture and tourism will have been developed and disseminated for review and potential use by National Implementation Committees or other relevant national and local constituencies or organizations. Also, mechanisms to support community disaster preparedness and mitigation planning will have been implemented, such as disseminating "best practices" information and increasing the capability of communities to undertake and absorb these best practices. Achieving IR2 also means increased multi-sectoral participation, as shown by improved public commitment and transfers, and increased environmental and disaster management capability of professionals and technocrats. Finally, the accomplishment of IR2 means the establishment of integrated management systems as shown by the establishment of databases for monitoring and evaluation, along with the increased capability of professionals and technocrats as mentioned earlier. The Results Framework shows a link between the lower level IRs of "increased capability of professionals and technocrats" and "databases established for monitoring and evaluation", to show the interdependence of the two.

When IR3 is achieved, increased public and private sector financial resources are being channelled to environmental and disaster management, through cost recovery program, the implementation of appropriate economic instruments to internalize environmental costs in the national accounts and into production costs and consumption prices of selected goods and services. Also, when IR3 is achieved, specific priority protocols and their elements will have received funding for their implementation.

The source of information for the IR data will be relevant community, local, national and regional organizations. Again, we are awaiting the results from the Caribbean Regional Environmental Strategy and the OFDA/LAC Disaster Management Strategy to further develop a Framework and accompanying indicators.



* Priority Protocols: UNCLOS, Cartagena, UNFCCC, & CBD
 additional protocols that may be targeted: Montreal, Basel, CITES